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PROLOGUE 
What is past is more than prologue. Our actions one day influence 
our options for the next. Sometimes they influence our neighbors' op-
tions as well. 
These causal links between present circumstances and past acts 
often shape our intuitions about justice. We more readily accept an-
other's misfortune if we can say, "He did it to himself." We more 
readily accept another's success if we can say, "She earned it." 
Unfortunately, as all first-year law students learn, causation is a 
tricky notion. Causes in fact tend to be multiple and partial, and cul-
tures vary in their views about how much or how little volitional in-
volvement makes one the cause, the one "responsible" for a 
subsequent situation. 1 In particular, cultures vary in their willingness 
to assert that individuals have brought about their own misfortunes. 
One culture might deny food stamps to striking workers on the theory 
that the workers caused their own predicament. 2 A different culture 
1. See generally L. KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 210-51 (1987); Austin, Thelnsur-
ance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 559 (1983). 
2. See Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 377-80 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing argu-
ment of the Secretary of Labor); 117 CONG. REC. 21673 (1971) (we should "say to strikers what 
we have said to students, to hippies, and others - ' •.. if you are one of the voluntarily poor, you 
must look to your own resources for help' ") (remarks of Rep. Michel). 
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might excuse them from responsibility, concluding that an individual 
worker's action should not be considered in isolation, ·but should 
be situated within the broader context of labor-management 
negotiations. 3 
Those different approaches to assigning causal responsibility reflect 
more than different conceptions of the scope of individual free will. 
They also reflect different reactions to the possibility of "moral haz-
ard." The theory of moral hazard claims that people who are insured 
against the unfortunate consequences of their behavior are more likely 
to take risks than people who are not insured. 4 It claims, for example, 
that people with homeowners' insurance are less likely to lock their 
doors. A society that worries about the possibility of moral hazard 
womes that people who are excused from responsibility for their acts 
will take foolish risks that will ultimately harm the larger community. 
Societies that worrj about moral hazard have found a variety of 
mechanisms for mitigating its effects; most involve some version of 
splitting the difference. Thus, a society may agree _to insure against 
part of its members' suffering, hoping that the residual pain will suffice 
to discourage imprudent behavior. In so doing, the society acts like a 
health insurer that makes people pay deductibles or like an automobile 
insurer that protects negligent drivers against financial loss but cannot 
protect them against pain. 5 
Moral hazard can be viewed as a particularly interesting variant of 
a more general problem, a problem that goes by the name of "negative 
externalities" in the economics literature. Negative externalities arise 
whenever an actor does something that imposes costs on someone else. 
In moral hazard situations, that someone else is an insurer and the 
cost is imposed derivatively; the cost would fall on the actor were it 
not for an agreement shifting that cost to the insurer. In both the 
special case of moral hazard and the more general case of negative 
externalities, individuals may act contrary to the interests of the larger 
society. In each case, to the extent individuals are psychologically es-
tranged from those who must ultimately bear the costs of their actions, 
3. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 380-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
4. See generally K. ARROW, EssAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 142-43 (1971); c. 
HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION (1985). I use the term "moral hazard" in 
the arguably nonpejorative sense that it is used by economists. This use contrasts with that of 
insurers, who often refer to this phenomenon as "morale hazard" and use "moral hazard" to 
describe unsavory personal characteristics (such as a tendency to lie on insurance applications) 
that pre-date the issuance of insurance but may raise the risk of claim. See id. at 29-30, 35-37. 
5. In a comprehensive and thoughtful analysis, Carol Heimer refers to these strategies as 
efforts to transform "reactive risks" (risks that change as a result of the establishment of insur-
ance) into "fixed risks" (which do not change because other forces predominate over the effects 
of moral hazard). See C. HEIMER, supra note 4, at 28-48. 
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they may do things they would not do if they had to bear the costs 
themselves. 
Perhaps the central function of civil society is to create institutions 
- of law, of custom, of manners - that will le~d people to think 
about others. Institutions that will make them feel the consequences 
of their acts, even when those consequences might seem to afflict only 
others. Institutions that will make them internalize externalities and 
that will make them act with a sense of responsibility for themselves 
and others. 6 When such societal institutions fail, citizens take impru-
dent risks. 
I shall describe the failures of such societal institutions - situa-
tions in which individual self-interest is allowed to diverge from com-
munal self-interest - as instances of "social irresponsibility." By that 
term I mean traditional cases of moral hazard: cases in which people 
(whether by act or omission) take risks they would not othenvise take 
because they have shifted the costs of injury to an insurer. I also mean 
those cases in which people do things that impose costs on others but 
would act differently if they had to bear the costs themselves. 
This definition of social irresponsibility does not include all situa-
tions that involve negative externalities. Specifically, it excludes situa-
tions where people who escape some of the costs of their actions would 
not behave any differently if they had to bear all those costs. More-
over, it includes many cases in which (notwithstanding the somewhat 
confusing term "moral hazard") people's behavior would ultimately 
be characterized as perfectly moral, even desirable. 7 The definition is 
structured to embrace a class of actions that we ought to find suspi-
cious: actions that occur only because people do unto others what 
they would not do unto themselves. 
Conceptions of familial obligation, especially the obligation of par-
ent to child, are central to the enterprise of containing social irrespon-
sibility. Enlightened modern welfare states try to take care of children 
whose needs are not met by their parents. Of course, there is always a 
risk that such state generosity might ultimately harm its beneficiaries 
by stimulating irresponsible parental conduct. To minimize that risk, 
6. Cf. T. SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 127-28 (1978) (describing in-
stitutional arrangements to overcome "divergences between perceived individual interest and 
some larger collective bargain"). One need not, of course, justify social responsibility in purely 
instrumental terms - as a mechanism promoting efficiency or enforcing a collective bargain 
among autonomous individuals. Responsible behavior can also be deemed an intrinsically good 
element of human social existence. 
7. For example, the fact that a poor person might not see a doctor if she had to pay the bill 
herself tells us nothing about whether it is wrong for her to see the doctor if she knows that 
Medicaid will pay. Indeed, it is the goal of many in-kind social welfare programs to allow people 
to incur certain costs that they would not otherwise incur. 
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states rely on a mixture of legal sanction, · social stigma, and 
noneconomic reward. Love is linked to duty. Parents who sacrifice 
for their children are extolled; those who gobble up their children's 
seed com are roundly criticized. 
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to questions of 
intergenerational obligation, even intergenerational obligation outside 
the family context. Alarm is growing over whether our country is 
consuming too much, saving too little, and collectively selling out our 
children. Much of the popular and academic literature about the 
budget deficit is in substantial part an effort to shore up our sense of 
responsibility for those who will come after. 8 
In this article, I shall try to illuminate the question of how govern-
ments, as opposed to private insurers, grapple with the problem of 
intergenerational social irresponsibility. I shall do so by analyzing and 
criticizing a single public program. That program, the Michigan Edu-
cation Trust (MET), was the most widely publicized government ac-
tion in the field of higher education finance during the 1980s. MET 
allows parents of young children to purchase contracts promising to 
cover the children's tuition at Michigan public colleges when they en-
roll up to eighteen years later. 
Part I considers MET's justification in the abstract. It reviews the 
historical relationship among college tuitions, family incomes, and in-
vestment returns. It contends that, although one can think of several 
plausible and legitimate reasons why a state might create a prepaid 
college tuition program such as MET, the most interesting is as a re-
sponse to a risk of incipient social irresponsibility. For the availability 
of financial aid to college students has created a risk of social irrespon-
sibility in certain parents of college-bound children. 
Part II considers the behavior of MET's Board of Directors in a 
specific context. By far the most important issue that the MET Board 
has confronted was how much to charge participants during the pro-
gram's first year of operations. That question required the Board to 
act in the face of some subtle but not unusual uncertainties. The 
Board responded to those uncertainties by charging an extremely low 
price for MET contracts. Such a price can be justified only by making 
some assumptions about how MET will be taxed by the federal gov-
ernment - assumptions that I conclude are rather daring. Perhaps 
even more significantly, the low price cari be justified only by assuming 
that college tuition inflation in the future will stop outpacing invest-
8. E.g., P. COURANT & E. GRAMLICH, FEDERAL BUDGET DEFICITS 27 (1986); B. FRIED-
MAN, DAY OF RECKONING (1988); P. LONGMAN, BORN TO PAY (1987); Rauch, Kids as Capital, 
264 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug. 1989, at 56. 
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ment returns, an assumption that reverses the historical pattern and 
clashes with the most commonly articulated public justification for 
having a program such as MET. 
Part III returns to the more general level. It explores the variety of 
consequences - distributional and educational - that may flow from 
the MET Board's action. It then speculates about why the MET 
Board took such a risk. It considers what insights may be gleaned by 
describing the behavior of MET's Board of Directors as an ironic ex-
ample of the social irresponsibility that a program such as MET might 
have been designed to address. And it identifies certain features of 
MET's administrative and bureaucratic history - features that recur 
in a variety of public programs - that may have facilitated socially 
irresponsible behavior. 
In setting forth this case study, I also attempt to develop a secon-
dary theme. I shall argue that efforts to justify or criticize public pro-
grams should always incorporate assessments of who the programs' 
beneficiaries are likely to be, specifically of where in the income distri-
bution they are likely to lie. Thus, while Part I argues that a program 
such as MET might plausibly be defended as a check on social irre-
sponsibility, it concludes that plausible justifications are not enough. 
Programs should be justified by comparison with alternative programs 
addressed to the same goals, and an essential element of the compari-
son should be the programs' relative effects on political or economic 
inequalities. Part III carries the same theme from the world of ex ante 
justification into the world of ex post evaluation. Programs must be 
implemented, and policy analysts must be sensitive to the ways in 
which the process of implementation can exacerbate a program's dis-
tributional costs. 
I. JUSTIFYING MET: TUITION INFLATION, INVESTMENT 
RETURNS, STUDENT LOANS, AND SOCIAL 
IRRESPONSIBILITY 
In this Part, I offer a critical review of several possible justifications 
for creating a prepaid college tuition program. My aim is not to de-
scribe the personal motives of the individual legislators who happen to 
have supported the creation of such a program in Michigan. Nor is it 
to give a historical report of the justifications that were given to the 
public. Rather, it is to survey the range of public purposes that might 
plausibly have been invoked in support of such a program, and to raise 
questions about how one ought to evaluate the sufficiency of those 
justifications. 
I begin by presenting a brief review of the history and structure of 
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the Michigan Education Trust. I then evaluate the most widely publi-
cized justification for MET: the assertion that tuition inflation was 
racing out of control, and that MET offered a way to keep college 
affordable for children who would otheI'Wise be le_ft behind. I argue 
that, while the fear that college is becoming less affordable is in some 
ways understandable, it is less well justified than is often assumed. 
I next argue that, even assuming the legitimacy of individuals' pri-
vate fears about tuition inflation, they cannot establish an adequate 
public justification for a particular programmatic response in the ab-
sence of information about the likely position of program participants 
within the income distribution. In MET's case, those private concerns 
would seem to call for a more broad-based public response than MET 
provides, a response whose benefits are more equally distributed 
throughout society. 
I then consider three justifications that appeal to more public con-
cerns, justifications drawn from the literature of market failure. The 
possibility that MET might be defended as a remedy for the absence of 
tuition insurance in the private marketplace seems more hypothetical 
than real. It seems equally hypothetical to characterize MET as a cor-
rective to monopoly pricing. The most plausible of the three "market 
failure" justifications is that imperfect information about investment 
opportunities is leading parents to invest less efficiently than they 
might. Yet, even in combination, these justifications do not seem to 
add much to the case for a program having MET's particular struc-
ture. The central problem in each case is that MET is only a partial 
response to each concern, a response whose benefits are channeled to 
the most financially secure segment of the pool of potentia~ly eligible 
participants. 
Finally, I outline a less conventional justification for prepaid tui-
tion programs such as MET. I raise the possibility that MET might be 
defended as a response to incipient social irresponsibility, as an effort 
to ensure that the widespread perception that tuition was out of control · 
would not lead parents to abandon responsibility for paying for their 
children's educations. I conclude that, while such a justification is in 
many ways more defensible than the more traditional ones, it depends 
upon some empirical assumptions that are sufficiently debatable that 
one would want to be careful to guarantee that the possible public 
benefits were not dwarfed by other social costs. 
A. Introduction: The Essential Structure of the Michigan 
Education Trust 
The Michigan Education Trust is the nation's first government-
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sponsored prepaid college tuition program. MET sells contracts to 
parents (and grandparents) of children, promising to pay the tuition 
(including all mandatory fees but not room and board) of any benefici-
ary child who ends up attending one of Michigan's fifteen public 
colleges.9 
Governor James Blanchard first proposed a state-run prepaid tui-
tion program in his State of the State Address on January 30, 1986. 
He introduced the proposal by noting widespread parental fears that 
college was becoming less and less affordable: 
I share the deep concern of parents of young children who fear that they 
cannot honestly promise their children the hope of a higher education at 
a Michigan public university. 
Their anxiety comes from reports that by the year 2000 . . . inflation 
and other factors could drive the cost of tuition at a public university to 
$20,000 or more. IO 
Governor Blanchard continued by calling for a public response to that 
anxiety: 
By using the combined investment power of Michigan, a higher interest 
rate can be earned and compounded without taxation. This can be made 
to work ... in much the same way as widely used IRA's are being used 
for retirement. 
This will not be a giveaway program or require additional state 
expenditures. 
Instead, it will be an investment program designed to help parents 
guarantee to their children the opportunity of a Michigan college 
education. I I 
Thus, as originally conceived, MET was to be a self-financing invest-
ment and tuition insurance program. I2 MET would take advantage of 
the fact that the federal government does not tax states' incomes to 
provide "higher interest rates ... compounded without taxation." By 
borrowing federal tax shelter from the state in that manner, MET 
would offer better-than-market returns to parents saving for college. 
In that broad outline, MET was solidly in the tradition of the most 
prominent private-sector tuition initiatives of the 1980s, 13 and set the 
9. Some four-year degree-granting postsecondary institutions are called "universities," others 
are called "colleges." In this article, I shall use the term "colleges" to encompass all such four-
year institutions. Note that, as I use the term, I am not including two-year community colleges 
and junior colleges. 
10. 1986 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 152. 
11. Id. 
12. As initially proposed, MET was known as "BEST" - the Baccalaureate Education Sav-
ings Trust. It changed acronyms in the state legislature. 
13. During the summer of 1985, Duquesne University began selling tuition futures to alumni 
parents. The contracts provided that beneficiary children could attend Duquesne at no extra 
charge, but that if a child did not begin college at Duquesne, the parent would receive his or her 
principal back with no interest. Risk-Pool Financing and Future Enrollments, ADMINISTRATOR, 
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standard for the public-sector efforts that would follow. 14 
The Michigan legislature responded briskly to Governor 
Blanchard's proposal, and he signed the Michigan Education Trust 
Act before the end of 1986.15 The Act created MET as an autono-
mous subunit within the Michigan Department ofTreasury. 16 MET is 
managed by a nine-member Board of Directors.17 Its assets are not 
considered state money and may not be loaned or transferred to the 
state (although they may be pooled with state pension funds for invest-
ment purposes).18 If MET becomes insolvent, the state has no statu-
tory obligation to bail it out; rath_er, whatever assets of MET remain 
are to be immediately prorated among the investors. 19 
The Act prohibited MET from selling any contracts until it had 
obtained a ruling from the Internal Revenue Service that parents who 
purchased them would not owe any additional income tax as a re-
Feb. 10, 1986, at 1. In March 1988, after selling 622 contracts, Duquesne suspended sales amid 
concerns about whether the school was losing too much money in the program. Evangelaut, 
Duquesne U. Suspends Pioneering Prepaid-Tuition Plan,· Nationwide, the Concept Meets Growing 
Resistance, Chronicle of Higher Educ., Mar. 16, 1988, at A35. Approximately 12 other colleges 
adopted similar plans, but few found many takers. Id. The most recent school to announce such 
a program is Indiana University. Indiana U. Offers Parents a Chance to Buy Credit Hours in 
Advance, far Use After 1990, Chronicle of Higher Educ., Dec. 14, 1988, at A26. 
In Jufy 1989, a closely held Minnesota corporation announced a plan to organize a consor-
tium of prepaid tuition plans that would allow for freer transfer of tuition prepayment credits 
across schools than the earlier plans. Putka, Group of Educators Backs Tuition-Prepayment Plan, 
Wall St. J., July 18, 1989, at Bl, col. 3. 
A slightly different approach was taken by a New Jersey bank in September 1987, when it 
began selling the "CollegeSure CD,'' a variable-rate certificate of deposit that bears interest at a 
rate equal to 1.5% below the rate of inflation in the IC 500 Index. The IC 500 Index is calcu-
lated by the College Board and is designed to reflect the cost of tuition, fees, room, and board at 
500 private four-year colleges. COLLEGE SAVINGS BANK, ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FRE-
QUENTLY AsKED ABOUT THE CoLLEGESURE CD (1987). The certificates are insured by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation but do not guarantee that any particular college's tuition 
will track the index. Moreover, annual earnings are subject to federal income taxation. 
14. Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Maine, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming all enacted prepaid tuition programs along the general lines of MET. Of these, Florida, 
Wyoming, Ohio, and West Virginia have actually implemented the program by selling eontracts. 
The California legislature enacted a prepaid tuition bill, but it was vetoed by the Governor. 
In addition, 17 states have enacted or authorized special college-oriented savings bond pro-
grams. The programs do not guarantee that their interest payments will keep up with tuition 
inflation, but some of them offer bonus interest payments if the bonds are used to pay for higher 
education expenses and all are exempt from state and federal income taxes. See generally Michi-
gan Education Trust, Status of Other States, (revised June 16, 1989). 
In 1988, Congress amended the Internal Revenue Code to provide that interest on EE Sav-
ings Bonds purchased by adults on or after January 1, 1990, will be exempt from federal income 
taxation if the proceeds are used for certain higher education expenses and the taxpayer's modi-
fied adjusted gross income is below an inflation-adjusted ceiling. 1.R.C. § 135 (West Supp. 1989). 
15. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 390.1421-.1444 (West 1988). 
16. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 390.1425 (West 1988). 
17. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 390.1430 (West 1988). 
18. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.1429. (2), (4) (West 1988). 
19. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 390.1433 (West 1988). 
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sult.20 On.March 29, 1988, the IRS issued the requisite ruling.21 Un-
fortunately for MET, however, the IRS also ruled that the Trust 
would have to pay federal income taxes on its annual net earnings. 
(The ruling thus undermined a central financial premise of Governor 
Blanchard's initial proposal - the assumption that MET, unlike indi-
vidual parents but like the state of Michigan, would be immunized 
from federal income taxation. )22 
During the summer of 1988, MET announced a price schedule for 
the first year's contracts. The cost of a MET contract covering four 
years of tuition ranged from about $6800 for a newborn baby to about 
$9200 for a child entering tenth grade in the fall of 1988. During Au-
gust, nominal registration fees were paid to reserve places in the pro-
gram for more than 82,000 children. 23 Out of that pool, just under 
39,000 contracts were purchased before the deadline of November 30, 
1988, at a total purchase cost of more than one-quarter of a billion 
dollars.24 
The contracts provide that MET will cover the state-resident tui-
tion for any MET beneficiary who attends a Michigan public college. 
If the child does not attend a Michigan public college, he or she can 
obtain a cash refund in an amount that depends upon what the child 
does instead. 25 
B. Why Parents Might Want a Prepaid Tuition Program: The 
Relationship Among Tuition Inflation, Income, and 
Investments 
Tuition inflation had been attracting widespread national media at-
tention when Governor Blanchard spoke.26 People were worrying 
20. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 390.1433 (3) (West 1988). 
21. The ruling has been released to the public, in "sanitized" form, as Priv. Ltr. Rut. 88-25· 
027 (March 29, 1988). 
22. See statement quoted supra text accompanying note 11. The ruling also indicates that 
when the child ultimately enters college, he or she will be taxed each year on the difference 
between one year of the then-prevailing tuition at that school and the amount that was originally 
paid for one year of the MET contract. 
23. See Pay-Now, Learn-Later Plan Proves Popular in Michigan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1988, 
at AS, col. 5. 
24. COOPERS & LYBRAND, MICHIGAN EDUCATION TRUST ACTUARY'S REPORT ON 1988 
ENROLLMENTS 1, 5-11 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ACTUARY'S REPORT]. Roughly an additional 
1500 contracts (having a purchase cost of about $4 million) were sold that provide for more 
restricted benefits than the standard contract described in the text. 
25. See infra text accompanying notes 68-85. 
26. See, e.g., Ahead: Another Big Jump in College Tuition, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 
8, 1985, at 60; "Tuition Shock" Awaits College Students in Fall, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Apr. 16, 1984, at 69; Noah, Highbrow Robbery: The Colleges Call It Tuition, We Call It Plunder, 
WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 1983, at 16; College Costs: The Good News and the Bad, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 11, 1983, at 56. 
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about whether they would be able to give their children the same op-
portunities for higher education that their parents had given them. 
Some were speculating that the task was futile. Before considering 
whether MET is a justifiable public response to such speculation, it is 
appropriate to consider the extent to which it is grounded in economic 
reality. 
FIGURE 1 
Real Tuition Inflation (Smoothed) 
At Four-Year Colleges and Universities 
1Q.Q%,....---------------------.... .----. 
---us Private 
"*'" US Public 
..... 
Ml Public 
70-71 75-76 80-81 84-85 
Academic Year 
Figure 1 shows "real" tuition inflation over the past quarter-
century. It shows the extent to which average annual tuition inflation 
has outrun general price inflation27 (a) at private four-year colleges 
27. To transform nominal tuition inflation into real tuition inflation, one takes the geometric 
difference between the rate of nominal tuition inflation and the rate of general price inflation 
from year to year. The geometric difference between PCT1 and PCT2 is (1 + PCT1)/(1 + PCT2) 
- 1. The geometric difference is a more accurate reflection of relative changes in costs than the 
arithmetic difference (PCT1 - PCTi). For example, if prices generally double and tuition triples, 
tuition relatively speaking has become half again as expensive as it used to be. The geometric 
difference (50%) reflects that; the arithmetic difference (100%) does not. 
As a measure of general price inflation, I used the linear average of the 12 CPI-U-Xl figures 
for the July 1 through June 30 period that includes each academic year (that is, I added up the 12 
numbers and divided the total by 12). The CPI-U-Xl is a more accurate reflection of consumer 
price inflation than the CPI-U (indeed, since January 1983 the CPI-Uhas been calculated using 
the CPI-U-Xl methodology). See generally Gillingham & Lane, Changing the Treatment of 
Shelter Costs for Homeowners in the CPL MONTHLY LAB. RE.V., June 1982, at 9 (explaining the 
change from CPI-U to a modified CPI-U-Xl). 
The CPI-U-Xl is the most appropriate price inflation measure for an analysis of the costs 
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and universities nationwide,28 (b) at public four-year colleges and uni-
versities nationwide, and (c) at Michigan public colleges.29 The first 
three sets of points on the graph reflect tuition inflation "smoothed" 
over five-year intervals; the last two sets reflect tuition inflation 
smoothed over four-year intervals. 
This graph reveals several items of interest. Nationally, public col-
leges became relatively more expensive (compared to other consumer 
goods and services) during the late 1960s, stayed roughly level (in real 
terms) during the 1970s, and then became relatively more expensive 
again during the 1980s. Private colleges followed a similar pattern, 
but consistently outpaced the public colleges. And, except during the 
early 1980s, Michigan's public colleges were getting more expensive at 
a faster rate than even the typical private college nationwide.3° For all 
categories, real tuition inflation during the 1980s was a return to the 
higher levels of the late 1960s after a brief reprieve during the 1970s.31 
faced by consumers of higher education. A more specialized Higher Education Price Index 
("HEPI") follows the price of goods and services purchased by colleges, the producers of higher 
education. The HEPI is less volatile than the CPI, largely because colleges spend about three 
quarters of their budget on personnel compensation, which is less volatile than consumer prices 
generally. See generally NATL. INsr. OF EDUC., INFLATION MEASURES FOR SCHOOLS AND 
COLLEGES 37-54 (1983) (describing HEPI and comparing changes in HEPI and other measures 
of prices); RESEARCH Assocs. OF WASH., HIGHER EDUCATION PRICES AND PRICE INDEXES: 
1988 UPDATE (1988). 
28. Nationwide private and public tuition figures for the period from 
0
1976-1977 through 
1987-1988 were supplied to me by Tom Snyder of the U.S. Department of Education. U.S. 
DEPT. OF EDUC., DIGESf OF EDUCATION STATISTICS Table 218 (forthcoming 1990). 
For the period from 1964-1965 through 1975-1976, Table 218 does not provide a composite 
for four-year institutions but rather gives separate tuition figures for "universities" on the one 
hand and "other 4-year institutions" on the other. I extrapolated composite figures for that 
period by taking a weighted average of the two sets given, with the weight reflecting the average 
implicit in the aforementioned 1976-1977 to 1987-1988 figures. 
For the 1988-1989 academic year, I rescaled tuition figures published by the College Entrance 
Examination Board in a press release dated August 5, 1988, so that they would mesh with the 
Department of Education figures. 
29. I am grateful to Marcea Metzler for her assistance in preparing the data on Michigan 
public colleges. She obtained raw figures on tuition and enrollments at each of the 15 Michigan 
public colleges for the period from 1968-1969 to 1988-1989 from Edna Letzau at the President's 
Council _on State Universities of Michigan. The figures used in the text reflect calculated average 
tuitions at Michigan public colleges for resident students, weighted by Michigan-resident fiscal-
year:. equated enrollment at each tuition level Uuniors and seniors pay more than freshmen and 
sophomores at.some schools). 
I expanded the time frame back an additional three years by obtaining raw figures on tuition 
and enrollments for the years 1965-1966 and 1966-1967 from the state archives in Lansing, 
Michigan. A Budgetary Analysis of the 4-Y ear State-Supported Colleges and Universities for 
fiscal years 1966-1967, 1965-1966 & 1964-1965, Subject Files, 1963-1969, State Appropriations, 
1963~1967, RG 78-104, Box 3, Folder 7; Higher Education Selected Basic Data, Subject Files, 
1963-1969, Colleges an_d Universities, 1966-1967, RG 78-104, Box l, Folder 5; Fact Sheet No. 3, 
Subject Files, 1963-1969, Colleges and Universities, 1966-1967, RG 78-104, Box 1, Folder 5, I 
obtained a 1967-1968 figure by interpolating between the 1966-1967 and 1968-1969 figures. 
30. For speculation about why that may be, see infra note 104. 
31. I do not know why tuition inflation consistently outruns price inflation more generally. 
Two prominent economists have argued that, in some labor-intensive service industries, fewer 
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But such a summary graph tells only part of the story. For one 
thing, it shows only the rate of change in tuition levels. It says nothing 
about the absolute level of tuition. For another, it compares changes 
in tuition rates with changes in prices generally. That comparison fails 
to reflect the fact that during some periods family incomes have kept 
up with price inflation, but during others they have not. 
We can get a different perspective by comparing average tuition 
levels with the median income of an American family:32 
technology-driven productivity gains are possible than in sectors of the economy that produce 
goods entering into the CPI. See W. BAUMOL & w. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS: THE Eco-
NOMIC DILEMMA ch. VII (1966). My suspicion is that, as a descriptive matter, this argument 
accounts for part, but not all, of the disparity. See generally Bowen, Economic Pressures on the 
Major Private Universities, in JOINT EcoNOMIC COMMITIEE, 91sr CoNG., lsr SESS., THE Eco-
NOMICS AND FINANCING OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 399 (Joint Comm. 
Print 1969) [hereinafter EcoNOMICS AND FINANCING]; s. HARRIS, HIGHER EDUCATION: RE-
SOURCES AND FINANCE 557-67 (1962); Harris, Financing of Higher Education: Broad Issues, in 
FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION 35, 43 (D. Keezer ed. 1959) [hereinafter Harris, Broad Issues]; 
see also Hauptman & Hartle, Tuition Increases Since 1970: A Perspective, HIGHER EDUC. & 
NATL. AFF., Feb. 23, 1987, at 5, 6-7. 
I do not have strong views about whether higher education could or should show more tech-
nology-driven productivity gains. For purposes of this article, the consequence (positive real 
tuition inflation) rather than the cause is what matters. 
32. I calculated academic-year median family income by averaging consecutive calendar year 
figures as reported in BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MONEY INCOME OF 
HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1987, at 34 (Current Popula-
tion Reports, Series P-60, No. 162, February 1989} [hereinafter 1987 MONEY INCOME]. 
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FIGURE 2 
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Figure 2 appears to lend credence to the view that a college education 
was rapidly becoming less affordable during the early 1980s in a way 
that it had not been during the 1960s. During the late 1960s, real 
family incomes were growing as fast as real tuitions. 33 During the 
1980s they were not. This graph seems to validate the widespread 
perception that families in the 1980s are substantially worse off than 
their counterparts had been in the 1960s.34 
Of course, there are several plausible objections to the use of Fig-
ure 2 as a justification for public policy. To begin with, one might 
question whether the median family income is a reference point that 
ought to have any normative policy significance. One might contend 
that attention should be limited to the median family income of those 
families whose children will end up going to college. Since children 
from high-income families are more likely to go to college and since 
the median high-income family has been doing better than the median 
33. The best available evidence suggests income growth has generally outpaced tuition in-
creases since the turn of the century, except for an exceptional period of tuition growth during 
the 1950s. Sees. HARRIS, supra note 31, at 67-71, 77, SS, 137-48; see also R. FREEMAN, CRISIS 
IN COLLEGE FINANCE? 97-99 (1965); Harris, Broad Issues, supra note 31, at 56. 
34. For a wide-ranging survey of various aspects of family well-being during that period, see 
F. LEVY, DOLLARS AND DREAMS 45-73 (1987). 
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family over the past fifteen years, such a limitation would make the 
information revealed by Figure 2 seem less disturbing. 
That objection, however, is inappropriate. It depends upon an im-
plicit assumption that the current distribution of children attending 
college is completely independent of the price of tuition. In the ab-
sence of such an (implausible, I would say) assumption, it remains a 
matter of public policy concern if college is becoming less affordable 
for the median family, even if it were not becoming less affordable for 
those who can presently afford it. I would offer a similar response to 
the argument that Figure 2 overstates the squeeze on parents by not 
reflecting the fact that family sizes were shrinking during this period, 
so that each family had fewer potential students to worry about. 35 
A second objection to the use of Figure 2 is far more compelling, 
for reasons that call into question the use of such percentage-of-in-
come graphs in any policy debate. The probler_n has to do with the 
way in which graphs can dull our skeptical faculties. When we see a 
graph, our eyes tend to focus on the slope. Things sloping upward or 
downward make us nervous or happy; things that look horizontal 
seem safe.36 But we must always ask whether we really want a hori-
zontal line. 
Why should tuition remain a constant percentage of family in-
come? If, after taking inflation into account, incomes still go up, why 
does one deserve sympathy for being unable to spend the new, extra 
dollars in the same way as the old? If, after taking into account 
changes in the prices of food, shelter, clothing, health care, and every-
thing else that is factored into the consumer .price index, I still have 
extra money, in what sense am I "cramped" if I have to spend more 
than my customary twenty percent on college? 
Figure 3 reflects the opposite normative assumption from the pre-
ceding graph. It answers the following question: If the median Amer-
ican family made higher education for children its number one 
priority, paying exactly one year's tuition "off the top" of every annual 
35. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN FAMILY INCOME: 1970-1986 (1988), 
for a study using equivalence scales to adjust median family income to reflect changes in family 
size. The study even offers a measure for median family income of families with children. Id. at 
71. Unfortunately, the CBO figures span only part of the period for which I have tuition figures. 
Nevertheless, using the CBO figures, when they are available, causes the United States and Mich-
igan public college lines to flatten out so that the 1986-1987 figures are little different from the 
1965-1966 figures; it dampens but does not eliminate the sharp upsurge in private college 
tuitions. 
36. Obviously, slope can be manipulated by simply rescaling the axes, a troublesome point in 
its own right. See generally D. HUFF, How To LIE WITH STATISTICS 60-65 (1954). For a 
perceptive discussion of the more general problems of ethical integrity in graphing, see the mag-
nificent work of Edward Tufte, E. TUFfE, THE VISUAL DISPLAY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMA-
TION 53-87 (1983). 
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paycheck, how much would it have left to spend on other things, after 
taking inflation into account? During the early 1980s, such a family 
would have slipped back from the high-water mark it had reached 
during the 1970 s. But even during the worst part of the 1980 s, such a 
family would have been unambiguously better off than its predecessor 
was back in the 1960 s. 
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To be sure, one ought to consider whether it is in a sense cheating 
to take tuition "off the top."37 Why not take housing or food or 
37. The slope of the curve in Figure 3 is affected by one assumption that bears emphasis -
the assumption that the family is paying exactly one year's tuition out of current income. If the 
family under consideration were paying tuition for two children at private colleges out of current 
income each year, its real after-tuition income in the 1980s would indeed be as low as that of a 
comparable family in the 1960s. Conversely, if one were comparing younger families in the 
1960s and 1980s, trying to save less than one year's tuition each year while the children were 
young, the slope would be even more positive. See 1987 MONEY INCOME, supra note 32, at 62-
63. 
Finally, if one is interested purely in the question of whether parents of college-aged children 
are being squeezed, one also ought to take room-and-board expenses into account. In fact, com-
bined room-and-board charges did not change significantly in real terms between the 1965-1966 
academic year and the 1982-1983 academic year. Since that time, however, they have risen 
sharply in real terms at both private and public institutions. See U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., supra 
note 28, Table 218 (forthcoming 1990). That rise is only partially accounted for by the real 
increase in food and rental costs more generally. See 1989 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. 
OF CoMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 469 (Tables 758, 759). 
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automobiles or movies off the top? That question is precisely my 
point. People will indeed differ over what the first extra dollar of new 
income should be spent on. Some would prefer to spend more money 
on housing or food or automobiles and less on higher education. But a 
horizontal line in Figure 3 suggests that the median family can main-
tain precisely its level of consumption of all those other items and still 
keep up with tuition. 38 
I do not deny that a family receiving the median income can in 
some senses be said to be experiencing a tuition squeeze. But such a 
squeeze is not simply a function of the relationship between tuition 
and income. It must also reflect a preference (or need) to consume 
more of some other good or service than the median family used to 
consume.39 
For purposes of analysis, however, let us assume that this histori-
cal relationship between tuition and income justifies some public re-
sponse. Does that assumption also justify a response in the form of a 
prepaid tuition program? No. A prepaid tuition program assists only 
those families who have or can borrow the money needed to partici-
pate. It does not respond to the needs of families who are implicitly 
portrayed in Figure 3, families who are attempting to pay tuition out 
of current labor income.40 Rather, it responds to the needs of families 
who are willing and able to set aside money for their children's higher 
education up to eighteen years in advance. In the words of Governor 
Blanchard, a prepaid tuition program is "an investment program 
designed to help parents guarantee to give their children the opportu-
Whether such a rise should be as troublesome as a tuition rise turns on whether one believes that 
living on campus rather than at home is part of a college education or a matter of discretionary 
consumption. 
38. One item clearly should come "off the top" before tuition: income taxes. (The Census 
Bureau's definition of income is pre-tax.) Between 1977 and 1988, the median family enjoyed a 
slight reduction in the effective rate of individual income taxes, but that reduction was slightly 
more than offset by increases in social insurance taxes. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, 
THE CHANGING DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL TAXES: 1975-1990, at 47-48 (1987) [hereinafter 
CHANGING DISTRIBUTION]. 
Moreover, as a technical matter, the adjustment to after-tuition income should be made using 
a Consumer Price Index that does not itself take tuition into account. In fact, college tuition 
accounts for only 1.17% of the CPI market basket, so omitting it would have no noticeable effect 
on the graph. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2329, 
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF COMPONENTS IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEXES, 1988, at 7 
(1989). 
39. It might also reflect disagreement with the weighting system used by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics in creating the Consumer Price Index market basket. If one thinks that shelter costs, 
for example, should be 40% rather than 27.8% of the so-called market basket, then one's own 
personalized CPI would show more inflation in recent years than the official figures. See, e.g., 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED REPORT: APRIL 1989, 
at 7. 
40. A median family's income is about 75% labor earnings and 9% investment earnings. 
CHANGING DISTRIBUTION, supra note 38, at 68-69. 
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nity of a ... college education."41 
Since a prepaid tuition program is a program for people with 
money to invest, it is sensible to ask whether investment earnings 
(rather than family income generally) have kept up with tuition infla-
tion historically. Figure 4 shows what would have happened to two 
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pools of money invested during the 1965-1966 academic year. The 
first pool of $1158 was equal to the national average of one year's tui-
tion at a private college that year; the second pool of $314 was equal to 
the average tuition at a Michigan public college. Half of each pool 
was invested in common stocks, half in long-term corporate bonds.42 
The graphs compare the value of each portfolio with subsequent tui-
tion rates, assuming each portfolio paid federal and state income taxes 
at the annual rate of thirty-three percent. 43 
41. 1986 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 152 (emphasis added). 
42. The raw monthly data is found at IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES, INC., STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS, 
AND INFLATION 148, 152 (1990) (total returns by month for the Standard and Poor's 500 Stock 
Composite Index and for the Salomon Brothers long-term, high-grade corporate bond total re-
turn index). I calculated indices for July I-June 30 fiscal years, to enhance comparability with 
the tuition figures. Thus, the stock market crash of October 1987 is reflected in the figures for 
1987-1988: 
43. The marginal federal income tax rate for very-high-income taxpayers is currently 28%, 
and the Michigan rate is 4.6%. A combined rate of33% is substantially lower than the rate that 
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This graph appears to fortify the case for a prepaid tuition pro-
gram. Consider the hypothetical case of a mother with one child en-
tering college today and one child who will enter college in 2005. If 
the historical relationship reflected in the graph continues, and if the 
mother sets aside an equal amount of money today for each child, her 
seemingly prudent behavior on behalf of the younger child will not be 
adequate to meet the child's needs. What she has set aside will not 
grow fast enough to pay for college in 2005. A prepaid tuition pro-
gram that sold tuition for the class of 2005 at today's prices would 
respond to the apparent needs of the mother. 
Once again, however, the argument confuses an observation about 
the world with a normative claim. Before one can conclude that a 
public program that helps its participants to cope with the world is 
justified, one needs more information about the income distribution of 
the society at large and of those who might be able to participate in the 
program. More precisely, if one's only justification for a program is 
that it helps its participants, one must consider two questions. Where 
are those participants likely to lie in the income distribution? And do 
they have a special moral claim on the community for assistance? 
C. Distributional Effects of Public Responses to Private Needs 
Suppose a state runs a program that helps some citizens to satisfy 
their individual desires and also "breaks even" financially, i.e., does 
not cost the state's taxpayers any additional tax dollars. Why should 
it be a matter of public concern whether the program's beneficiaries 
are predominantly rich, middle-class, working-class, or poor? 
There are at least two reasons to be concerned. The first has to do 
with why the state breaks even on the program .. Is the state relying on 
its tax-exempt status for federal income tax purposes? Is it taking ad-
vantage of its unique status as a public entity, using the time and en-
ergy of civil servants, taking up space in public buildings, and 
exploiting its privileged access to the media to create a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace? If so, then it is likely that the partici-
pants in the program will be getting a higher rate of economic return 
on their investments than they could have obtained in the private mar-
ket if the state program had not existed. 
If the state gives program participants a higher rate of return on 
investment than is readily available in the marketplace, then the pro-
gram will enhance the wealth of its participants. If those participants 
actually prevailed during the time period shown in Figure 4, but it is more appropriate for efforts 
to decide whether future investments would keep up with tuition if the securities markets con-
tinue to behave as they have in the past. 
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are predominantly rich, the program will exacerbate inequalities of 
wealth within the society; if they are predominantly poor, the program 
will reduce them. To the extent inequality of wealth undermines so-
cial cohesion and stability, or undermines perceptions of "equal oppor-
tunity," predictable changes in the extent of inequality are costs or 
benefits that ought to be reckoned in one's deliberations over the wis-
dom of a particular program. 
Indeed, even if the program does not enhance the wealth of its par-
ticipants, even if it offers them exactly the same rate of return (i.e., 
value) that a private, for-profit venture would offer were it not for 
some market failure, one might still have legitimate concern about the 
income distribution of program participants. The reason is that public 
resources are scarce. By public resources, I do not mean merely dol-
lars, although I mean them as well. I mean the time of legislators, 
which cannot be increased simply by buying more of them. I mean the 
ability of a deliberative body to concentrate collective thought on a 
public agenda of issues. I mean the ability of a citizenry to notice and 
respond to the acts of its government. No program is cost-free. 
Admittedly, the fact that no program is cost-free does not demon-
strate that distributional concerns are pertinent to every program. 
That conclusion requires the additional observation that one task of 
representative government is to keep all sectors of the citizenry feeling 
that the government takes note of their existence. Accordingly, in 
choosing from a long list of equally good programs to launch, a gov-
ernment may legitimately worry about whether its interactions with 
the citizenry are neglecting some range or another of the income dis-
tribution. A government's authoritative voice as an embodiment of 
community values depends in part upon its audience's sense of mem-
bership in that community. 
Governments have legitimate concern if an identifiable group be-
comes alienated from the process of governance because public pro-
grams appear to be directed at other audiences. An entire society may 
properly worry about how its working-class citizens are feeling. If the 
working class feels ignored by legislators who are perceived to worry 
only about the very rich and the very poor, social cohesion may be 
undermined. Under those circumstances, a legislator could, and per-
haps should, be especially interested in any program that attracts a 
disproportionate number of working-class participants. 
The structure of MET would seem to favor those who have accu-
mulated enough money to participate - the upper end of the income 
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distribution.44 Indeed, as I shall document in more detail in Part 
III.A and in the Appendix, participation in fact turned out to be heav-
ily skewed in precisely that manner. Such a bias in the distribution of 
benefits cannot be defended on the basis of varying moral claims. The 
mother who has already saved enough to pay for a child's tuition has 
no stronger claim to protection from tuition inflation than a parent 
who, year by year, sets aside some money to achieve the same goal. 
Nor even than the parent who, in the year the child enters college, 
spends current labor earnings on tuition rather than personal con-
sumption. If one's concern is simply that tuition is increasing too fast, 
then one ought to protect all types of parents by subsidizing all tuition 
payers (either directly or by subsidizing the colleges so that they may 
keep tuition low). 
I am not suggesting that a government must always tackle all 
problems at once. A prepaid tuition program serving the needs of the 
mother might certainly be part of a package, each of whose compo-
nents targets a different .needy group. But one cannot simply point to 
the possibility of a piecemeal strategy to justify a particular program. 
In the higher education context, it is difficult to justify on grounds of 
need or desert (rather than behavioral modification) the creation of a 
program to help the upper class when the hypothetical component for 
the middle class is not yet in place. 
D. A Public Justification: Correcting Market Failures 
In the economics literature it is conventional to justify governmen-
tal programs as correctives to "market failures" - situations in which 
structural flaws preclude the private marketplace from operating effi-
ciently. 45 Three possibilities suggest themselves as partial justifications 
for MET. 
One potential source of market failure is the absence of a full set of 
markets, in particular the absence of futures and insurance markets. 
MET has thus been described as providing "tuition insurance," pro-
tecting parents against the risk that tuition will increase dramatically 
faster than investment returns. 
44. To be sure, if one did not have money accumulated to purchase a MET contract, one 
could attempt to borrow the funds. MET negotiated an agreement with the.state's savings and 
loan institutions to encourage those institutions to lend money to purchasers on the security of 
MET contracts. The agreement, however, did not limit the interest rates that the savings and 
loan institutions could charge on so-called "MET Loans," and the rates ultimately charged ex-
ceeded the contracts' projected rate of return if one used MET's actuarial assumptions. See 
Crawley, Interest Rates Too High for Tuition Program, Official Says, Ann Arbor News, Sept. 18, 
1988, at A9, col. 1. Although MET officials were hoping that half of all MET contracts would be 
funded by MET Loans, id., ultimately only about 30% were. 
45. See, e.g., A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES ON PUBLIC EcONOMICS 5-8 (1980). 
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This justification, although far from specious, is not compelling 
either. To begin with, the market has not entirely failed. At least one 
FDIC-insured bank currently sells certificates of deposit that bear in-
terest at a rate just below the rate of inflation in a market index of 
tuition and other college expenses.46 More significantly, MET does 
not by its terms provide such insurance. MET is an independent body 
with no revenues other than those provided by the sale of MET con-
tracts. Accordingly, if the risk that MET were thought to insure 
against were to materialize - if tuitions were to race up faster than 
expected earnings - MET would go bankrupt. MET's portfolio of 
risks is not diversified; rather, all risks are perfectly correlated. Ac-
cordingly, MET cannot provide its beneficiaries true insurance protec-
tion without some form of guarantee that the state will bail it out in 
the event of bankruptcy - a guarantee that the legislature specifically 
declined to provide. 
A second potential source of market failure is imperfect competi-
tion due to monopoly. In MET's case, the argument would be that the 
public colleges were operating inefficiently because they did not have 
to compete with one another on the basis of price in order to attract 
customers (i.e., students). In other words, MET might be a remedy 
for tuition gouging. 
At first blush this might seem a peculiar justification for so com-
plex a program as MET. Why would the legislature not simply regu-
late the price directly? In Michigan, however, the fifteen public 
colleges are 'established by the state constitution as independent of di-
rect legislative control. 47 And, as I shall explain in more detail in Part 
Ill, MET has in fact had a substantial influence over tujtion policy 
among the fifteen public colleges. Nonetheless, I have found no evi-
dence that any Michigan political figure has seriously maintained that 
Michigan's public colleges were in fact gouging. Moreover, during 
legislative deliberatioqs MET's supporters explicitly denied that MET 
would keep tuitions down.48 Accordingly, for present purposes, I 
would relegate this argument to the category of the hypothetical 
rather than the real. 
A third potential source of market failure is imperfectly distributed 
information among market participants. In MET's case, it has been 
suggested that many parents saving for their children's college educa-
tions are ignorant of the investment opportunities available in the mar-
46. See supra note 13. 
47. See infra note 234. 
48. See 25 GONGWER NEWS SERVICE'S MICHIGAN REPORT, Report No. 74 (Apr. 17, 1986). 
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ketplace. They may keep their college savings in passbook accounts 
rather than investing in no-load mutual funds. By providing what is, 
in effect, a state-managed mutual fund, MET could be seen as effec-
tively transforming uninformed or unsophisticated investors into well-
informed, sophisticated investors. 
This argument is the most plausible of the three, but still depends 
upon some fairly strong empirical assumptions about the pool of MET 
participants. Like the other two market-failure arguments, it is not so 
compelling as to make distributional concerns irrelevant. In other 
words, if MET were known to have neutral or beneficial distributional 
effects, the three hypothetical sources of market failure might offer 
some mild additional justification for the program. To the extent 
MET's distributional effects are negative, however, none of these class-
ical market-failure arguments seems adequate to justify the program. 
E. An Alternative Public Justification: Fighting Incipient 
Social Irresponsibility 
The market-failure justifications for a program such as MET are 
thus somewhat weaker than one might initially have thought. I tum 
now to an alternative justification, one that I think offers a stronger 
public justification for a program whose personal benefits will redound 
primarily to people situated toward the upper end of the income distri-
bution. This justification, grounded in the need to strengthen cultural 
norms that condemn socially irresponsible conduct, is the most credi-
ble public justification for MET. Moreover, attention to its structure 
allows one to think carefully about how such arguments might be de-
veloped in other areas. Nonetheless, I conclude that even this argu-
ment may ultimately prove inadequate to justify MET itself. 
Since the Higher Education Act of 1965 49 inaugurated the federal 
Guaranteed Student Loan program, federal and state governments 
have worked hard to ensure that children are not denied a higher edu-
cation because of their parents' socioeconomic status. so Government 
programs have given children what the private market would not -
49. Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219. 
50. For a useful history, see NATIONAL COMMN. ON STUDENT FINANCIAL AsSISTANCE, 
GUARANTEED STUDENT LOANS: A BACKGROUND PAPER (1982). See also CARNEGIE COUN-
CIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN HIGHER Eouc., THE FEDERAL ROLE IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCA-
TION 22-54 (1975) (analyzing various student aid programs); c. FINN, SCHOLARS, DOLLARS, 
AND BUREAUCRATS 8-19 (1978) (comparing the federal government's financing mechanisms for 
higher education with the government's various educational objectives). For overviews of the 
government programs that led up to the GSL program, see A. RIVLIN, THE ROLE OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION 61-97 (1961); see also R. FREE-
MAN, supra note 33, at 102-07; Calkins, Government Support of Higher Education, in FINANCING 
HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 31, at 183. 
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an opportunity to borrow against their future earnings in order to pay 
for college. The Guaranteed Student Loan program did much to 
equalize access to higher education. 
It is tempting to describe the GSL program with the assistance of a 
simple spatial metaphor. Before the program, one group of families 
could afford to send its children to college, a second group could not. 
The program seems merely to transport families from the Outsiders' 
Group (unable to afford college) into the Insiders' Group (able to af-
ford college). The problem with such a spatial metaphor, however, is 
that it presumes that people who were already members of the Insid-
ers' Group will not change their behavior in response to the program. 
It presumes that the families who used to save to send their children to 
college will continue to do so, so that the only costs of the program 
will be those associated with taking care of the Outsiders' Group. 
Such a static metaphor fails to capture the dynamism of social life. 
Like any program that advances us beyond a state of primitive so-
cial Darwinism, Guaranteed Student Loans weaken the link between 
behavior and consequences. In particular, they weaken the sanction 
for parents who fail to save enough money to fund their children's 
college education.51 To be sure, some economic sanction endures: a 
child who leaves college saddled with debt is less well situated than 
one who leaves debt-free. Moreover, the dominant culture continues 
to pressure parents to save. But whenever a public program removes 
economic pressures toward responsible action, social planners must 
consider whether the remaining cultural pressures are strong enough 
to avert significant behavioral shifts. And they must remain sensitive 
to subsequent changes that may weaken those cultural pressures. 52 
Whether or not people's attitudes toward the future really changed 
in the 1980s, the popular media certainly reinforced perceptions that 
America crossed a cultural watershed during those years. Magazines 
and newspapers doted on the yuppie class as the distilled essence of 
self-indulgent irresponsible consumerism. 53 Books hinted that the 
5 I. See Bowen, Tuitions and Student Loans in the Finance of Higher Education, in EcoNOM· 
ICS AND FINANCING, supra note 31, at 623. 
52. In a perceptive 1986 article, Michael McPherson and Mary Skinner pointed out that as a 
matter of intergenerational equity, one could plausibly have either of two systems: one under 
which each generation (saves and) pays for its children's education, a second under which each 
gem:ration (borrows and) pays for its own education. Either system is stable, but if one adopts 
the first, one must always be aware that each generation may be tempted to accept its parents' 
largesse while refusing to help its own children. A transition from the first system to the second 
is difficult to manage fairly. See generally McPherson & Skinner, Paying for College: A Lifetime 
Proposition, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1986, at 29; see also Hansen, Pay Now, Go Later, 147 COLL. 
Bo. REV. 8, IO (1988) ("Among others, college financial aid offices are increasingly concerned 
ab.out the need to reinforce the message that families must save if they can."). 
53. See, e,g., Yuppies Uncork a Boom in Fine French Wine, Bus. WK., July 1, 1985, at 58; 
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Reagan administration's response to the country's growing budget def-
icit was legitimating the view that each generation should take care of 
itself. 54 And in the entertainment world, the central tenet of compact-
disk moral philosophy was, "Don't worry. Be happy."55 
In such an atmosphere, the concept of futility can be a catalyst for 
a shift in cultural norms. If parents are led to believe that it might be 
futile to save for their child's college education, they might well aban-
don their sense of personal responsibility for providing that education. 
The following utterance, though hypothetical, is unsettling for a soci-
ety that wants to limit its commitment of public funds to higher 
education: 
Everything I read says trying to save up the tuition in advance is a lost 
cause. The American dream of self-sufficiency is over. No matter what 
we do, she'll have to borrow like we did. There's no reason to forgo 
theater tickets this year if it will only make a little dent in a hopeless 
problem. 
The effects of perceptions of futility on individuals' willingness to act 
with responsibility toward the future are well known. To invoke just 
one example, 'the average price of a house in Tokyo has skyrocketed 
over the past five years, moving from six times the average Tokyo-
dweller's annual wage in 1984 to eighteen times the average annual 
wage in 1989.56 Japanese society has become divided between the 
property-owning nyuu ritchi and the propertyless nyuu pua. Many 
members of the nyuu pua have abandoned dreams of ever owning a 
home. But, according to The Economist: "[T]he new poor, having 
ceased to save for a home, have more income left to spend as they 
choose than ever before. A mink coat for the wife, membership of a 
golf club for the husband and a shiny new foreign car for the family 
are a nice consolation. "57 
When Governor Blanchard proposed the creation of MET, he 
called attention to the perceived futility of saving for college. Ordina-
rily, such an act would be expected to reinforce that perception of 
futility. Governor Blanchard therefore took pains to describe MET in 
Yuppies in the Office, FORTUNE June 24, 1985, at 135; More GM Yuppiemobi/es, Bus. WK., Feb. 
11, 1985, at 36; Dog Togs for Yuppie Puppies: Canine Couture, Taking a Wow Bow, Wash. Post, 
Sept. 1, 1984, at Bl; Sound: Yuppies at Home - A Hi-Fi Habitat, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1984, 
§ 2, at 23; Yumpies, YAPs, Yuppies: Who They Are, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 16, 1984, 
at 39; Onward and Yupward, PEOPLE, Jan. 9, 1984, at 47; Here Come the Yuppies, TIME, Jan. 9, 
1984, at 66. 
54. E.g., B. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 1-27. 
55. Bobby McFerrin, Don't Worry, Be Happy, on SIMPLE PLEASURES (EMI-Manhattan 
Records 1988). 
56. Japans Consumer Boom, THE EcoNOMIST, Sept. 9, 1989, at 21, 22. 
57. Id. 
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ways that would undermine such a perception - as an antidote to 
despair: "We will move to eliminate parents' uncertainty about paying 
for their children's higher education by proposing a guaranteed tuition 
program ... designed to help parents guarantee to their children the 
opportunity of a Michigan college education."58 
MET might thus be justified as a "mood-altering" program, serv-
ing to rehabilitate weakening cultural norms. Before MET, a growing 
sense of futility may have made parents more willing to let someone 
else worry about their children's college educations. MET could be 
seen as a public strategy for keeping that sense of futility under 
control. 
To be sure, the actual participants in MET may well not have been 
parents who, without the program, would have given in to futility. It 
is quite plausible that much of the money these parents spent to buy 
prepaid tuition contracts would have been used for other forms of sav-
ings. 59 Indeed, it is even possible that, lulled into a false sense of se-
curity, program participants will save less than they otherwise would 
have! 
But the defense of MET as a mood-altering program looks beyond 
those parents who actually participate by buying contracts. MET was 
a highly visible symbol that could well have affected all parents' per-
ceptions of what is possible. Even for people who do not participate in 
such a program, the public celebration of those who do can change 
attitudes. The variety of mechanisms available to save for college 
might become a mare common topic of dinner conversation. And 
conversations might change behavior. 60 
58. 1986 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE 152 (emphasis added). 
59. It bears emphasis that, as outlined by Governor Blanchard, the prepaid tuition program 
would work by, in effect, allowing parents' college savings to accumulate free of federal income 
taxation. The most carefully analyzed tax-based savings-inducement program to date has been 
the Individual Retirement Account. See I.R.C. §§ 219, 408, 409, 4973-4974, 6693 (1988). 
Whether the IRA in fact stimulated additional savings or merely led to reshuffling of portfolios 
remains the subject of much debate. See Feenberg & Skinner, Sources of IRA Saving, in 3 TAX 
POLICY AND THE EcoNOMY 25 (1989) (little or no evidence supporting "shifting" hypothesis); 
Venti & Wise, The Determinants of IRA Contributions and the Effect of Limit Changes, in PEN· 
s10Ns IN THE U.S. EcoNOMY 9 (Z. Bodie, J. Shoven & D. Wise eds. 1988) (general discussion of 
likely effects of changes in IRA contribution limits); Burtless, Comment, in id. at 48-52 & n.1 
(more interesting but unanswered by Venti and Wise is the question of the IRA's net effect on 
personal savings, which has been minimal, and its net effect on national savings, which is even 
worse); Venti & Wise,1RAs and Savings, in NBER SUMMARY RE,PORT: TAXES AND CAPITAL 
FORMATION 6 (D. Zerwitz ed. 1988) (most participation is new savings); Hubbard, Do IRAs and 
Keoghs Increase Saving?, 37 NATL. TAX J. 43 (1984) (answering yes); Note, Costs and Conse-
quences of Tax Incentives: The Individual Retirement Account, 94 HARV. L. REV. 864, 877-78 
(1981) (available data suggest the IRA deduction is an expensive way to generate savings). See 
generally Steuerle, The Failure of Saving Incentives, 44 TAX NOTES 603 (1989) (most saving 
incentives simply do not work). 
60. I do not contend that this justification for MET was foremost in the legislature's mind 
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Naturally, it is conceivable that MET's effects on perceptions of 
futility might be exactly the opposite of those I have hypothesized. 
Parents unable to afford a MET contract may wrongly conclude that 
they would not be able tq accumulate enough savings over time to pay 
for their children's college. Even if one assumes, however, that MET's 
net "demonstration effects" on feelings of futility will be to the good, 
that is not the end of the story. One must still form a judgment about 
whether those net benefits are sufficient to justify any distributional 
costs. And one must ask whether alternative mood-altering strategies 
might have been pursued that would have entailed fewer distributional 
costs. 
F. Summary 
The Michigan Education Trust was presented as a response to pa-
rental anxiety over runaway college tuition inflation. Yet the percep-
tions of the speed with which college tuitions were running away may 
have been exaggerated. And even if some anxiety is justified, one must 
be sensitive to the distributional effects of programs that are designed 
to respond to the anxieties of only one part of the community. 
MET can also be justified by reference to public objectives. It 
might be thought of as correcting a failure in the marketplace - im-
perfect information about investment opportunities. It might be 
thought of as an effort to check incipient social irresponsibility by rein-
forcing norms of parental obligation. Yet the invocation of plausible 
public objectives does not end the inquiry any more than does the in-
vocation of plausible private objectives. One must still attend to the 
possibility of public costs, in particular distributional costs. In the bal-
ance of this article, I explore the potential public costs of MET as it 
has actually been implemented. 
when it enacted the program. I have, however, found one piece of evidence to suggest that MET 
proponents hoped the program would reduce the number of middle-income families who take 
advantage of financial aid programs. In April 1986, during testimony before the Colleges and 
Universities Committee of the State House of Representatives, Treasurer Robert Bowman de-
scribed the likely effect of the MET on middle class use of financial aid. The Gongwer News 
Service gave the following account of his testimony: 
This is a middle-income plan. But once investments are made, middle-income families 
should not need other scholarship monies as much, freeing those funds for poor families. 
Plus, the state could consider investing a portion of the funds it already spends on scholar-
ships and grants into the program on behalf of poorer students. 
25 GONGWER NEWS SERVICE'S MICHIGAN REPORT, supra note 48 (emphasis added). Similarly, 
in an address to the MET Board of Directors at their first meeting, Governor Blanchard sug-
gested that, "as more middle class persons take advantage of the tuition guarantee program, 
more of those [direct grant and scholarship] funds would be available for lower income families." 
26 GONGWER NEWS SERVICE'S MICHIGAN REPORT, Report No. 42, at 4 (Mar. 5, 1987). 
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II. IMPLEMENTING MET:. SELLING CONTRACTS Too CHEAPLY 
In this Part, I move from design to implementation. Whereas 
Part I was concerned with the abstract question of what policy reasons 
might justify the creation of a program such as MET, this Part is con-
cerned with the concrete question of what happened to MET after it 
was created. Here I offer a critique of the manner in which MET has 
been implemented. I examine the single most important decision 
MET's Directors had to make during the program's first year of oper-
ations: setting the prices at which MET contracts would be sold. 
The types of concerns the Directors had to consider in establishing 
those prices are concerns that are commonly described as "actuarial." 
MET is supposed to be run in an "actuarially sound" manner. I shall 
first review some of the background questions that one must confront 
in evaluating the actuarial soundness of a public program. I shall then 
offer a detailed actuarial analysis of MET itself, concluding that the 
prices MET charged were far too low, given the information available 
to MET's Directors at the time they acted. 
A. Actuarial Soundness - Some General Issues 
Section 13(1) of the Act requires that MET be administered "in a 
manner reasonably designed to be actuarially sound such that the as-
sets of the trust will be sufficient to defray the obligations of the 
trust."61 What does it mean for a program like MET to be "actuari-
ally sound"? The phrase is used in two radically different senses. In 
its first sense, it would require one to look at MET year by year, asking 
whether the program's assets will be sufficient to defray its obligations 
as they come due. In its other sense, it would require one to look at 
MET cohort by cohort, asking whether the assets contributed by each 
cohort of participants, together with the trust's earnings on those as-
sets, will be sufficient to defray the trust's eventual obligations to that 
cohort. 
The difference between the two approaches can be quite significant. 
Consider a hypothetical program to pay for a single year of college, 
built on the following assumptions: 
(a) The program sells exactly one contract each year, to benefi-
ciaries each of whom cashes in the contract exactly five years later. 
(b) The price of a contract each year is set precisely equal to the 
cost of college that year. 
61. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 390.1433 (West 1988). 
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(c) The cost of college is $1 in the first year, $2 in the second year, 
and doubles each year thereafter. 
(d) The program does not invest the contract proceeds at all, but 
simply puts them into a glass jar. 
If one adopted a year-to-year perspective, the program - a perfect 
pay-as-you-go plan - would always be in balance. It would build up 
a $31 surplus in the first five years and then maintain it. 62 It would 
never go bankrupt. Viewed from a cohort-by-cohort perspective, how-
ever, the program is insolvent from day one and becomes geometri-
cally more so year by year.63 · . 
The year-by-year perspective is the one traditionally taken in dis-
cussing the solvency of the Social Security Trust Funds. 64 Based on 
assumptions about the number of living retirees in future years, their 
levels of benefits, and the number of workers in covered employment 
and their earnings, a surplus is projected to accumulate in some years 
and be drawn down in others. 
The year-by-year perspective was once popular with businesses es-
tablishing company pension plans as well. After some highly publi-
cized defaults on pension obligations, Congress adopted the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (BRISA). Section 302 of 
BRISA (and its overlapping counterpart section 412 of the Internal 
Revenue Code) requires most businesses' pensions to meet certain 
"minimum funding" standards. (Government pensions are exempt 
from ERISA's minimum funding requirements.) To be "actuarially 
sound" for BRISA purposes, a company pension must take the co-
hort-by-cohort approach with regard to all benefits accruing after the 
plan is created and must work to fund any benefits that were promised 
but unfunded in prior years. 6s . 
62. The fund gets $1 the first year, $2 the second year, $4 the third year, $8 the fourth year, 
and $16 the fifth year, but does not have to pay anything out during those years. In subsequent 
years it takes in as much as it pays out. 
63. If one's discount rate is equal to one's annual after-tax return on investment, the overall 
present value of the trust in year n is equal to -$31 X (2" - 1). 
It should be noted that this hypothetical is not purely hypothetical. History has produced 
some notorious swindles whose economic structures were quite similar. See, e.g., 1 L. Loss & J. 
SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 3-9 & n.21 (1989) (discussing John Law's South Sea Bub-
ble and citing discussions of more recent scams). 
64. See, e.g .. COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
lOlST CoNG., lST SESS., BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE 
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 80-84 (Comm. Print 1989). Begin-
ning in 1988, the Social Security Trustees began offering a "level-financing" appraisal of the 
program's actuarial balance as well, an approach that moves even more closely toward a pure 
year-by-year approach. Id. at 81. 
65. Plans are given some discretion to "accrue" costs even fa5ter than a strict cohort-by-
cohort economic analysis of company obligations would dictate. They may not, however, go any 
slower than the "accrued benefit cost method." See J. LANGBEIN & B. WOLK, PENSION AND 
1064 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1035 
How should MET be evaluated? It is useful to begin by thinking 
about why the year-by-year perspective has been thought justified in 
the Social Security context. One obvious point of departure is the fact 
that the Social Security system's assumed future revenues are tax reve-
nues. The tax rates for those future years have already been enacted 
into law through the democratic process. Individuals cannot avoid 
contributing to the system without sacrificing net earnings or leaving 
the country. Furthermore, when one considers the remaining determi-
nants of future Social Security revenues - earnings rates, fertility 
rates, etc. - they seem in an important sense to be much larger than 
the program itself. They seem to be big, exogenous factors of the sort 
that lend themselves to plausible long-range demographic or 
econometric forecasts. They seem unlikely to be affected significantly 
by the existence or nonexistence, success or failure of the Social Secur-
ity system. 
Yet even with Social Security, there are good reasons to hesitate 
about using the year-by-year approach. The system's long-range fi-
nancial picture is extremely sensitive to even slight departures from 
the actuarial assumptions, and the year-by-year approach leaves no 
margin for error. Given the differences between MET and the Social 
Security system, one must be even less comfortable with the notion of 
using such an approach to evaluate MET. 
MET's future revenues are less controllable than Social Security's, 
since they result from voluntary individual investment decisions to 
purchase contracts. Demographers and econometricians are even less 
comfortable making predictions about such matters than they are 
making predictions about fertility rates. Moreover, those individual 
decisions are certain to be closely tied to individuals' perceptions of 
the solvency of the MET program. A cohort-by- cohort approach is 
thus both simpler to calculate than a year-by-year approach and (at 
least in principle) more likely to be accurate over the long run. That is 
the approach used by MET's actuaries, and that is the approach I 
shall use in the balance of this article. 
Under a cohort-by-cohort approach, the price MET should charge 
any given cohort depends upon two numbers: (1) the assumed aggre-
gate payout to that cohort (in future dollars), and (2) the assumed 
after-tax rate of return MET will earn in the interim. Each of these 
two numbers is in tum derived from two further assumptions. The 
aggregate payout to the cohort of newborns who entered MET in 1988 
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 229-33 (1990); D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 
275-98 (6th ed. 1989). 
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will depend on: (a) how the cohort members ultimately distribute 
themselves among the fifteen Michigan public colleges and among the 
various refund possibilities, and (b) the total increase in tuition at the 
fifteen Michigan public colleges over the next twenty-two years. The 
Trust's after-tax rate of return on its investments will depend on: (a) 
the pre-tax rate of return on investments, and (b) the federal income 
tax treatment of the trust and its investments. 
B. Actuarial Soundness - A Close Look at MET 
Take a deep breath. This section walks through the details of a 
moderately complex public program, scrutinizing the many judgments 
that were needed to implement it. It dissects the multitude of assump-
tions that necessarily enter the seemingly simple question of what 
price to charge. In so doing it provides a framework for the analysis of 
any program of public insurance. And it yields a bottom-line number. 
It concludes that, if the members of the MET Board of Directors were 
determined to proceed on the basis of the information they had avail-
able at the time they acted, they should have priced MET to raise 
more than 100 million dollars more than it actually did during the first 
year.66 
It is my strong belief that the steps along the way matter more 
than the bottom line. An understanding of where and how risks were 
taken is extremely useful when one inquires into why they were taken, 
and what their long-term effects will be - questions I shall take up in 
Part III. On the other hand, different people read articles for different 
reasons. If you are more interested in obtaining a rough general un-
derstanding of the types of problems presented by programs such as 
MET than in grappling with each analytical question posed along the 
way, you might profitably skim this section and resume closer reading 
in section II.Con page 1108, infra. 
1. Costs: How Much MET Will Need To Pay Out 
MET's actuaries projected the future expenditure for each cohort 
by taking the current weighted average tuition cost (weighting each 
school's tuition by the number of students attending) and increasing it 
at an assumed annual rate of tuition inflation for the future. 67 Using 
66. That figure is arrived at through the interaction among a range of factors summarized in 
Table 2 and notes 215-16, infra. 
67. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, MICHIGAN EDUCATION TRUST BOARD MEETING - AU-
GUST 24, 1988: ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIONS - ANALYSIS AND STATUS [hereinafter 1988 ACTU-
ARIAL AsSUMPTIONS - ANALYSIS); COOPERS & LYBRAND, ACTUARIAL AsSUMPTIONS 
UTILIZED IN DETERMINING PREMIUMS UNDER FULL BENEFITS, LIMITED BENEFITS AND 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE OPTIONS (June 17, 1988) [hereinafter 1988 ACTUARIAL AsSUMPTIONS 
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the current weighted average tuition cost as a starting point corre-
sponds to an assumption that MET participants will distribute them-
selves among the fifteen Michigan public colleges in the same 
proportions as the general population of Michigan residents who at-
tend the Michigan public colleges. There are at least three ways in 
which that assumption is likely to prove wrong. They involve the cash 
refunds available under the contract, the theory of adverse selection, 
and the theory of moral hazard. 
a. Cash refunds. MET beneficiaries who do not attend Michigan 
public colleges are promised refunds (sometimes denominated "termi-
nations" by MET) in amounts that depend upon what the beneficiaries 
do instead. The Act creates in effect three classes of cash refund: one 
for students who attend college outside Michigan, one for students 
who attend a private college within Michigan, and one for students 
who do not go directly to a four-year college at all. 
According to the statute, a child who attends a degree-granting 
institution out~ide of Michigan may claim a refund in the form of a 
payment to that institution equal to the lesser of (a) the linear average 
of tuition charged resident students by the Michigan public colleges68 
or (b) the amount to which the initial purchase cost of the contract has 
grown through investment over time. 69 The statute also provides that 
any such cash refund shall be made "in equal installments over 4 years 
and not later than August 15 of the year due."70 The contract does 
not in fact reflect the limitation in clause (b) above. It does, however, 
provide that the calculation of Average Tuition for purposes of a re-
fund "shall be based upon the last full Academic Year before the re-
fund payments commence and for the number of Academic Years 
covered by the Contract."71 
Because the most expensive Michigan public colleges are also the 
largest, the linear average tuition is about 8.1 % lower than the 
- PREMIUMS]. These assumptions have been maintained, largely unchanged, in the two actua-
rial reviews performed after prices were set and contracts were sold. See COOPERS & LYBRAND, 
ACTUARY'S REPORT ON 1988 ENROLLMENT (Mar. 1989); COOPERS & LYBRAND, ACTUARY'S 
REPORT, VALUATION As OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1989 (MAR. 1990). 
68. That is, the sum of the 15 tuitions, divided by 15. 
69. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.1428 (2) (West 1988). The statutory language reads: 
"the lesser of the average tuition cost of all state institutions of higher education on the date of 
termination of the contract, or the face amount of the payment or payments and any accrued 
investment income attributable to the payment or payments." 
70. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 390.1428 (2) (West 1988). 
71. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, FORM T-1032, MICHIGAN EDUCATION TRUST 
FULL BENEFITS PLAN CONTRACT§ 7(b)(2)(iii) (Aug. 1988) [hereinafter CONTRACT]; see also 
id., §§ 7(a)(2), 17(f); Emergency Rule 6(3)(b)(i), Mich. Reg. 27, 31 (Nov. 1988). The Contract 
provides the same refund for a child who receives a full-tuition scholarship. CONTRACT, supra, 
§§ 7(a)(3), 7(b)(2); see also Emergency Rule 6(3)(b)(i), Mich. Reg. 27, 31 (Nov. 1988). 
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weighted average tuition. Moreover, because the calculation of Aver-
age Tuition is made with respect to the child's senior year in high 
school and does not increase from year to year as the child goes 
through college, its value is greatly diminished during periods of sub-
stantial tuition inflation.72 Using the 7.3% annual tuition inflation as.: 
sumption made by the MET actuaries, the contractual refund would 
be 23.2% below the actuaries' overall expected payout.73 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, that fact was not emphasized in MET's advertising.74 
In 1986, it appears that approximately thirteen percent of Michi-
gan residents who entered four-year institutions attended out- of-state 
institutions.75 One cannot say whether the percentage of MET partici-
72. Interestingly, at least one member of the MET Board of Directors was concerned about 
this feature of the refunds, expressing skepticism that the statute really precluded year-by-year 
adjustments. See Michigan Education Trust Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, July 21, 1988, 
at 8 [hereinafter MET Board Minutes] (discussion among Dumouchelle, Keeley, and Naoum) 
(available at Office of the M.E.T., Lansing, MI). 
It is not clear what MET plans to do if a child's parents buys four separate one-year contracts 
instead of buying a single four-year contract. It is at least arguable that the present contractual 
language would give a much larger refund to the child who buys in pieces. 
73. [ (l - 8.1%) x 4] I [ (l + 7.3%) + (1 + 7.3%)2 + (l + 7.3%)3 + (l + 7.3%)4] = 
76.8% = (1 - 23.2%). 
74. Indeed, MET's advertising was studiously vague about the amount of the refunds. It 
neither emphasized their value nor highlighted the significance of the decision to freeze refunds 
at the level of tuitions during the child's senior year of high school. In its descriptive mailing to 
curious parents, for example, MET included the following questions and answers: 
Q. What are the advantages of the Michigan Education Trust program over individual 
savings programs? 
A. There are several advantages. 
Second, unlike many private plans that require students to attend a specific college, MET 
is portable to the school of the student's choice. While tuition is guaranteed only at a Michi-
gan public institution, the student may attend any college in the nation and funds may be 
used toward tuition at that college .... 
The amount of the refund will be based on the reason for terminating the contract. 
If a student decides to attend an out-of-state college, a refund of the average tuition cost of 
Michigan's public institutions may be provided. 
Michigan Dept. of Treasury, "Michigan Education Trust: Guaranteeing Tomorrow's College 
Tuition Costs at Today's Prices," at 4-7 (July 1988 information release). 
In a televised call-in show about the program, Governor Blanchard described the refunds as 
follows: 
[T]he nice thing about this is that it is portable .... If they go to a private school or in-
dependent college they don't get the full amount obviously, we can't guarantee that, those 
are private institutions, but they will get the average tuition in a public one. 
"The Michigan Trust," (WTVS television broadcast, Aug. 3, 1988) (transcript at p. 10) [hereinaf-
ter WTVS Transcript]. 
In a letter to parents who paid the $25 application fee and were then considering entering into 
a contract, MET included a table showing the refund as "One-fourth of the Average Tuition cost 
for each year the beneficiary directs payment to the college," but text underneath the table stated 
explicitly that "[a]ll refund amounts are determined on the basis of public four-year colleges and 
universities for the academic year immediately preceding the commencement of the refund and 
for the number of academic years covered by the contract." Michigan Dept. of Treasury, "The 
MET Program: A Summary," 3-4 (Aug. 1988 information release). 
75. Michigan State Board of Educ., THE DATA SOURCE 1 (Table l) (Nov. 1988). 
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pants who go ouf of state will be higher or lower than thirteen percent. 
On the one hand, the bigger refund available to students who go to 
Michigan public colleges suggests that MET's out- of-state percentage 
may well be lower. On the other hand, the disproportionate represen-
tation of high-income families in MET,76 suggests that MET's out-of-
state percentage may be higher. If one uses the (intermediate and 
probably best) assumption that thirteen percent of the participants will 
go out of state, then MET will have over-estimated costs on their ac-
count by approximately 3%.77 
According to the statute, a child who attends a private college in-
side Michigan is entitled to a refund in the form of a payment to that 
institution that "shall not be less than the prevailing weighted average 
tuition cost of state institutions of higher education for the number of 
credit hours covered by the contract on the date of termination."78 
This weighted average refund is higher than the linear average refund 
that is to be given students who go out of state. As was true for out-
of-state students, however, the contract provides that the averaging 
calculation shall be "based upon the last full Academic Year before 
the refund payments commence for the number of Academic Years 
covered by the Contract. "79 
Once again, the refund's failure to increase from year to year as the 
child goes through college greatly diminishes its value during periods 
of substantial tuition inflation. Using the 7.3% annual tuition infla-
tion assumption made by the MET actuaries, the contractual refund 
would be 16.4% below the actuaries' overall expected payout. so If the 
proportion of MET beneficiaries who attend Michigan private colleges 
matches the proportion of Michigan high school seniors generally who 
do, MET will have overestimated its costs by 4.1 % on their account.st 
76. See infra section III.A. 
77. 13% x 23.2% = 3.0%. 
78. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 390.1428 (4), 390.1424 (i) (West 1988). 
79. CONTRACT, supra note 71, § 7(b)(l); see also id., §§ 7(b)(l), 7(a)(l), 17(mm); Emergency 
Rule 6(3)(a), Mich. Reg. 27, 31 (Nov. 1988). 
It bears mentioning that, while the Contract calculates the weighted average tuition cost by 
reference to "in-state undergraduate[s]," CONTRACT, supra note 71, §§ 17(d),(ll),(mm), the stat-
utory definition is not literally restricted to in-state students. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 390.1424 (i) (West 1988). Such a reading of the statute would mean that MET underestimated 
its costs on account of this group. Since it is most implausible that the legislature intended to 
provide an incentive for state residents to attend private colleges over public ones, I expect that 
such a reading is no more likely to prevail than the Contract's extreme interpretation in the 
.opposite direction. 
80. [ 100% X 4] I [ (1 + 7.3%) + (1 + 7.3%)2 + (1 + 7.3%)3 + (1 + 7.3%)4] = 83.6% 
= (1 - 16.4%). 
81. I calculated this figure as follows. School-by-school profiles in COLLEGE ENTRANCE 
EXAMINATION BOARD, THE COLLEGE HANDBOOK 1988-1989, indicate that in the freshman 
class of 1987, 29.1% of Michigan residents entering four-year colleges and staying in-state en· 
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According to the statute, if a child dies, attends a community col-
lege, or does not attend college at all, MET will pay out a refund equal 
to the lowest tuition then being charged any resident students by any 
of the fifteen Michigan public colleges.82 In 1988, that was 25.1 % 
lower than the weighted average. And once again, the contract speci-
fies that the amount is calculated "based upon the last full Academic 
Year before the refund payments commence, and for the number of 
Academic Years covered by the contract, less a Termination fee."83 
Under a 7.3% annual tuition inflation assumption, this refund would 
end up being 37.4% below the actuaries' overall expected payout.84 
Because this refund is so small compared to the potential payout in 
benefits for a beneficiary who attends a Michigan public college, the 
contract provides that in circumstances where a beneficiary would be 
relegated to this refund, the contract may be transferred to another 
close family mem~er. 85 As a result, one cannot easily predict how 
many children will end up with the lowest refund option. At best one 
can simply note that it provides a slight additional cushion of protec-
tion of Trust solvency on top of the roughly 7% cushion provided by 
the two primary refund provisions. 
To summarize, the refund provisions reduce the amount of benefits 
MET can expect to have to pay. A cautious ("cbnservative") estimate 
would be that MET's costs will be reduced by (a) 3.0% on account of 
beneficiaries who attend college out of state, and (b) an additional 
4.1 % on account of beneficiaries who attend private in-state institu-
tions. To combine both effects, one does not simply add the two per-
centages together.86 The geometric (rather than arithmetic) sum of 
the two reductions on account of the refund rules indicates that the 
use of the weighted average tuition leads to an overestimate of future 
costs by 7.0%.87 
tered Michigan private colleges (12,176); 70.9% (29,667) entered Michigan public colleges. If one 
uses the 1986 finding that another 13% of Michigan residents entering four-year colleges chose 
to go out of state, see supra note 75 and accompanying text, that means only 25.3% of Michigan 
residents entering all four-year colleges went to Michigan private colleges (29.1 % X (1 - 13%) 
= 25.3%.). Thus: 25.3% X 16.4% = 4.1%. 
82. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.1428 (2) (West 1988). The precise language is: "the 
lowest tuition cost of all state institutions of higher education on the date of termination of the 
contract." · 
83. CONTRACT, supra note 71, § 7(b)(3). See id. §§ 7(a)(4)-(6), 17(s). 
84. [(l -25.1%) x 4]/[(1+7.3%) + (1+7.3%)2 + (1+7.3%)3 + (1+7.3%)4] = 
62.6% = (1 - 37.4%). 
85. CONTRACT, supra note 71, § 6. 
86. Think of the result if one has two effects, each of which tend to reduce costs by 50%. 
87. The formula for the geometric sum tracks the formula for geometric differences set forth 
supra in note 27, and is as follows: 
SUM = (1 + PCT1) X (1 + PCTi) - 1. 
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b. Adverse selection. There are strong theoretical grounds to be-
lieve that MET beneficiaries will behave differently from the typical 
Michigan resident. The theory of adverse selection predicts that, be-
cause MET will ultimately have the greatest value for children who 
attend expensive Michigan public colleges and the least value for chil-
dren who attend the least expensive Michigan public colleges, parents 
who have reason to believe their children will attend more expensive 
Michigan public colleges are more likely to purchase contracts than 
parents who have reason to believe their children will attend the less 
expensive schools. 88 If the parents' judgments are more likely to be 
right than a random guess would be, adverse selection would increase 
MET's future costs.89 
One can estimate part of the cost of adverse selection by using the 
zip codes of MET participants, which MET has made public. The 
fifteen Michigan public colleges tend to draw their students in different 
proportions from different regions of the state. Each school has a dif-
ferent geographic profile. To the extent that people in a single zip 
code share demographic, cultural, and socioeconomic traits that bear 
on their likely choice of college,90 one can draw some inferences about 
the extent of adverse selection based on the zip code distribution of 
MET beneficiaries. 
I constructed a database giving, for each zip code, the number of 
MET participants and the number of children who entered each of the 
fifteen Michigan public colleges in 1988.91 I assumed that MET par-
ticipants from each zip code would distribute themselves among the 
fifteen Michigan public colleges in the same way that children from 
that zip code entering Michigan public colleges in 1988 had distrib-
88. The differences may be expressed as differential rates of return on the initial investment. 
The rates of return depend upon more than just what school the child attends, of course. They 
also depend upon the age of the child initially and upon the rate of tuition inflation during the 
interim period. For examples, see infra note 169 and accompanying text. 
89. Adverse selection may also take place for reasons other than mere profit.maximization. 
Even if all parents agreed that MET would be a fabulous value no matter where their children 
went to school, the fact that a MET contract is itself expensive makes it more likely that wealth· 
ier parents will participate; to the extent the children of wealthy parents are more likely to attend 
the expensive schools, adverse selection will result. 
90. See Austin, supra note 1, at 543 & n.174. 
91. I am grateful to Marilyn Knepp, the Office of Academic Planning and Analysis at the 
University of Michigan, and the other members of the President's Council of State Universities of 
Michigan, who cooperated to provide me with this information. Lake Superior State University 
was unable to provide information broken down by zip code, but instead provided a county-by-
county distribution. I allocated LSSU students to particular zip codes according to the relative 
population of children in the different zip codes in each county as of 1980, information which I 
obtained from the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Summary Tape File 3B, with 
the programming assistance of Cathy Sun. I am also grateful to Cindy Brach for her assistance 
in manipulating the gargantuan spreadsheet that resulted. 
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uted themselves. Adding up each school's projected share of MET 
participants across all zip codes, I obtained the following results: 
TABLE 1 
Central Michigan Univ.: 
Eastern Michigan Univ.: 
Ferris State Univ.: 
Grand Valley State Univ.: 
Lake Superior State Univ.: 
Michigan State Univ.: 
Michigan Tech. Univ.: 
Northern Michigan Univ.: 
Oakland Univ.: 
Saginaw Valley State Univ.: 
Univ. of Michigan (Ann Arbor): 
Univ. of,Michigan (Dearborn): 
Univ. of Michigan (Flint): 
Wayne State Univ.: 
Western Michigan Univ.: 
1988 
Students 
9.9%. 
9.1% 
7.4% 
4.0% 
1.6% 
19.5% 
3.6% 
3.8% 
5.1% 
2.3% 
10.2% 
2.9% 
2.7% 
8.7% 
9.3% 
Projected 
MET 
Students 
9.3% 
10~0% 
5.5% 
2.9% 
0.6% 
22.4% 
2.8% 
2.3% 
5.8% 
1.2% 
13.2% 
3.7% 
1.6% 
9.0% 
9.7% 
Thus, MET participants are more likely than the average state-
college-bound Michigan high school senior to attend the state's most 
expensive schools, such as the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. 
If the weights iri the second column are accurate, then a price based 
exclusively on the weights shown in the first column would underesti-
mate MET's total tuition costs by 3.4%.92 
To be sure, this methodology almost certainly under-estimates the 
extent of adverse selection. It assumes that, within each zip code, 
MET participants will go where students go generally. It therefore 
fails to reflect adverse selection within each zip code, adverse selection 
that could in theory be quite significant.93 Moreover, this methodol-
92. MET's actuaries appreciated the possibility of adverse selection. They took the position 
that the assumed rate of tuition inflation of 7.3% reflected "a little extra conservation" beyond 
what was otherwise warranted, in order to protect against adverse selection. 1988 ACTUARIAL 
AssUMPTIONS - ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 2. They asserted that the net effect would J>e 
"approximately 3%" but that "there were other factors involved which were enough to over-
come the 3% bias." MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, Sept. 20, 1988, at 5. 
93. How significant it would be depends upon how heterogeneous the population of each zip 
code is, and how prone to select adversely. If one knew that each zip code were homogeneous, 
then the figures in the text would show all the adverse selection one will find. If one knew that 
each zip code were radically heterogeneous and its families prone to select adversely, one might 
be able to predict that all MET beneficiaries would attend the University of Michigan based on 
adverse selection. (Note that if one makes too extreme an assumption about zip code heterogene-
ity, one must then conclude that the calculation in the text has absolutely no predictive value, 
since it is premised on the assumption that at least some information about expected behavior is 
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ogy does not attempt to reflect the effect of adverse selection on the 
distribution of cash refunds, since zip-code data were not available for 
entrants into Michigan private colleges and out-of-state colleges. 94 A 
conservative pricing analysis would accordingly account for the 3.4% 
known adverse selection and then leave some additional cushion for 
extra adverse selection not picked up by this methodology. 
c. Moral hazard. Even though MET can be understood in part as 
an antidote to the moral hazard presented by college financial aid, that 
does not mean MET cannot itself become infected by the phenome-
non. MET is, after all, insurance against tuition inflation. Children 
who, absent MET, might have chosen a less expensive school to save 
money will be freed from budgetary constraints. Since MET will pay 
the full cost of tuition at any Michigan public college, a child who 
wants to attend a particular one of the fifteen will face a decision in 
which money will virtually no longer be an object.95 Accordingly, one 
would predict further skewing toward the more expensive schools, on 
top of the skewing already indicated by adverse selection. Until MET 
has some substantial experience with students using their contract 
benefits, however, it will not be possible to offer a quantitative estimate 
of how severe the moral hazard effects will be. In the meantime, as 
was true for adverse selection not reflected in the zip code analysis, a 
conservative pricing analysis would leave at least some cushion to ac-
count for moral hazard. 96 In the balance of this article, I shall use a 
figure of 5% to cover both moral hazard and any adverse selection 
below the zip code level not accounted for in the prior section's 
analysis. 
d. Future tuition inflation. The actuaries assumed that the 
weighted average tuition for Michigan residents at the Michigan pub-
lic colleges would increase at the rate of 10.1 % between 1987 and 
conveyed by zip code.) If one were to make the intermediate (but not necessarily better founded) 
assumption that the families within each zip code show exactly the same degrees of heterogeneity 
and proclivity to select adversely as the zip code aggregates, one could then use a crude iterative 
process to estimate the additional effect. For an alternative way to gauge the extent of heteroge-
neity within zip codes, see infra note 300 and accompanying text. 
94. See generally supra notes 68-87 and accompanying text. 
95. It still is some object. When a child uses a MET contract to attend college, the IRS has 
ruled that the child will be taxed each year on the difference between one year of the then-
prevailing tuition at that school and the amount that was originally paid for one year of the MET 
contract. Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988). The more expensive the school the child 
attends, the more the child will owe in federal taxes. If the child is in a 15% marginal tax. 
bracket, MET will, in effect, be able to rely on a 15% federally supplied co-payment requiremeqt 
as a check on moral hazard. Moreover, to the extent that room-and-board costs vary among the 
15 colleges, an additional residual budgetary constraint will remain. 
96. MET's actuaries never discuss moral hazard separately. One must presume that they 
were referring to it together with adverse selection when they spoke generally of "Bias Toward 
Higher Priced Schools" in 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIONS -ANALYSIS, supra note 67. 
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1988, and at the (nominal, not real) rate of 7.3% per year thereafter.97 
The 10.1 percent assumption ultimately proved uncannily accurate.98 
The question is whether the assumption of 7.3 % tuition inflation for 
the future will prove equally so. 
Earlier in this article, I presented historical data on real tuition 
inflation.99 A graph of nominal tuition inflation at Michigan public 
universities, "smoothed" over five- and four-year intervals, looks like 
this: 
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Tuition Inflation at MI Public Colleges 
(Nominal Annual Rate, Smoothed) 
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Among the Michigan public colleges, weighted-average tuition infla-
tion ran at a rate of9.1% per year between 1965-1966 and 1988-1989. 
If one looks only at the period since 1968-1969 (when my data are 
more uniform and reliable), the average rate was 8.7% per year. 100 
97. 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIONS -ANALYSIS, supra note 67. This section considers the 
assumed nominal rate of tuition inflation as an independent historical artifact. I shall consider 
that rate relative to rates of investment return infra text at notes 110-111. 
98. For the reason why, see generally infra section 111.B. 
99. See supra Figure 1. 
100. In a world of moral hazard and adverse selection, one must be wary of excessive reliance 
on the weighted-average tuition in measuring tuition inflation. The estimates in the text assume 
that aU schools are raising their tuitions at the same percentage rate from year to year. If the 
variance of that tuition increases over time (if the more expensive schools raise their tuitions at a 
faster rate than the less expensive schools), then tuition at the more expensive schools will puU 
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Moreover, tuition inflation over the twenty-year period was remarka-
bly constant. Each ten-year half period (1968-1969 to 1978-1979 and 
1978-1979 to 1988-1989) had the same 8.7% average annual rate as 
the two-decade whole.101 
If MET had set its prices assuming an 8.7% rate of tuition infla-
tion, rather than a 7.3% rate, it would have charged substantially 
more for the contracts. For the cohort of beneficiaries who were en-
tering the tenth grade in 1988, the price would have been 6% higher. 
For the cohort entering as newborns in 1988, the price would have 
been 19% higher- $8053 instead of $6756. If tuition inflation in fact 
proceeds at an 8.7% rate, MET's payout cost will be 12% higher than 
projected, given the age distribution of the children who were actually 
signed up in 1988. If tuition inflation continues at the 10% annual 
rate seen between 1987-1988 and 1988-1989, MET will face obliga-
tions 26% higher than anticipated.102 
How ought one forecast tuition inflation over the long term? How 
ought one choose among 7.3%, 8.7%, and 10.0%? Statisticians fore-
cast the future in a variety of ways, ranging from simple deterministic 
extrapolations, through more sophisticated stochastic extrapolation 
models, up to the most complex structural econometric regression 
models. 103 
further away from the weighted average. Adverse selection and moral hazard will then have 
even greater costs for the program. 
In fact, over the past 20 years the rates of tuition inflation have varied somewhat among the 
Michigan public colleges but not greatly. If, instead of looking at the historical change in the 
weighted average tuition, one looked at the historical change in each school's tuitions and 
weighted them by the projected distribution of MET beneficiaries shown in Table 1 above, one 
would obtain a rate of8:74%, a figure insignificantly different from the 8.73% rate of inflation in 
the weighted average over the same period. 
101. The second 10-year period shows substantially more variance than the first 10-year pe-
riod did. That reflects the fact that for academic years 1984-1985 and 1985-1986, Governor 
Blanchard asked the public colleges to freeze their tuitions and, for the most part, they complied. 
In subsequent years, however, the schools appear to have been recouping their losses. 
102. The following sensitivity table shows how much extra costs MET would face at various 
levels of tuition inflation: 
Annual Tuition Inflation Underestimate 
8.0% 
9.0% 
10.0% 
11.0% 
12.0% 
5.9% 
15.3% 
25.9% 
37.9% 
51.5% 
103. For statistically sophisticated introductions to methodology, see R. PINDYCK & D. 
RUBINFELD, EcoNOMETRIC MODELS AND EcoNOMIC FORECASTS, chs. 15, 17, 19 (2d ed. 1981); 
M. NERLOVE, D. GRETHER, & J. CARVALHO, ANALYSIS OF EcONOMIC TIME SERIES chs. VI, 
VII, x. XI, XII (1979); G. Box & G. JENKINS, TIME SERIES ANALYSIS (1970); Granger & 
Engle, Econometric Forecasting: A Brief Survey of Current and Future Techniques, in FORECAST· 
ING IN THE SOCIAL AND NATURAL SCIENCES, at 117 (K. Land & s. Schneider eds. 1987). For a 
discussion of the limitations of the methodology in making long-range forecasts, see Land & 
Schneider, Forecasting in the Social and Natural Sciences: An Overview and Analysis of Isomor-
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I do not have enough data to generate a structural econometric 
regression model that takes into account the full range of underlying 
conditions that almost certainly influence public tuition levels in 
Michigan (costs faced by colleges, levels of state appropriations, avail-
able numbers of students, tuition levels nationwide, etc.). Moreover, 
even if I did, such a model can be used to make long-range projections 
of tuition inflation only by making strong assumptions about whether 
those underlying conditions will conform to their historical patterns, 
assumptions that strike me as no more intuitively plausible than an 
assumption that the number which ultimately matters (tuition infla-
tion) will conform to its own historical pattern. 104 
Unfortunately, the various models for extrapolating from the his-
torical pattern of a single series are of only limited value when one 
attempts to make truly long-term forecasts - forecasts that require 
one to look about as far into the future as far as one is able to look 
back into the past. Moving-average models produce long-run fore-
casts that converge to the simple average value of the available data 
phisms, in id. at 7, 15-17. For less statistically oriented approaches to some of the epistemologi-
cal issues, see 0. HELMER, LOOKING FORWARD 70-78 (1983); Smith, The Social Forecasting 
Industry, in FORECASTING IN THE SOCIAL AND NATURAL SCIENCES, supra, at 35. 
104. It is possible that the MET Board believed that since Michigan public college tuitions 
had been inflating faster than public college tuitions nationally, see supra Figure 1, in the future 
they will inflate slower. One would need a great deal of information about the similarities and 
differences among public colleges in different states in order to know whether that hypothesis or 
its opposite is more plausible. 
To pick just one concrete aspect of the problem, in academic year 1968-1969, Michigan 
ranked 17th among the 50 states in direct operating subsidies to four-year colleges. In academic 
year 1986-1987, Michigan's rank had dropped to 30th. Mindless: Michigan Cheats Its Future by 
Shortchanging Universities, Detroit Free Press, Aug. 18, 1989, at lOA, col. l; see also S. HARRIS, 
supra note 31, at 338 (showing an even higher ranking for Michigan in 1957); Harris, supra note 
31, at 63 (same); PRESIDENTS COUNCIL, STATE UNIVERSITIES OF MICHIGAN, DEVELOPING 
MICHIGAN'S MINDPOWER, Dec. 15, 1989, at 11 (looking at state appropriations per student, 
Michigan fell from 24th to 32nd between 1977-1978 and 1988-1989); D. MURPHY & R. Bos-
SARD, 1 MICHIGAN HIGHER EDUCATION FUNDING MODEL TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 
92-94 (1976). 
It is surely a plausible hypothesis that this fact accounts for why Michigan's resident tuition 
increased faster than the national average during that period. But see J. Wittstruck & S. Bragg, 
Focus on Price, 36 (July 1988) (unpublished paper) (nature of relationship may depend on 
whether you take a long-term or short-term view). But assuming that hypothesis is true, one 
cannot know what to expect from the future unless one knows how future legislative appropria-
tions in Michigan will compare to future legislative appropriations nationally. 
Moreover, other plausible explanations for Michigan's traditional high rate of tuition infla-
tion would suggest that the trend is likely to continue. It is certainly possible that Michigan's 
public colleges offer an educational product that is in significant ways different from that offered 
by other states' public colleges. Without attempting to demonstrate the point, I would raise the 
possibility that Michigan's colleges are providing a "premium education" that depends heavily 
on "top quality" personnel and equipment. If the prices of "top quality" personnel and equip-
ment increase more rapidly than the prices of the "good" personnel and equipment used in other 
states, then one would expect the historical disparity between Michigan tuition inflation and 
nationwide public college tuition inflation to continue for as long as Michigan chooses to provide 
a "premium education." 
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(which would project an average of 8.7% over the next 18 years based 
on tuition data from the past 20 years); integrated autoregressive mod-
els produce long-run forecasts that converge to a simple trend line (a 
straight line trend would project an average of 7. 7 % over the next 18 
years, based on tuition data from the past 20 years). 105 Where, as in 
this case, the simple trend line is not a horizontal line and thus 
predicts something different from the simple average, one's choice be-
tween the two must reflect (a) an independently grounded judgment 
about whether the recent trend will endure or is nothing but an arti-
fact of history, or (b) an independently grounded commitment to cau-
tion or to optimism. 
Given the function of the tuition inflation assumption in the over-
all structure of MET, I would offer two reasons why the MET Board 
should have tended towards caution in selecting a tuition inflation as-
sumption - why it should have chosen a figure of at least 8. 7%. The 
first reason has to do with the asymmetrical costs of error. Undue 
conservatism in these circumstances yields a slightly overfunded pro-
gram, with fewer participants than it might have attracted othenvise. 
Undue boldness, however, yields aD; insolvent program that may well 
deny participants the very "insurance" they thought they had 
purchased. 
The second reason has to do with the connection between design 
and implementation. If one is crafting a public program whose mis-
sion is to insure against an expected problem, one ought not imple-
ment that program in such a way as to make its success contingent on 
a hope that the problem will never in fact materialize. MET was cre-
ated to address a public concern that tuition inflation will continue at 
a high rate. Since the MET Board was not delegated the authority to 
lower tuitions directly, it ought to have selected an actuarial structure 
capable of surviving if relatively high rates of tuition inflation con-
tinue. It should certainly not have assumed that, in the future, tuition 
inflation rates will decline of their own accord. 106 
In the balance of this article, I shall therefore adopt a tuition infla-
tion assumption of 8.7%, rather than the MET Board's figure of 
7.3%. That suggests an underestimate of overall future costs by the 
MET Board of 12.3% on account of future tuition inflation. 
105. See R. PINDYCK & D. RUBINFELD, supra note 103, at 561-68. 
106. To be sure, one might wish to think about this motivating assumption in relative, rather 
than absolute, terms. One might wish to concentrate on tuition levels, compared with returns on 
investment. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43. I shall consider the MET Board's pack· 
age of assumptions iif these terms infra text accompanying note 111; my conclusion is that the 
package is no less aggressive than the separate parts. 
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e. The costs subtotal. One may combine the figures given above 
regarding anticipated future costs as follows: 
Refunds 
Observed Adverse Selection 
Moral hazard and unobserved adverse selection 
Tuition inflation 
7:0% overstatement 
0.4% understatement 
5.0% understatement 
12.3% understatement 
The net result is an overall underestimate of projected costs by 10.1 
percent. That, however, is only half of a picture of MET's cohort-by-
cohort solvency. One also needs to know how much MET will have 
available when it comes time to meet its financial obligations. 
2. Revenues: How Much MET Will Be Able To Pay Out 
In order to meet its obligations to the matriculating children; MET 
will invest the money it receives. How much will be available to pay 
out depends on two factors: {l) MET's pre-tax rate of return on in-
vestment, and (2) the federal tax treatment of MET. 
a. Pre-tax return on investment. The ·actuaries assumed that in 
September 1989 MET would divide its money into two separate 
"funds": seventy-five percent into an "Annuity Fund" and twenty-five 
percent into a "Guarantee Fund." They assumed that the Annuity 
Fund would be used to purchase a group annuity contract from a life 
insurance company, paying benefits in the names of the beneficiaries. 
They assumed that the Guarantee Fund would be invested in a diversi-
fied portfolio of corporate and government securities.107 
The actuaries assumed that the nominal (not real) pre-tax rate of 
return on the Annuity Fund would range from 7.12% per year, com-
pounded annually, for short-term deferred annuities (purchased to 
cover the contracts of older children) to more than 9.83% per year, 
compounded annually, for longer-term deferred annuities (purchased 
to cover the contracts of younger children). 108 These rates reflect net 
rates actually quoted to MET by an insurance company for fixed-rate 
annuities; their use is therefore quite conservative. If one weights the 
various returns by the age distribution of MET participants, they im-
ply an overall return of about 9.4% per year. 
The actuaries assumed that the nominal pre-tax rate of return on 
107. See 1988 ACTUARIAL AsSUMPTIONS - PREMIUMS, supra note 67. 
108. MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, June 21, 1988, at 8. The figures moved from 
7.12% for a one-year deferral up to 9.83% for a 12-year deferral and then slowly dropped back 
to 9.71% for an 18-year deferral. Id. 
One might well ask why, if the actuaries expected a return qf 10% on general-fund moneys, 
they expected 75% of the funds to be invested in annuities having a projected composite yield of 
only 9.4%. The reason has to do with federal income taxes. See infra section 11.B.2.b.ii. 
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the Guarantee Fund would be 10% per year, compounded annually. 
The following graph shows annual nominal total return rates (current 
income and capital appreciation), smoothed over the usual five- and 
four-year periods, on a hypothetical portfolio composed half of com-
mon stocks and half of long-term corporate bonds. 109 
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This pattern shows a distinct upward trend. Until 1980, total returns 
on this portfolio were distinctly below 10% per year. Over the period 
from 1965-1966 through 1988-1989, the average annual rate of return 
was 8.6% (a composite of 9.6% in the stock market and 7.1 % in the 
bond market). Over the first half of that span, the nominal rate was 
only 4.6% (4.8% stocks, 4.5% bonds); over the second half of that 
span, the nominal rate soared to 12.3% (14.2% stocks, 9.6% bonds). 
Even over much longer time horizons, the patterns are not stable. Be-
tween 1928 and 1948, the average rate of return was 3.5%; between 
1948 and 1968, 12.5%; between 1968 and 1988, 9.5%.11° 
109. During the mid-1980s, Michigan's pension funds moved from an investment mix of 
roughly 80% bonds and 20% stocks, to a mix of roughly 55% bonds and 45% stocks. Michigan 
Dept. of Treasury Release (Apr. 18, 1988) (Table 1, attached to memo from Jan W. Lyddon to 
Speaker Gary M. Owen, Michigan House of Representatives, April 19, 1988). 
110. Calculated from IBBOTSON AssoCIATES, supra note 42, at 174, 177. 
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As was the case with tuition inflation, it would be wonderful to 
have a complete econometric model and perfect knowledge of the fu-
ture behavior of the independent components of that model over the 
next eighteen years. Unfortunately, of course, no such model exists. 
In the absence of such a model, one is left to puzzle over whether a 
10% pre-tax total return assumption - high by long-term standards, 
but lower than the 1980s - should be deemed overly optimistic. 
While I certainly would not deem the assumption excessively cautious, 
neither am I prepared to think it so aggressive as to be beyond the 
bounds of fiduciary prudence. In the balance of this article, I shall 
therefore simply accept the MET Board's assumed pre-tax total return 
of 10% per year. 
Before moving on, however, I would like to offer two more graphs. 
There is great intuitive power in the suggestion that, whatever else 
may determine nominal rates of tuition inflation, and whatever else 
may determine nominal rates of total return on investments, both are . 
strongly affected by general price inflation in the marketplace. One 
might therefore expect the difference between investment returns and 
tuit_ion inflation to be a more interesting number thart either figure in-
dividually. The difference between MET's assumed return on invest-
. ment of 10% and MET's assumed rate of tuition inflation of 7.3% is 
2.5%. 111 The differences during the period from 1965-1966 to 1988-
1989 looked like this: 
111. Note that this is a geometric difference: 1.10 I 1.013 = 1.025. For an explanation of 
geometric differences, see supra note 27. 
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Over the entire period, investment returns ran 0.5% behind Michi-
gan tuition inflation. During the first half, they ran 4.3% behind; dur-
ing the span from 1976-1977 through 1988-1989, they ran 3.2% 
ahead. Thinking about the relationship between investment returns 
and tuition inflation thus appears to give us no more stable benchmark 
than thinking about each component separately. One must still decide 
whether the next eighteen years are more likely to resemble the past 
ten or the past twenty. 
Slight guidance may be drawn from Figure 8, which provides the 
same information as that shown in Figure 7, except that it shows the 
individual year-to-year changes rather than the five-year smoothed 
averages: 
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Of the twenty-three year-to-year changes shown, only nine have in-
vestments outpacing tuition inflation by more than 1 %. The only pe-
riod in which they did so reliably was the spurt from 1981-1982 
through 1985-1986, .a period during which the stock market boomed 
and Michigan universities agreed to freeze their tuitions for two con-
secutive years. On balance, I would conclude that MET's assumption 
that investments will consistently outpace tuition inflation by 2.5% is 
optimistic when compared with the historical record. A geometric dif-
ference of only 1.2% per year (the difference one would obtain by pro-
jecting tuition inflation at 8.7% per year) is surely easier to defend as 
within the range of prudence. 
b. The effects of federal taxes. How much MET will have avail-
able to pay to any particular cohort is a function of more than just the 
amount MET will earn on its investments. It depends as well on how 
much of its earnings MET will have to share with the federal govern-
ment. MET's actuarial soundness is a function of its after-tax 
earnings. 
Three different categories of tax problems can affect MET's after-
tax earnings. One category involves MET's marginal income tax rate, 
which depends upon how MET itself is viewed for federal tax pur-
poses. A charitable organization or an integral part of the state gov-
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ernment would face a marginal rate of zero percent. A trust would 
face a marginal rate of 28%. An association taxed as a corporation 
would face a marginal rate of 34%. 
A second category of tax problem involves the tax treatment of 
different types of potential investments. For example, if MET were to 
buy tax-exempt municipal bonds, it would pay no tax on interest 
earned from those bonds. (Of course, such bonds generally have a 
lower return than the pre-tax returns available from portfolios such as 
that used for analysis in the previous section.) 
A third category of tax problem involves the tax treatment of pay-
ments between ME:r and the beneficiaries. Must MET pay tax on the 
money it receives by selling contracts? May it take a deduction when 
it pays a beneficiary's tuition? 
In setting prices, MET's Board of Directors made the following 
assumptions with regard to each of these categories: 
(1) MET will be treated as an "association taxable as a corporation" 
and will accordingly face a marginal rate of 34%. 
(2) By investing 75% of its funds in deferred annuities, MET will be 
able to avoid paying any tax on the earnings from those annuities. 
(3) MET will not owe any tax on the money it receives by selling 
contracts, and MET will be able to take a deduction to the extent its 
payment of a beneficiary's tuition exceeds what the beneficiary initially 
paid to buy the contract. 
The net result of these assumptions is that the MET Directors as-
sumed the overall effective rate of tax on their investments was ap-
proximately 12%. 
In this section, I review those assumptions in detail. I conclude 
that the first assumption is appropriate, that the second assumption is 
unsupportable, and that the third assumption is probably only half 
right. I also explore an alternative theory that has a stronger chance 
of success than the tax assumptions used by MET's Board of Direc-
tors, but that I conclude is ultimately unlikely to prevail. 
I should emphasize at this point that it is possible for MET's tax 
assumptions to prevail. MET may not be audited. Even if MET is 
audited, the application of the tax laws to new situations is sometimes 
difficult to predict. Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service may tem-
per a dispassionate interpretation of existing authorities with a sensi-
tivity to more overtly political considerations. Finally, Congress may 
intervene and o_ffer MET favorable tax treatment directly. 
My goal in this section is thus not to predict the ultimate outcome 
of a fight between MET and the IRS. Rather, I would like to make a 
more general observation about the nature of the MET Board's behav-
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ior. My point is· that, by making such optimistic tax assumptions 
without the benefit of either a ruling from the IRS or an opinion letter 
from tax counsel, the MET Board took a significant risk. For, as I 
shall demonstrate, if MET had adopted a price structure based on 
more cautious tax assumptions, it would have collected 25% more 
money from the participants ____: even if it kept its nontax actuarial 
assumptions unchanged. 
(I appreciate that not all readers of this article may be interested in 
understanding the range of challenging questions of federal tax doc-
trine presented by a program such as MET. Such readers are welcome 
to proceed to section 11.B.2.c 011. page 1106, infra. I ask only that they 
accept the proposition that the MET Board of Directors based its 
prices on a set of tax assumptions that carry an extremely high risk of 
being proved inaccurate.) . 
i. ls MET a tax-exempt entity? In calculating prices for MET's 
Board of Directors, the actuaries assumed that MET would not benefit 
from any of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that might 
arguably make it tax-exempt. 112 That assumption is consistent with 
rulings issued to MET by the Internal Revenue Service.113 Yet even 
though the actuaries did not assume that MET would be tax exempt 
when they calculated the price of MET contracts, they did - as a 
means to give comfort about. the overall soundness of the trust -
stress the possibility that MET might some day be held to be tax-
exempt.114 
Why might MET be tax-exempt? In its initial ruling request, MET 
had advanced· two arguments to support exemption: (1) that MET is 
an "integral part of the state," directly exempted by the principle of 
"intergovernmental tax immunity"; and (2) that MET's income will 
"accrue" to the state out of the exercise of an "essential governmental 
function" and be exempt under section 115 of the Internal Revenue 
112. See 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIONS - ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 1. 
113. See Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988); MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, May 
2, 1989, at 3-4 (statement of Lawrence Owen). 
114. In its reports of June 17, 1988, and August 24, 1988, Coopers & Lybrand commented 
that "S01(c)(3) or other tax-exempt status may be obtained!!!" 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIONS 
-ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 3; 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIONS - PREMIUMS, supra note 67, 
at 3. In its oral report to the Board of Directors on September 20, 1988, Coopers & Lybrand 
indicated that the Detroit law firm of Miller, Canfield, Paddock, and Stone had "expressed a 
strong likelihood MET will receive S01(c)(3) status." MET Minutes, supra note 72, Sept. 20, 
1988, at 4. And in a conversation in July 1988, the Chairman ofMET's Board insisted that the 
trust would ultimately be declared tax-exempt, "like the lottery commission." 'Interview with 
Robert A. Bowman, Michigan Treasury Secretary (July 19, 1988) (Notes of John Furman, copy 
on file with Michigan Law Review) [hereinafter Meeting, July 19, 1988]. 
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Code. 115 Later, MET advanced the argument that it was a 501(c)(3) 
charitable organization. None of these approaches moved the IRS. In 
this section, I shall review the merits of each argument, concluding 
that the MET Board should not for any purposes rely on the possibility 
of tax exemption. In particular, the MET Board should not act as if 
risky positions in other areas are somehow "balanced out" by the pos-
sibility of a tax exemption. 
The principle of "intergovernmental tax immunity" has a long and 
somewhat tempestuous history. 116 At present, it is understood to ex-
empt states (and "integral parts" of states) from certain kinds of fed-
115. Ruling request letter from Burton Leland and Robert Bowman to Thomas Lyden of the 
Internal Revenue Service, at 9, 10 (Feb. 19, 1987) (copy on file with Michigan Law Review). 
116. The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity protects the federal government from 
state taxation. See California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2228 
(1989). More significantly for MET, it also provides slightly more limited protection to state 
governments from federal taxation, and it is that aspect of the doctrine that interests me here. 
The doctrine, which is reviewed at length in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 515-27 
(1988), has had two components, which have moved in opposite directions over time. 
The first component deals with taxation of activities of the states themselves. Until the mid-
1940s, only the states' "essential governmental functions" (as opposed to nonessential proprie-
tary activities) enjoyed tax immunity. See, e.g., Allen v. Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 
304 U.S. 439, 452 (1938); Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U.S. 218, 225 (1938); Brush v. Commis-
sioner, 300 U.S. 352, 361-62 (1937); Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214, 227 (1934); Ohio v. 
Helvering, 292 U.S. 360, 368-69 (1934); Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523-24 
(1926); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911); South Carolina v. United States, 199 
U.S. 437, 454-63 (1905). More recently, however, the Supreme Court has moved away from 
efforts to have the constitutional issue tum on an essential/nonessential distinction. See Helver-
ing v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 579-82, 586 
(1946) (opinions of Frankfurter, J., joined by Rutledge, J., and of Stone, C.J., concurring, joined 
by Reed, Murphy, and Burton, JJ.); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 
541-47 (1985); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523-26 nn.14-15. The rule of those cases 
would appear to be that states may be taxed directly, even on "essential functions,'' as long as the 
federal government does so in a nondiscriminatory manner. But see New York v. United States, 
326 U.S. at 586-88 (Stone, C.J., concurring). Some lower courts, however, continue to apply the 
"essential governmental function" test in evaluating intergovernmental tax immunity cases. E.g., 
Ohio County & Indep. Agric. Socys. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126, 1132 (1982); 
Troy State Univ. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 493, 499 (1974). 
The second component deals with federal taxation of people who deal with state govern-
ments. Between 1871and1937, this component of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity 
was thought to be quite broad, prohibiting the federal government from taxing the states but also 
prohibiting the federal government from taxing people who dealt with state governments if the 
tax would "burden" the state's efforts to perform an essential function. See, e.g., Collector v. 
Day, 78 U.S. (11 Walt.) 113 (1870); Pollock·v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); 
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 
570 (1931); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932). 
Since 1938, however, this component of the doctrine has contracted dramatically. See, e.g., 
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938) (overruling Burnet and Gillespie); 
Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405 (confining Day to its facts); Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe, 306 
U.S. 466 (1939) (overruling Day); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (overruling 
Pollock). 
Today, most problems involving the doctrine concern disputes over whether a particular en-
tity is part of the state (and therefore entitled to immunity) or not. See Massachusetts v. United 
States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978); Rev. Rut. 87-2, 1987-1 C.B. 18 (state supreme court created, super-
vised, and controlled a Lawyer Trust Account Fund, whose earnings were disbursed for public 
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eral taxes. 117 The IRS ruling concluded that MET is not an "integral 
part" of the State of Michigan on the basis of four observations: 
(a) MET's funds are not derived from the state; 
(b) MET's funds are not subject to the claims of state creditors; 
(c) Michigan cannot use MET's funds for any purpose other than to 
pay the tuition and cash refunds to which individual beneficiaries may be 
entitled; and 
(d) MET's Board is not subject to supervision by any other state 
agency. 118 
The point of these four observations is that MET is a world unto itself 
within state government. The first three demonstrate that MET is ec-
onomically sealed off from the rest of state government. The last dem-
onstrates that it is administratively sealed off. Taken together, they 
make it easy to conclude that MET is not such an "integral part" of 
the sovereign state of Michigan that the state would be burdened if 
MET were taxed. 119 
MET's second argument to the IRS - that it is exempt under sec-
tion 115 of the Code - was properly rejected as well. Section 115 
exempts income that is "derived from any public utility or the exercise 
of any essential governmental function and accruing to a State 
•••• "
120 The legislative history of that very old and somewhat cryptic 
language strongly supports the view that it was intended to be no more 
than a codification of the principle of intergovernmental tax 
immunity.121 
purposes rather than for the benefit of the clients who supplied the principal); Rev. Rul. 77-261, 
1977-2 C.B. 45; Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,315 (Dec. 21, 1984). . 
See generally Powell, The Waning of Intergovernmental Tax Immunities, 58 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
633, 664-65 (1945). 
117. Authorities are divided over whether states are immune from federal taxes that would 
"unduly burden" their functioning so as to threaten their sovereignty or whether they are im-
mune merely from discriminatory federal taxes. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. at 523 
n.14 (acknowledging but not resolving the question). 
118. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988). 
119. The conclusion is easily consistent with the line of authorities that makes state-run li-
quor stores tax-exempt, see Rev. Rul. 71-132, 1971-1 C.B. 29; ~ev. Rul. 71-131, 1971-1 C.B. 29, 
but makes state-created savings-and-loan-insurance corporations taxable, see Maryland Savings-
Share Ins. Corp. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 761, 767-68 (D. Md. 1970), revd. on other 
grounds, 400 U.S. 4, 7 n.2 (1970) (per curiam). In the former case, federal taxation confiscates 
money that would otherwise enter state coffers; in the latter case, it does not. 
120. l.R.C. § 115 (1988). 
121. This language entered the tax laws in 191~. Tariff of 1913, ch. 16, § IIG(a), 38 Stat. 
114, 172. It was reproduced, with only minor stylistic changes and an updated grandfathering 
proviso, in the Revenue Act of 1916. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 1 l(b), 39 Stat. 756, 767. It 
was carried forward, again with only minor stylistic- changes, into a subsequent Revenue Act, 
and into the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and ultimately became § 115 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 116(d), 45 Stat. 791, 823; Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1939, ch. 2, § 116(d), 53 Stat. 1, 49; Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 
591, § 115, 68A Stat. 1, 35. The grandfathering proviso dealing with income in the hands of 
public utilities that was to be turned over to the state was not deleted until 1976, when it was 
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Over the years, the courts and the IRS have treated the provision 
as requiring a different form of analysis from the principle of intergov-
ernmental tax immunity, but have not allowed it to produce different 
results. The courts have construed the word "accrue" narrowly, ap-
plying section 115 only when an integral part of a state or municipal 
government has "a vested right" or "an enforceable claim" to the 
money. They have not found the accrual requirement satisfied when 
income or a benefit merely "inures" to a state or when unused earn-
ings may, at some future time, be delivered to the state treasury. 122 
Moreover, while the General Counsel's Office at the IRS has used· a 
less stringent interpretation of "accrual" than have the courts, it too 
has produced the same pattern of results that one finds under the prin-
ciple of intergovernmental tax immunity.123 
declared obsolete. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-4S5, § 1901(a)(19), 90 Stat. 1S20, 
1766. 
The original 1913 House bill, H.R. 3321, did not explicitly exempt state and municipal corpo-
rations from the corporate income tax. The Senate Finance Committee added an amendment 
affirming that states would never be taxed on their revenues, from any source. SO CONG. REC. 
2513-14, 3867 (1913). On the floor of the Senate, the Committee went further. Speaking for the 
Committee, Senator Simmons persuaded the Senate to exempt the income of public utilities, at 
the public utility level, to the extent that such income was ultimately to be passed through to the 
state. 50 CoNG. REc. 4380 (1913). In Conference, however, both the main provision and the 
proviso were cut back to exempt revenue derived by a governmental body from a corporation, 
but.not the revenues· derived by that corporation from its business. SO CONG. REc. S320-21 
(1913) (remarks of Sen. Shively). 
122. Such an interpretation is consistent with the understanding that Senator Shively 
presented to the Senate at the completion of the Conference that produced the final language. SO 
CoNG. REc. 5320-21 (1913); see also Troy State Univ. v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 493, 497 (1974); 
City of Bethel v. United States, S94 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979); 
Ohio Cty. & Indep. Agric. Socys. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126, 1134 (1982); Omaha 
Pub. Power Dist. v. O'Malley, 232 F.2d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 3S2 U.S. 837 
(1956); Town of Fairhaven v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 19S6); Keokuk & Hamil-
ton Bridge, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 249 (1949), revd., 180 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1950); Bear 
Gulch Water Co. v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1281 (1939), ajfd., 116 F.2d 97S (9th Cir.1941), 
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 652 (1941); Citizens' Water Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 750, 753 
(1935), ajfd., 87 F.2d 874 (8th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 694 (1937). 
But cf Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 761, 76S (D. Md. 
1970), revd. on other grounds, 400 U.S. 4 (1970), which found that the state-run savings and loan 
insurance mechanism failed to satisfy§ 115's "accrual" test through "a weighing of how central 
the activity sought to be taxed is to the operation of state government and of how directly taxa· 
tion of the income of the activity will burden the state treasury." But see Keokuk & Hamilton 
Bridge, Inc. v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 19SO) (corporation formed to run toll bridge, 
pay off outstanding mortgage, and turn it over to city; § 11S applies). 
123. Early on, the Internal Revenue Service released a confusing General Counsel's Memo· 
randum that at one point indicated that§ 115 applies "to that part of the income of a corporation 
engage_d in the operation of a public utility or in the performance of some governmental function 
which accrues to a State or municipality by virtue of its ownership of such corporation." Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 14,407, 14-1 C.B. 103, 105 (1935) (emphasis added), superseded by Rev. Rul. 71-
131, 1971-1 C.B. 28. Other portions of the memorandum, however, referred only to efforts to 
collect taxes from states and municipalities, and the ultimate conclusion was simply that the 
State of Montana itself was not subject to taxation. Id. at 105-07. 
More recently, the IRS has taken the position that, while the intergovernmental tax immu-
nity principle applies only to "integral parts" of governments, mere "instrumentalities" of the 
state (which, unlike "integral parts," must file federal income tax returns) may nonetheless be 
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MET's economic isolation from the rest of state government thus 
keeps it outside the protection of section 115 as well. The state gives 
no money to MET; MET gives no money to the state. Indeed, MET's 
situation is virtually indistinguishable from that of the Maryland Sav-
ings-Share Insurance Corporation (MSSIC) - the entity established 
by the state of Maryland to insure its savings and loan institutions and 
to thereby inspire citizen confidence in them. And the United States 
Supreme Court, in an obscure but pellucid footnote, held MSSIC to be 
ineligible for section 115 protection.124 
After the IRS rejected the intergovernmental immunity and sec-
covered by § 115 if their income "accrues" to the state. Rev. Rul. 77-261, 1977-2 C.B. 45; see 
also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,601 at n.1 (Jan. 30, 1987); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,315 (Dec. 21, 1984) 
(§ 115 can exempt income in the hands of entities that are not "integral parts of states," which 
makes it unnecessary to determine whether the board in question is or is not "integral"); Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 39,006 (June 28, 1983); Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,657 (Aug. 31, 1978); Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 34,704 (Dec. 2, 1971) (intergovernmental tax immunity applies to "integral parts" of the 
state; § 115 applies to "instrumentalities" of the state that are not "integral parts"). But cf. Gen. 
Couns. Mem. 38,471 (Aug. 13, 1980) (any organization whose income is excluded under § 115 is 
a "state institution" within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § I.6033-2(g)(l)(v)). 
And in deciding whether income "accrues" to the state, the IRS has been satisfied in a range 
of situations that fall short of actual or constructive receipt, as long as there is clear evidence that 
the income will eventually wind up in state coffers and not in the hands of private citizens. See 
Rev. Ru!. 77-261, 1977-2 C.B. 45, 46 (state had "an unrestricted right to receive in [its] own right 
[its] proportionate share of the investment [entity]'s income as it is earned"); Rev. Rul. 59-41, 
1959-1 C.B. 13 (city established and issued bonds for a nonprofit water corporation that it would 
control and manage, with any surplus after bond amortization to be paid to the general fund); 
Rev. Ru!. 57-151, 1957-1 C.B. 64 (county established a trust to provide utility services, whose 
funds would, upon liquidation, be distributed to the county); Rev. Ru!. 54-296, 1954-2 C.B. 59 
(city formed a corporation to improve and rent out a municipal building); see also Gen. Couns. 
Mem. 39,006 (June ~8, 1983). 
124. United States v. Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 7 n.2 (1970). 
The IRS letter ruling to MET on the § 115 issue is, admittedly, somewhat peculiar. Instead 
of emphasizing MET's relationship to the rest of state government, the IRS emphasized the 
relationship between MET and the citizenry at large. The letter ruling to MET declared that 
§ 115 does not apply to any activity that serves a private interest in ways that are not "incidental 
to the public interest." Priv. Ltr. Ru!., 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988). According to the letter rul-
ing, "The basic principle underlying section 115 is that property (including any income thereon) 
must be devoted to purposes which are considered beneficial to the community in general, rather 
than particular individuals." The ruling concluded that because MET provides "a direct eco-
nomic benefit" to contract beneficiaries and nobody else, it does not satisfy that standard. Id. 
The problem with that analysis is that it is incomplete. It fails to explain why the benefits for 
MET contract beneficiaries are not merely "incidental to the public interest" in encouraging 
savings for college. After all, most public programs distribute their benefits unequally. Water 
utilities are more beneficial to people who take many showers. Schools are more beneficial to 
children and their parents. 
To be sure, if one wished to distinguish MET from schools and public utilities on functional 
rather than structural grounds, it would not be hard. Section 115 refers only to income derived 
from "essential governmental functions"; investment management for parents with money to set 
aside for their children's college education could plausibly be deemed "non-essential." The fed-
eral government has, in other contexts, denied tax benefits to state governments when they act 
simply as money managers. I.R.C. §§ 103(b)(2), 148 (1988) (denying tax exemption for munici-
pal bonds whose proceeds are intentionally used to acquire higher-yielding investments). But if 
the IRS wished not to rely on the simple structural argument, the letter ruling's approach was 
not the right one to take. 
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tion 115 arguments, MET then filed an application for an exemption 
under section 50l(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, as a "charitable 
. . . or educational" corporation. The IRS promptly rejected the 
application. 125 
Section 501(c)(3) applies by its terms only to organizations "no 
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual." MET provides no services.126 It is purely 
an economic enterprise designed to help investors' savings keep up 
with tuition inflation. Moreover, if MET's earnings do not keep up 
with tuition inflation, those individuals will be harmed because MET 
will have to dissolve.127 Thus, all of MET's net earnings inure to the 
benefit of specifically identifiable private individuals - the MET 
beneficiaries. 
ii. The treatment of MET investments in deferred annuities. 
While the assumption by MET's actuaries that it will not be tax-
exempt is thus appropriate, the same cannot be said of the assumption 
that it could place seventy-five percent of its money into an Annuity 
Fund, use that money to purchase deferred annuities from life insur-
ance companies, and not owe any taxes on the annual increment in the 
annuities' value.12s 
Under the Internal Revenue Code, when a natural person 
purchases a deferred annuity from a life insurance company, taxation 
of the so-called "inside buildup" of the annuity is deferred until the 
annuity is paid out. Deferral, while obviously less valuable than com-
plete exemption from taxation, nonetheless has significant economic 
value because it permits interest to compound more rapidly. During 
the early 1980s, it became popular for employers to purchase deferred 
annuities as a form of tax-favored deferred compensation for employ-
ees that would not have to comply with ERISA's rigorous require-
ments for qualified pension plans.129 
125. I have not seen a copy of either the exemption application or the IRS ruling, but both 
have been referred to in the Minutes of the Board. See, e.g., MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, 
July 11, 1989. 
126. It is thus different from entities like churches and social clubs that provide noncash 
benefits to particular individuals who elect to participate. 
127. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 390.1433 sec. 13(2) (West 1988). On the tax significance, 
see, for example, Rev. Rul. 66-259, 1966-2 C.B. 214 (trust not tax-exempt where principal ulti· 
mately reverts to creator, since any gains derived from investing and reinvesting the principal 
would inure to the benefit of an individual). 
128. See 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIONS - ANALYSIS, supra note 67; 1988 ACTUARIAL 
AssUMPTIONS - PREMIUMS, supra note 67. 
129. Among the most significant of ERISA's requirements are the antidiscrimination rules: 
the plan may not discriminate in favor of highly compensated employees as to coverage, and it 
may not simultaneously discriminate as to both contributors and benefits. I.R.C. §§ 40l(a)(4), 
40l(a)(5) (1988); I.R.C. § 40l{a)(26) (1988). 
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As part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Congress attempted to 
restrict the attractiveness of deferred annuities as tax shelters.130 One 
change raised the penalty tax on withdrawals from deferred annuities 
before the beneficiary reaches 591/2 years old.131 A second change cre-
ated a new section 72(u) of the Code, which denies the benefits of tax 
deferral unless the annuity is held by a natural person.132 MET is not 
a natural person.133 Thus, at first blush, section 72(u) would appear to 
130. The House Report describes the changes as follows: 
Under present law, income credited to a deferred annuity contract is not taxed currently 
to the owner of the contract or to the insurance company issuing the contract .... 
The committee believes that the present-law rules relating to deferred annuity contracts 
present an opportunity for employers to fund, on a tax-favored basis, significant amounts of 
deferred compensation for employees. This favorable tax treatment may create a disincen-
tive for employers to provide benefits to employees under qualified pension plans, which are 
subject to significantly greater restrictions ..•• 
Further, the committee believes that tax incentives for savings should not be provided 
unless the savings generally are held for retirement. The committee notes that other forms 
of tax-favored savings (e.g., IRAs) are subject to higher additional taxes on early withdraw-
als .••. 
Under the bill, if any annuity contract is held by a person who is not a natural person 
(such as a corporation), then the contract is not treated as an annuity contract for Federal 
income tax purposes and the income on the contract for any taxable year is treated as ordi-
nary income received or accrued by the owner of the contract during the taxable year. 
In addition, the bill extends the additional income tax on early withdrawals from quali-
fied plans and IRAs to deferred annuity contracts. 
H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. vol. 2, at 703-04. 
131. I.R.C. § 72(q) (1988). 
132. I.R.C. § 72(u) (1988) reads as follows: 
TREATMENT OF ANNUITY CONTRACTS NOT HELD BY NATURAL PERSONS 
(1) IN GENERAL - If any annuity contract is held by a person who is not a natural 
person-
(A) such contract shall not be treated as an annuity contract for purposes of this subti-
tle, and 
(B) the income on the contract for any taxable year of the policyholder shall be treated 
as ordinary income received or·accrued by the owner during such taxable year. 
For purposes of this paragraph, holding by a trust or other entity as an agent for a 
natural person shall not be taken into account. 
(2) INCOME ON THE CONTRACT -
(A) IN GENERAL - For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "income on the con-
tract" means, with respect to any taxable year of the policy-holder, the excess of -
(i) the sum of the net surrender value of the contract as of the close 
of the taxable year plus all distributions under the contract received dur-
ing the taxable year or any prior taxable year, reduced by 
(ii) the sum of the amount of net premiums under the contract for 
the taxable year and prior taxable years and amounts includible in gross 
income for prior taxable years with respect to such contract under this 
subsection. 
Where necessary to prevent the avoidance of this subsection, the Secretary may 
substitute "fair market value of the contract" for "net surrender value of the 
contract" each place it appears in the preceding sentence. 
(B) NET PREMIUMS - For purposes of this paragraph, the term "net premiums" 
means the amount of premiums paid under the contract reduced by any policyholder 
dividends. 
133. See S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. vol. 3, at 567 (not-
ing that a corporation or a trust is not a natural person). 
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make MET taxable on the annual increase in value of any annuities 
that it "holds." 
The key statutory language, however, is found at the end of subsec-
tion 72(u)(l), which provides that "holding by a trust or other entity 
as an agent for a natural person shall not be taken into account." If 
MET bought deferred annuities, would it hold them "as an agent" for 
the beneficiaries? The contract, drafted with this issue in mind, clearly 
speaks of MET buying annuities in the role of an "agent" so that the 
beneficiaries would be the owners of the annuities for tax purposes. 134 
But would that language be effective for tax purposes? 
In fact, there is a lot of law on this point. The tax laws are forever 
having to come to grips with two basic facts of our legal order. The 
first is that, like some natural persons, legally created "persons" have 
split personalities. They are separate entities with independent integ-
rity and at the same time conduits through which others pursue their 
own interests. The second is that "property rights" - rights between 
people to control the use of things - are susceptible to almost infinite 
subdivision among different persons, both legal and natural. 
The tax laws respond to the phenomenon of "legal persons" by 
working from the general premise that each person, legal or natural, is 
a separate taxpayer, unless there are special reasons to think other-
wise.135 Sometimes, as is the case with most corporations, that prem-
ise means that the same ite~ of "income" is taxed more than once. 
Sometimes, however, special rules operate to alleviate that sort of 
"double taxation."136 
The tax laws have had more trouble responding to the phenome-
non of fragmented ownership. It would be theoretically pure (at least 
for some theorists) to abandon the notion of "property" and to treat 
any legally enforceable right as an item of value for tax purposes. 
Each right could be assigned its own value and basis, depreciation 
schedule, and the like. It would also be administratively unworkable. 
Accordingly, the tax laws have in most cases chosen to work with the 
common law categories of property and to make one single person the 
"owner" for tax purposes of each item of property. 
134. CONTRACT, supra note 71, § 12(a). 
135. Examples of situations in which we think otherwise are when we permit married 
couples to file joint returns, l.R.C. § 6013 (1988), when we permit affiliated corporations to file 
consolidated returns, l.R.C. §§ 1501-05 (1988), and when we conclude that a given entity has no 
substantive existence and call it a "sham," see Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 
436 (1943). 
136. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 102 (1988) (exclusion of gift receipt from income of donee); I.R.C. 
§ 1361 (1988) (treatment of S Corporation as pass-through entity); I.R.C. § 665-67 (1988} 
(throwback rules for trusts). 
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To give a concrete example, I live with my family in a house in 
Ann Arbor and we rent out the upstairs floor to a changing cast of 
tenants. Legally, we "own" the whole house, subject to our making 
good on a set of continuing obligations for the future. The bank has a 
"mortgage interest" in it. Our tenants have a "leasehold interest" in 
part of it, subject to their making good on a set of continuing obliga-
tions for the future. If one were to think of the "house" as a function-
ing economic entity with a very long future life, the bank would own 
about seventy-five percent of it, we would own about twenty-five per-
cent of it, and the tenants would own virtually none of it. For tax 
purposes, however, we are treated as "owning" the whole thing. 
The tax laws' preference for not subdividing property any more 
than is absolutely necessary, 137 has brought with it the sometimes 
painful task of deciding who is the "true owner" of an item of property 
when rights are fairly evenly divided between two persons. Formal 
legal determinations of tax ownership have come in an extraordinary 
range of settings.138 Analytic commentary on those determinations 
has come to acknowledge that it is perhaps easier to describe rules of 
thumb used in particular commercial contexts than to describe over-
arching principles that unify the entire world of tax. 139 I would offer 
five very rough (and not particularly original) general principles: 
(1) The IRS and the courts tend to begin with the legal forms chosen 
by the parties and then recharacterize the transaction whenever they find 
the divergence between form and "substance" offensive to their 
sensibilities. 
(2) The sensibilities of the IRS and the courts are less likely to be 
offended by a divergence that harms the taxpayer than by a divergence 
that helps the taxpayer.140 
(3) In defining the "substance" of a situation, long-term economic 
exposure to changes in the market value of an asset almost always 
matters. 
137. This is not to say that it is not done. There are some examples borrowed from the 
common law of property (life estates and remainders, joint ownership, etc.) and others that are 
purely creatures of the tax laws (recognition of new entity, "constructive partnership" or "con-
structive trust"). 
138. See, e.g .. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 
112 (1940); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933). 
139. For the best articulation of this position, see lsenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance 
in Taxation (Book Review), 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 859 (1982); see also 1 B. BITIKER & L. LOKKEN, 
FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsrATES AND GIFrS 1]1] 4.3-4.4.3 (2d ed. 1989). 
140. Since taxpayers structure the transactions that are taxed, they can do so in ways that 
minimize the variance between economic income and taxable.income. If they choose not to, they 
can hardly blame the Commissioner. Moreover, it is often the case in such situations that, while 
a given form increases the tax burden of one party to a transaction, it also decreases the tax 
burden of another. A rule that emphasizes form over substance in such situations minimizes the 
risk that the government will be whipsawed by parties to an agreement who take logically incon-
sistent positions about the agreement's tax consequences. 
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(4) In definin'g the "substance" of a situation, short-term and inter-
mediate-term control over the use of an asset sometimes matters. 
(5) In defining the "substance" of a situation, the existence or nonex-
istence of a nontax motivation for choosing a particular form sometimes 
matters. 
MET's contracts adopted a form of words declaring that, if MET 
bought any annuities, it would be doing so merely as the beneficiaries' 
agent. 141 The substantive contractual ground rules, however, were 
that MET would have complete discretion over whether, when, and 
from whom to buy such annuities. 142 When the annuities came due, 
MET would apply as much of the proceeds as necessary to satisfy its 
obligations to the beneficiary143 and then would use the rest to satisfy 
its obligations under other MET contracts.144 The use of annuities 
would neither enlarge nor diminish the beneficiary's rights against 
MET.14s 
Whatever it may be, this is certainly not an agency agreement. As 
a matter of substantive right and obligation, MET is assigned all con-
trol over the decision to buy, sell, and manage the annuities. In addi-
tion, MET is assigned all the benefits and burdens associated with 
changes in the market value of any annuities it buys. 
At common law, the central distinguishing feature of an agency 
relationship is the right of the principal to control the agent. 146 "It is 
the element of continuous subjection to the will of the principal which 
distinguishes the agent from other fiduciaries and the agency agree-
ment from other agreements."147 In litigated cases treating a pur-
ported agency agreement as a "true agency" for tax purposes, the right 
141. CONTRACT, supra note 71, § 12(a) provides: 
SECTION 12. INVESTMENT THROUGH THE USE OF A GROUP ANNUITY. 
(a) If MET purchases a group annuity contract from a life insurance company as an in· 
vestment of funds received under this Contract, then an annuity will be issued in the name 
of the Beneficiary in conjunction with his or her status as a Beneficiary. For all state and 
federal tax purposes, the Beneficiary shall be considered the owner of any annuity contract 
so purchased. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. § 12(b) provides: 
MET is hereby designated to act as the agent of the Purchaser and Beneficiary in conjunc-
tion with all aspects of the annuity. As agent, MET's duties shall include, but shall not be 
limited to, the duty to effectuate a direct transfer of the annuity proceeds upon maturity of 
the annuity necessary to fulfill obligations under this Contract. 
144. Id.§ 12(c) provides: "Upon maturity of any annuity, the proceeds of that annuity may 
be used to fulfill obligations of contracts under this Plan." 
145. Id. § 12(d) provides: "The use of a group annuity contract as a means of investing 
funds received under the Contract will neither increase nor diminish the rights or obligations of 
any Person having an interest in this Contract." 
146. While necessary to a finding of agency, control is not always sufficient. See Commis-
sioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 346 (1988) (discussing National Carbide Corp. v. Commis· 
sioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949)). 
147. Restatement 2d of Agency (1958) (comment on subsection (1), ~ b); see also id. §§ 14 
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of the principal to direct the agent has been clear.148 But no benefici-
ary child can require MET, for example, to cash in his or her annuity 
and reinvest the proceeds in something else. And no beneficiary child 
can direct MET to cash in the annuity and give him or her the pro-
ceeds; the only bases for such a "termination" of the MET contract 
involve turning eighteen, dying, becoming disabled, or getting permis-
sion from the MET Board of Directors.149 
Outside the context of "agency" disputes, control has not always 
been a prerequisite to tax ownership, provided that the formal "owner" 
retained in fact a direct long-term financial stake in the ultimate mar-
ket value of the asset. This "burdens and benefits of ownership test," 
sometimes known as the "upside potential/downside risk" test or the 
"beneficial ownership" test, has come to assume a central role in deter-· 
mining whether what is in form a lease will be respected for tax 
purposes.1so 
(control by principal), 14B (agency and trust), 14C (agent or director), 14F (judicially appointed 
fiduciaries). 
148. See Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340, 345, 349 (finding corporation to be agent of partnership 
where agency agreement specified that "the partnership would have sole control of and responsi-
bility for the apartment complex"); United States v. Raphan, 759 F.2d 879, 881-82 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (agent had "no real interest in or duties or responsibilities in respect to the Property except 
to perform ministerial tasks at the written direction and instruction of Princpal"); Carver v. 
United States, 412 F.2d 233, 240 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (agent holding title to property, which is "to be 
dealt with or conveyed upon the joint direction of said parties"); Schlosberg v. United States, 
81-1USTC119272, at 86,677 (E.D. Va. 1981) (principal had "actual command" over the income 
and benefits of the property); Ourisman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 171, 186 (1984) (reviewed) 
(principals "continued to act as principals with respect to every aspect of the construction pro-
ject"; agent's activities were "minimal"). · 
Moreover, as these cases are careful to explain, this right of "control" has been exercised 
directly through an agreement of agency,_ not indirectly through stock 0\\111ership or voting con-
trol. See National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949). See generally B. Brrr-
KER & L. LoKKEN, supra note 139, at 1J 6.2; Miller, The Nominee Conundrum: The Live Dummy 
Is Dead, but the Dead Dummy Should Live/, 34 TAX L. REv. 213 (1979). 
It is unfortunate that many of these cases (usually involving corporate agents) have blended 
their discussion of "true agency" with a discussion of the issue presented in Moline Properties, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943), whether the corporation is any more than a sham. 
Obviously, a nonsham corporation can still act as an agent for someone else. 
Even outside the field of self-styled "agency" cases, control has been a significant issue. For 
examples dealing with the problem of "wraparound annuities," see Rev. Ru!. 82-55, 1982-1 C.B. 
12; Rev. Ru!. 81-225, 1981-2 C.B. 12; Rev. Rul. 80-274,-1980-2 C.B. 27; see also Christoffersen v. 
United States, 749 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1984). ' 
149. CONTRACT, supra note 71, § 7(a)(l)-(6). 
150. The world of "true lease" cases is vast and arcane. For a representative introduction, 
see Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978); Helvering v. F. & R. Lazarus & Co., 
308 U.S. 252 (1939); Swift Dodge v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1982); Torres v. 
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 702 (1987); Cooper v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 84 (1987); Rice's Toyota 
World v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184 (1983), affd. in part, revd. in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 
1985); Rev. Ru!. 55-540, 1955-2 C.B. 39. In planning leveraged lease transactions, taxpayers 
have come to rely heavily on the true lease advance ruling "guidelines" published by the Internal 
Revenue Service. See Rev. Proc. 79-48, 1979-2 C.B. 529; Rev. Proc. 76-30, 1976-2 C.B. 647; 
Rev. Proc. 75-28, 1975-1 C.B. 752; Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715. For useful commentary, 
see Simonson, Determining Tax Ownership of Leased Property, 38 TAX LAWYER 1 (~984); 
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Once again, however, MET - not the beneficiary - is the "per-
son" who has the relevant financial stake. Should the annuities pay 
MET more than it happens to owe any particular child by way of 
tuition or refund, MET does not have to pay the excess money to that 
child. 151 Should MET go bankrupt, any annuity contracts held by , 
MET would apparently enter into the pool of MET assets and be sub-
ject to the claims of general creditors. And should the child go bank-
rupt, there is no basis under which the child's creditors may seize the 
annuity. 
In sum, there is virtually no reason to believe that MET could es-
cape taxation on earnings from any investments it might make in de-
ferred annuities. 
m. The treatment of payments to and from MET. MET receives 
money from parents in early years; MET will pay benefits to children 
(or to c.olleges on children's behalf) in later years. The actuaries as-
sumed that MET will not have to recognize any income when it re-
ceives money from a parent. 152 Moreover, they assumed that when 
MET subsequently makes payments under the contracts, it will be en-
titled to a deduction equal to the difference between the amount it 
received in selling the contract and the amount it must pay back. 153 
Neither of those assumptions is necessarily implausible, standing 
alone. For reasons I shall articulate in this section, however, it is diffi-
cult to maintain them both at the same time. 
The tax treatment of payments to MET from parents and from 
MET to children and colleges depends on how the MET contracts are 
characterized. Three possibilities suggest themselves. First, one might 
think of a MET contract as a contract for the sale of insurance, or 
higher education services, or credits: the parents pay their money 
early and receive the goods later. Second, one might think of a MET 
contract as a share of "stock": parents make an equity investment in 
MET early, and their investment is liquidated later. Third, one might 
think of a MET contract as a "loan" from the parent to MET: MET 
Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1075 (1981). 
151. See MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, July 21, 1988, at 8 (comments of attorney 
Lynn Stevens Naoum) ("[T]he purchaser is ... irrevocably appointing MET as the person in-
tended to receive earnings in excess of tuition costs. The beneficiary does not receive the annuity 
proceeds, rather MET receives them and then transfers them directly to the university."). 
152. This assumption is consistent with the Private Letter Ruling MET received from the 
IRS, which states in part, "payments made under the contract ... are excludable from the gross 
income of Trust." Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 88-25-027 (March 29, 1988). 
153. 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIONS - PREMIUMS, supra note 67. 
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repays the loan later, with the amount of "interest" dependent on 
where the child goes to school. 
Treating a MET contract as an insurance agreement, or a sale of 
some other service or good, would justify only one of the two actuarial 
assumptions. MET would be able to deduct its payments on those 
contracts. Unfortunately, it would not be able to deduct those pay-
ments until it makes them 154 and it would also have to include the 
amount it receives from selling the contracts in current income.155 
Similarly, treating a MET contract as an equity investment in 
MET - as stock - would also justify only one of the two actuarial 
assumptions. MET would not recognize any income when it sells the 
contracts.156 Unfortunately, MET would not be able to deduct any 
portion of its payments to children or colleges under the contract. 
Such payments would merely be distributions "with respect to its 
stock."157 
The only characterization of a MET contract that is consistent 
)Vith both actuarial assumptions is to treat a MET contract as a loan. 
Corporations that borrow money may exclude the loan proceeds from 
income. They may also deduct whatever interest they pay up to and 
including the final repayment of principal.158 Thus, MET may be 
thinking of its contracts as long-term loans from the beneficiaries159 
that earn "interest" over time in amounts that depend upon whether 
and where the beneficiary goes to college. 
154. Even assuming MET uses the accrual method of accounting, the "all events test" is not 
satisfied until one knows where the child is going to college. 
155. See Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Automobile Assn. v. 
United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 
(1957). Elective statutory exceptions exist for prepaid subscriptions to periodicals and for pre-
paid dues of certain membership organizations. l.R.C. §§ 455, 456 (1988). Other exceptions 
exist for long-term building, installation, construction, and certain manufacturing contracts, see 
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-3 (1989), for trading stamps, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-4 (1989), and for taxpayers 
who postpone recognizing receipts for financial accounting purposes, Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5 
(1989). Obviously, none of these exceptions are available to MET. 
If MET were an insurance company dealing in particular forms of insurance according to the 
rules of Subchapter L, it could mitigate some of the burdens of having to include premiums in 
income to the extent it could show that some of the "premiums" were "unearned," or that it had 
in fact "incurred" certain losses before they were paid. See l.R.C. §§ 832(b)(4),(b)(5) (1988). It 
appears unlikely, however, that MET's particular brand of insurance would satisfy those require-
ments. See Maryland Savings-Share Ins. Corp. v. United States, 644 F.2d 16 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Rev. 
Rul. 61-167, 1961-2 C.B. 130. 
156. I.R.C. § 1032 (1988). One might stretch to characterize the payment as a mere contri-
bution to MET's "capital," see I.R.C. § 118 (1988), but without much plausibility, since the 
"contributors" would have no other interest in the business association. 
157. I.R.C. § 311 (1988). 
158. I.R.C. § 163 (1988). 
159. The "loan" would run from the beneficiary rather than the purchaser, since the pur-
chaser is presumed to have made a completed gift to the beneficiary on the date the contract is 
purchased. 
1096 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1035 
The courts and the IRS have a great deal of experience in deciding 
whether or not to characterize a given transaction as a loan. Unfortu-
nately, they have not been able to offer hard and fast rules, largely 
because loans have much in common with both long-term contracts 
and equity investments. All three transactions allow one party to use 
the other party's money over time and (in one way or another) require 
the user of the money to compensate the supplier for that use. 160 
By far the greatest source of case law on the nature of indebtedness 
has come in the effort to distinguish debt from shareholder equity. 
Since both corporate dividends and corporate interest payments create 
income for an individual recipient, and since interest payments but not 
dividend payments give rise to deductions for the corporation, corpo-
rate taxpayers often like to have their obligations to investors charac-
terized as indebtedness for tax purposes. Unfortunately, the 
abundance of cases has brought confusion rather than clarity, and 
most commentators have given up trying to cut a path through the 
thicket. 161 In 1969, Congress asked the Treasury Department to pro-
mulgate regulations. 162 In 1980, the Treasury Department offered its 
best effort, but after minor modifications and several delays in the ef-
fective date, the new regulations were withdrawn in 1983.163 
160. Thus, the presence in the transaction of "compensation for the use or forbearance of 
money" - the most commonly quoted definition of "interest" deductible under I.R.C. § 163 
(1988), see, e.g., Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417 U.S. 134, 145 
(1974); United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 57 (1965); Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 
U.S. 488, 498 (1940) - is not enough to demonstrate that the transaction is a loan. 
161. See, e.g., Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness to Shareholders: "Thin Capitalization" and 
Related Problems, 16 TAX L. REV. 1 (1960); Kaplan & Yoder, New Variations on an Old 
Enigma: The Treasury Department's Debt-Equity Regulations, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 567; 
Madison, The Deductibility of''lnterest" on Hybrid Securities, 39 TAX LAW. 465 (1986); Plumb, 
The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal. 26 
TAX L. REV. 369 (1971); Pusker, Debt-Equity Guidelines Subsequent to Withdrawal of Proposed 
Regulations, 67 TAXES, 88 (1989); Robertson & Burckel, When ls Debt Synonymous With Eq-
uity? Re~ent Developments in the Classification of Hybrid Securities, 66 TAXES, 784 (1988); Stone 
& McGeehan, Distinguishing Corporate Debt from Stock Under Section 385, 36 TAX L. REV, 341 
(1981); Stone, Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the Corporation and Its Share-
holders, 42 TuL. L. REv. 251 (1968); Comment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity Dis-
tinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 118 (1985). 
The courts' difficulties were such that for a time it became something of a sport to count the 
number of distinct "factors" emphasized in different cases. Professor Plumb came up with 32. 
Plumb, supra at 411-12. Holzman, The Interest-Dividend Guidelines, 47 TAXES 4 (1969), gives 
38. 
162. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 415, 83 Stat. 487 (codified as amended 
at I.R.C. § 385 (1988)). 
163. See Treatment of Certain Interests in Corporations as Stock or Indebtedness, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 18,957 (1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R., Pt. I) (proposed March 24, 1980); T.D. 7747, 
1981-1 C.B. 141; T.D. 7774, 1981-1 C.B. 168; T.D. 7801, 1982-1 C.B. 60; Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 47 Fed. Reg. 164 (1982) (proposed Jan. 2, 1982); T.D. 7822, 1982-2 C.B. 84; Notice 
of Proposed Withdrawal of a Treasury Decision, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,053 (1983) (proposed July 6, 
1983); T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69. 
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The murky state of the law, and the shakiness of its connection to 
matters of economic substance, make it difficult to predict with cer-
tainty how a MET contract will ultimately be characterized. Yet, of 
the various possibilities, it seems most unlikely that MET contracts 
will ultimately be treated as loans. t64 
First, nothing in the contract suggests that it is providing benefits 
as a payment to compensate for the use of the beneficiary's "principal" 
(i.e., the contract purchase price) over time. Rather, the MET con-
tract describes itself as a contract for the provision of "Educational 
Benefits" - an agreement to pay for credit hours. 165 As one impor-
tant commentator has noted, "[a]lthough the label is not controlling, a 
failure to endow the instrument with enough indicia of debt may be a 
threshold barrier for the taxpayer who seeks an interest deduction."166 
Second, unlike the usual holder of a note or some other evidence of 
indebtedness, a MET contract beneficiary may not sell those credit 
hours. MET benefits may be transferred to someone else only under 
certain narrowly defined circumstances.167 
Third, the value of MET benefits is contingent - it depends, 
among other things, upon the beneficiary's choice of schools and the 
school's tuition level.in that year. 168 Indeed, if one accepts MET's 
own assumptions about the future, it will be giving a child who was in 
the tenth grade in 1988 and who chooses to attend Northern Michigan 
University "interest" at an annual rate of 0.9%, while giving "inter-
est" of 15.5% per year to her classmate who attends the University of 
Michigan at Ann Arbor. 169 And if tuition at Northern Michigan Uni-
versity were to go up more slowly than the actuaries predicted, or if 
164. It should not go unnoticed that MET itself argued to the IRS in its first ruling request 
that a MET contract is not a loan, but rather a "bona fide payment for services to be rendered." 
Letter from Burton Leland and Robert A. Bowman to Thomas J. Lyden, supra note 115, at 24. 
165. CONTRACT, supra note 71, § 2. 
166. 3 B. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, EsTATES AND GIFTS p 91.10.2 (1981); 
see also Goldstein, supra note 161, at 13; Madison, supra note 161, at 473-74. For cases looking 
at such factors, see Slappey Drive Indus. Park v. United States, 561 F.2d 572, 582 (5th Cir. 
1977); Richmond, F. & P. R.R. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1975); Milwaukee & 
Suburban Transp. Corp. v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 279, 283 (7th Cir. 1960); United States v. 
South Ga. Ry., 107 F.2d 3, 5 (5th Cir. 1939); Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 397 F. Supp. 
753, 758-60 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Kentucky River Coal Corp. v. Lucas, 51 F.2d 586, 587 (W.D. Ky. 
1931); Wynnefield Heights., Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 953, 959 (1966). 
167. CONTRACT, supra note 71, §§ 6, 13, 16(b); see also supra text accompanying note 85. 
168. Most cases that emphasize the "contingency" factor have involved contingencies con-
cerning the status of the debtor, not of the creditor. E.g., Fox v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 972, 
1018-23 (1983); Cuyuna Realty Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 298, 300 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Guardian 
Inv. Corp. v. Phinney, 253 F.2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Virgin, 230 F.2d 880, 
882 (5th Cir. 1956). For a case refusing to treat an obligation as "debt" because of contingencies 
relating to the creditor, see Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 726 F.2d 1569, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 
ajfg., 1 Cl. Ct. 108, 126-29 (1983). 
169. To calculate these numbers, one needs to know that in 1988 tuition at the University of 
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the child attended a year or tWo of community college before transfer-
ring to the university, the "creditor" could well receive less than a full 
repayment of "principal." It is difficult to imagine a theory that would 
characterize such arrangements as loans without also sweeping in 
most. contracts for term insurance. 
Finally, the value of MET benefits is contingent upon whether 
MET itself remains solvent throughout the intervening years. The 
contract provides that an annual actuarial review will be conducted 
"[i]n order to protect Purcha~ers and Beneficiaries."170 If the actua-
rial review finds MET to be actuarially unsound and if that situation 
cannot be rectified, then MET must liquidate and an individual desig-
nated by the contract Purchaser shall receive a pro rata share of MET 
assets. 171 Assuming MET had been operated in an actuarially sound 
manner up until that time, the liquidating distribution would reflect 
the Purchaser's initial contribution plus earnings accumulated at the 
Trust's after-tax income rate. 
In sum, a MET contract is a hybrid. It is in part an equity invest-
ment in a state-sponsored pooled-investment organization. (In that re-
gard it resembles in some ways an unregulated mutual fund that fails 
to qualify for the favored tax treatment given designated Regulated 
Investment Companies172 and is therefore taxed as if its shares are 
stock in a traditional corporation.) At the same time, a MET contract 
is also in form an insurance policy. As long as MET remains actuari-
ally sound, benefiqiaries appear, on the surface, to have shifted to 
MET the risk that they will attend a school whose tuition is unusually 
high or has increased at an extraordinarily high rate. 173 And, to be 
sure, there remains some chance that the IRS could be persuaded that 
MET contracts are a fancy new breed of variable-rate loan. 
What is significant about the MET Board's assumption is that it is 
the most daring of the three options. If that assumption is wrong, the 
Trust is in grave financial danger. The cost of error varies, depending 
upon whether MET's position with respect to deferred annuities 
prevails. But suppose, as is almost certainly the case, that MET's as-
sumption regarding deferred annuities does not prevail, and that MET 
makes the most sensible responsive adjustment - it invests so as to 
Michigan was $3178 per year, tuition at Northern Michigan University was $1729 per year, and 
the MET premium for a 10th grader was $9152. See supra, note 29. 
170. CONTRACT, supra note 71, § 8(c). 
171. Id. § 8, Item 16. 
172. I.R.C. §§ 851 (1988). 
173. The extent to which the risk of high tuition inflation has in substance been shifted is 
open to serious debate. See supra text accompanying note 46. 
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reap the higher returns available from a diversified portfolio. Then, 
even if all of MET's other assumptions are correct, MET's assumption 
that the contract will be treated as a loan is an assumption that 
projects MET to have 25% more money after taxes than it will if the 
contract is treated as a sales contract or as stock. 
iv. The road not taken: might MET be a trust? A full analysis of 
the likely tax treatment of MET requires more than a simple appraisal 
of the strength of the assumptions made by the actuaries. For there is 
one line of argument that was not relied upon by MET's actuaries but 
that has a respectable chance of success and would mitigate some of 
the costs of other errors. That line of argument would have MET be 
taxed as a trust and not as a corporation. Ultimately, I do not find the 
argument persuasive. But the possibility of success is sufficiently high, 
and the substantive tax issue is sufficiently interesting, that I shall 
devote this section to spelling it out in detail. 
MET is, after all, the Michigan Education Trust. Why would 
MET not be taxed as a trust? A trust faces a lower marginal tax rate 
than a "business association" taxed as a corporation.174 Moreover, 
whereas a business association and its associate must endure what is 
usually called "double taxation," a trust and its beneficiaries are 
spared most of those pains.17s 
The primary rules for determining how a particular organization 
should be classified for tax purposes were first articulated by the 
Supreme Court. In a ~eries of 1935 opinions, the Court articulated a 
set of tests for determining when an organization should be deemed a 
business association, taxable as a corporation, and when not. 176 The 
Treasury Department subsequently codified those tests in a set of regu-
lations that have come to take on something of a life of their own.177 
If one had to decide whether MET looked more like a partnership 
174. The highest marginal rate faced by a trust is presently 28%. I.R.C. § l(e) (1988). The 
highest marginal rate faced by a corporation is presently 34%. l.R.C. § 11 (1988). The term 
"corporation" is defined to include "associations" by I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1988). 
175. A corporation is not permitted a deduction for dividends paid, and individual share-
holders are taxed on the full amount of dividends they receive. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (1988); cf. 
I.R.C. § 243 (1988) (corporate shareholders of corporations taxed on less than full amount of 
dividends). 
A trust is given a deduction for the lesser of currently required distributions and distributable 
net income, see I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (1988), and beneficiaries of a "complex trust" are given the 
benefit of taxes previously paid by the trust under the so-called "throwback rule" of I.R.C. § 666 
(1988). 
176. Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Assocs., 296 U.S. 369 (1935); Helvering v. Combs, 296 
U.S. 365 (1935); Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935); Morrissey v. Commissioner, 
296 U.S. 344 (1935). The Morrissey opinion is the longest and is often cited alone. See also 
Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924). 
177. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1983). 
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or a corporation, the task would be simple. One would note that MET 
has the "corporate characteristics" of continuous life, 178 centralized 
management,179 and limited liability for its investors,180 but lacks the 
corporate characteristic of "free transferability of interests."181 Since 
it has three out of the four characteristics deemed typical of corpora-
tions, it would warrant taxation as a corporation.182 
Trusts, however, share those characteristics. Accordingly, the reg-
ulations require that the inquiry tum on two other characteristics -
the presence of "associates" and of "an objective to carry on business 
and divide the gains therefrom."183 If both features are present, the 
organization will be taxed as a corporation; if either is missing, it will 
be taxed as a trust.184 
Is MET "carrying on business"? The definitive opinion on the 
subject of whether an organization that does nothing but manage pas-
sive investments should be characterized as "carrying on business" 
was rendered by Learned Hand in 1941.185 Hand concluded that, if 
the trustee of such an organization is empowered only to protect or 
conserve trust property, it should not be seen as carrying on business; 
if, however, the trustee has the power "to vary the existing invest-
ments of all [beneficiaries] at will, for as long as any new money 
[comes] in, and in this way to take advantage of market variations to 
improve the investments even of the first investors," it should be 
treated as carrying on business. 186 Since MET has the authority -
indeed, the mission - to change its investments in order to take ad-
vantage of market variations so that all cohorts may benefit simultane-
ously, it easily .satisfies the "carrying-on-business" test. 
178. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b). 
179. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c). 
180. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d). 
181. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e). 
182. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a). 
183. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2). 
184. Another provision of the regulations might arguably be read as subordinating the "asso· 
ciates" question to the "carrying-on-business" question. It reads: 
Generally speaking, an arrangement will be treated as a trust .•. if it can be shown that the 
purpose of the arrangement is to vest in trustees responsibility for the protection and conser· 
vation of property for beneficiaries who cannot share in the discharge of this responsibility 
and, therefore, are not associates in a joint enterprise for the conduct of business for profit. 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1986). The Tax Court, at least, has declined to read the regulations 
that way, however, and has continued to treat the questions as separate. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 187-97. 
185. Commissioner v. North Am. Bond Trust, 122 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1941). 
186. 122 F.2d at 546; cf. Commissioner v. Chase Natl. Bank, 122 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1941) (no 
power to vary investments, so taxed as a trust); see also Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. United 
States, 19 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Rev. Rul. 86-92, 1986-2 C.B. 214; Rev. Rul. 78-149, 
1978-1 C.B. 448; Rev. Rul. 75-192, 1975-1 C.B. 384. 
April 1990] Social Irresponsibility 1101 
As for whether MET's beneficiaries should be characterized as "as-
sociates," the fact that the young children were not participants in 
MET's creation does not preclude them from being associates in its 
enterprise. 187 And at least in one sense, they are all "associated" with 
one another in the MET venture. It thus seems logical to conclude, as 
the actuarial ~ssumptions presume, that MET will be taxed as an 
association. 
Two recent Tax Court decisions, however, offer MET a line of ar-
gument that it has not yet pressed. Indeed, it is an argument that may 
be more promising than those MET has chosen to rely on. These cases 
hold that where beneficiaries neither participate in the creation of the 
trust nor affirmatively enter into the enterprise, "some further volun-
tary activity may be necessary on their part to satisfy the 'associates' 
requirement." 188 
In Elm Street Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 189 the court con-
cluded that under such circumstances whether a true association exists 
depends upon whether the beneficiaries have either (a) freely transfera-
ble interests, or (b) some ability to influence or otherwise participate in 
the trust's activities. 190 Two individuals transferred real estate to a 
trust and gave the trustees substantial authority to run the trust as a 
business enterprise. 191 The individuals (the original beneficiaries) 
promptly gave their beneficial interests to members of their families, 
who had little authority to transfer their interests or influence the 
trustees' management of the property. The court rebuffed the IRS' 
efforts to have the trust taxed as a business association. 
More recently, in Estate of Bedell Trust v. Commissioner, 192 the 
court had to struggle with a rather complicated testamentary trust 
that the IRS apparently had chosen as a test case.193 The court char-
acterized the testator as a "strong-willed person accustomed to being 
the dominant figure in his family and having his own way, who was 
emphatic upon seeing to it that only his blood descendants should ben-
187. See Swanson, 296 U.S. at 364; Roberts·Solomon Trust Estate v. Commissioner, 34 
B.T.A. 723 (1936), ajfd., 89 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1937). 
188. Elm St. Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 803, 814 (1981); accord Estate of Bedell, 
Trust v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1207 (1986); see also United States v. Davidson, 115 F.2d 799, 
801 (6th Cir. 1940); Curt Teich Trust No. One v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 884 (1956); Living 
Funded Trust of Lyman v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 161 (1937). 
189. 76 T.C. 803 (1981), acq., 1981-2 C.B. 1. 
190. 76 T.C. at 813-18. 
191. The authority was not, in fact, ever exercised. 76 T.C. at 810. 
192. 86 T.C. 1207 (1986), acq. in result, 1987-2 C.B. 1. 
193. See the court's recitation of facts, 86 T.C. at 1208-14, and criticism of the IRS, 86 T.C. 
at 1222, for its apparent selection of the case as a test case. 
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efit from his estate."194 Finding the beneficiaries' interests nontrans-
ferable, the court appeared to go beyond Elm Street Realty to find the 
fact of non transferability alone sufficient to preclude a finding that the 
beneficiaries were "associates."195 The court went on, however, to em-
phasize the additional fact that the beneficiaries did not control the 
management of trust assets. 196 · 
MET's beneficiaries did not create MET, did not purchase their 
own contracts, cannot transfer their interests except under very lim-
ited circumstances, and have no authority to influence the behavior of 
the MET Board of Directors. Thus, to the extent Bedell and Elm 
Street Realty are good law, MET might qualify as a trust, since it lacks 
"associates."197 Indeed, MET's beneficiaries' powers are even less sig-
nificant than those held by the beneficiaries in Bedell. 198 
One can legitimately question the wisdom of the Bedell-Elm Street 
Realty line of authority. It might open up opportunities to escape the 
corporate double tax, especially in the context of family businesses. 199 
Moreover, one may well find MET's particular form of publicly mar-
keted risk pooling and investment management to be farther down the 
path from trust to corporation than either of the organizations at issue 
in Bedell and Elm Street Realty. But given that the IRS now appears 
to be accepting that line of cases,200 one might also wonder why MET 
did not press the IRS for a ruling that it should be taxed as a trust.201 
194. 86 T.C. at 1219. 
195. See 86 T.C. at 1220. 
196. 86 T.C. at 1220-21. 
197. In Bedell Trust, the Commissioner, relying on Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b) (defining a 
trust as an arrangement to protect or conserve property), submitted the argument that in the case 
of investment trusts "associates" are not required. The court rejected this proposed construction 
of§ 301.7701-4(b), observing that it would be inconsistent with Treas. Reg.§ 301.7701-2(a) (set-
ting forth "associates" requirement). 86 T.C. at 1221. The court indicated, however, that if the 
Treasury Department wished to, it could amend the regulations to make the point clear. 86 T.C. 
at 1221 n.9. 
198. See A.O.D. CC-1987-001(July26, 1988) (noting that the Bedell beneficiaries had some 
authority to modify or terminate the trust). 
199. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 88-42-043 (July 26, 1988) (IRS approved "trust" status for a 
marital accumulation trust in which the beneficiary had the right to replace the trustee at any 
time (she could even appoint herself trustee) and the trustee had the right to liquidate the trust at 
any time). 
200. The IRS acquiesced in Elm St. Realty, 76 T.C. 803, see 1981-2 C.B. 1, and acquiesced in 
the result in Bedell, 86 T.C. 1207, see 1987-2 C.B. 1. See also Priv. Ltr. RuJ., 88-42-043 (July 26, 
1988); A.O.D. CC-1987-001, 88-42-043 (July 26, 1988). 
201. MET's initial ruling request never raised the possibility. Accordingly, the private letter 
ruling issued in response does not address the possibility directly. The ruling states, without' 
elaboration, that "payments made under the contract ••• are excludable from the gross income of 
Trust." Priv. Ltr. Ru!. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988). While that is consistent with viewing MET as 
a corporation and MET Contracts as stock, it is equally consistent with viewing MET as a trust, 
since the payments would merely be contributions to the trust on behalf of the beneficiary. 
On the other hand, the ruling goes on to say that the beneficiary will be taxed on the differ-
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If MET could persuade the IRS to tax it as a trust, what would the 
consequences be? Once again, the answer is not entirely clear. Section 
661(a) of the Code allows a trust to take a deduction for any distribu-
tions properly paid to beneficiaries, to the extent that such distribu-
tions do not exceed "the distributable net income" of the trust. Since 
in any given year MET can be expected to make distributions to only 
one eighteenth (5.5%) of its beneficiaries, but is expected to have gross 
earnings of 10% of its asset base each year, this approach seems to 
offer the possibility of excludable contributions and deductible 
distributions. 202 
One remaining obstacle to such treatment (beyond the hurdle of 
being classified as a trust to begin with) lies in the "separate share" 
rule of section 663(c). Where different beneficiaries have "substan-
tially separate and independent shares" in the trust, "distributable net 
income" is calculated share by share rather than in the aggregate. 203 
In MET's case, treating each separately priced cohort as a separate 
share would effectively make distributions deductible only to the ex-
tent of the very last year of MET earnings on the beneficiary's cohort's 
contribution. 204 
In determining whether the "separate-share" rule applies, the issue 
is whether the distributions "are to be made in substantially the same 
manner as if separate trusts had been created."205 A share may be 
considered as separate even though two or more beneficiaries have in-
determinate interests in one share which is separate and independent 
from another share. 206 Even if a trust has the power to give one class 
of beneficiaries more than is due according to its share, separate share 
treatment may still apply "if the possibility of exercise of the power is 
remote."207 In MET's case, it would be necessary to determine 
whether the possibility that one cohort's contributions might not cover 
its eventual withdrawals is "remote." If MET could demonstrate 
ence between the value of the tuition provided by MET and his or her "basis" in the Contract. 
Id. That language is not consistent with viewing MET as a trust. See I.R.C. §§ 662-63, 665-67 
(1988). 
202. Unfortunately for the beneficiaries, that would make all of the distribution includable in 
their income, not merely the portion identified in the private letter ruling. See I.R.C. § 662 
(1988). 
203. Treas. Reg. § 1.663 (c)-1, (c)-2, (c)-3, (c)-4. Separate share treatment is not a matter of 
taxpayer election. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-l(d). 
204. Even though that treatment would thus be of relatively little value to MET, it would be 
of great value to the beneficiary, who would then be able to take advantage of the "throwback 
rules" of I.R.C. §§ 665-66 (1988). 
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(a) (as amended, 1979). 
206. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(c) (as amended, 1979). 
207. Treas. Reg. § 1.663(c)-3(d) (as amended, 1979). 
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otherwise, it could escape separate-share treatment.208 
On balance, it seems unlikely that MET could persuade the IRS 
both that it should be treated as a trust and that the separate-share 
rule should not apply. Nonetheless, it is at least something of a puzzle 
that MET has never pressed the argument with the IRS. I shall ex-
plore the more general puzzle of how MET chose to make its tax as-
sumptions later, in section IIl.B. 
v. The effects of possible future changes in the tax law. In setting 
the price for a program that is projected to extend over eighteen years 
into the future, a full actuarial analysis must consider the possibilities 
of changes in the tax laws. Two possibilities in particular warrant 
consideration. 
First, as noted above, the actuaries assumed that MET is an associ-
ation taxable as a corporation at a marginal rate of 34%. That is, in 
fact, the current prevailing rate for corporations. The history of tax 
rates suggests that it is unlikely to remain the current rate indefi-
nitely. 209 Moreover, given the current budget deficit, it is perhaps 
more likely that the rates will go up than down. Nonetheless, the 
strength of anti-tax-increase political forces is sufficient to make the 
point entirely speculative. I would not fault the Board unduly for fail-
ing to add in any cushion of protection on account of the possibility. 
An opposite form of change in the tax laws also warrants consider-
ation. That is, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that Congress 
would amend the Code to exempt MET and programs like it from 
federal income taxation. That would clearly be of substantial benefit 
to MET, and at one point during the consideration of the Technical 
and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988,210 Senator Donald Riegle of 
Michigan introduced such an amendment in Congress.211 
Unfortunately for MET, Congress rejected Senator Riegle's pro-
posed amendment and instead created a special tax break for federal 
Educational Savings Bonds.212 Given that history, it would unques-
208. Cf Rev. Ru!. 74-299, 1974-1 C.B. 154 (applying separate-share rule to limit deductions 
of nonqualified employees' trust, where trust maintained separate accounts for each participating 
employee). 
209. For taxable years beginning during 1964, the highest marginal rate was 50%. I.R.C. 
§ 11 (1958), as amended by Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 121, 78 Stat. 19, 25 (1964). For taxable years 
beginning from 1965 through 1978, the highest marginal rate was 48%. I.R.C. § 11 (1976),prior 
to amendment by Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 30l(a), 92 Stat. 2763, 2820 (1978). For taxable years 
beginning from 1979 through June 30, 1987, the highest marginal rate was 46%. I.R.C. § 11 
(1982 & Supp. III 1985), prior to amendment by Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 601(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 
2249 (1986). Only for taxable years beginning on or after July 1, 1987, has the highest marginal 
rate been 34%. Pub. L. 99-514, § 601(b)(l), 100 Stat. 2085, 2249 (1986). 
210. Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988). 
211. 134 CONG. REC. S15492 (1988). 
212. I.R.C. § 135 (West Supp. 1989); see also supra note 14. 
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tionably be imprudent for MET to set prices now in reliance on the 
possibility of future federal legislative tax relief. 
vi Summary: Quantifying MET's tax exposure. The different 
tax assumptions are interrelated. Thus, the cost of a mistake in any 
one tax assumption depends upon how many other tax assumptions 
are coming unglued at the same time. I have assembled a spreadsheet 
model of MET's financial structure that allows one to calculate the 
effects of any of the various permutations and combinations of tax 
mistakes. 
Absent a change in the tax laws, MET will not prevail with an 
argument that it will not be taxed on investments in deferred annui-
ties. If MET were to forge ahead and make the investments anyway, 
and if it were somehow to prevail on the other tax issues, ii would face 
an overall shortfall of 7.4%. That shortfall would reflect un-
dercharges ranging from 17.5% for newborns down to 1.2% for tenth 
graders. 
But despite the assumptions on which the 1988 prices were based, 
MET has not yet purchased deferred annuities. And given the bleak 
prognosis on the tax issue, it obviously should instead invest in a 
higher-yielding diversified stock-bond portfolio.213 If it were to do so, 
and if it were somehow to prevail on the other tax issues, it would not 
face any overall loss if all its other assumptions (tax and otherwise) 
were to hold up. Undercharges to the newborns would actually be 
offset by overcharges to the older children. 
Thus, if MET refrains from an ill-advised annuity purchase, the 
key tax issue will become its ability to exclude receipts from the sale of 
contracts while taking a deduction for its payment of benefits. As I 
explained earlier, the most likely outcome here is that MET will,not 
prevail - that the contracts will be treated as sales contracts or as 
stock.214 The cost of such an outcome would be extremely high. For 
a child who entered the tenth grade in the fall of 1988, it would mean 
that MET should have charged 4% more than it did. For a newborn 
213. I assume that the portfolio is split 50% common stocks and 50% long-term corporate 
bonds, see supra note 107, so as to yield a pre-tax rate of return of 10%. I assume further that 
25% of that overall yield takes the form of dividends for which MET is entitled to a 70% deduc-
tion pursuant to I.R.C. § 243. 
214. Were it not for the fact that the IRS has already ruled that MET will not be taxed on its 
receipts from the initial sale of contracts, see Priv. L. Ru!. 88-25-027 (Mar. 29, 1988), I might 
have thought that the most likely combination would have MET taxed as if it were entering into 
typical sales contracts. (The IRS has the authority to revoke private letter rulings retroactively, 
but does so only under unusual circumstances. See Rev. Proc. 89-1 § 16.05, 1989-11.R.B. 8, 20.) 
The cost of this treatment would be precisely the same as if the ·MET contract is treated as 
stock. Under the sorts of simplifying assumptions made to do these calculations, inclusion fol-
lowed by a full deduction has the same present-value cost as exclusion followed by no deduction. 
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in the fall of 1988, it would mean that MET should have charged 43% 
more! Overall, given the actual distribution of 1988 entrants, it would 
mean that MET should have collected 25.4% more in fees than it ac-
tually did. 
c. The revenues subtotal In sum, there are fewer factors to con-
sider on the revenues side of the balance sheet than there are on the 
cost side. The only complexity derives from a single black box known 
as "tax considerations." Moreover, as we have seen, some aggressive 
actuarial assumptions were lodged in that box as well. Because of 
those aggressive tax assumptions, revenues were most likely overesti-
mated by about 25.4%. 
3. The Grand Total: Matching Costs and Revenues 
The interactions among the various assumptions are complex in-
deed. Ultimately, the question is not whether any individual assump-
tion is sound, but whether the combination of assumptions is best 
characterized as daring or conservative. For a little daring in one area 
may well be counteracted by an abundance of caution in another. 
To provide an overall assessment of MET, it is helpful to compare 
the actuaries' assumptions with an alternative package of assumptions, 
one that I would characterize as more cautious and more realistic. In 
tabular form, the comparison looks like this: 
TABLE2 
Issue MET Lehman Difference 
1. Refunds for Out-of- No use 13.0% use - 3.0% 
Staters (23% low) 
2. Refunds for Private No use 25.0% use - 4.1% 
In-Staters (16% 
low) 
3. Refunds for No No use No use 0% 
college or 2-year 
college (37% low) 
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4. Adverse Selection 
Among Michigan 
Schools at Zip 
Code Level 
5. Moral Hazard and 
Adverse Selection 
Below Zip Code 
Level 
6. Weighted Average 
Tuition 
Inflation 
7. Pre-Tax Return 
8. Tax Treatment 
Social Irresponsibility 
3.0% 
None 
7.3% 
10.0% 
various 
3.4% 
5.0% 
8.7% 
10.0% 
various 
1107 
0.4% 
5.0% 
newborn 19.2% 
10th grader 6.4% 
avg. 12.37% 
0% 
newborn 43.1 % 
10th grader 4.19% 
avg. 25.4% 
When one combines these features,21 5 one reaches the somewhat dis-
turbing conclusion that, if MET had made more appropriate tax and 
actuarial assumptions, it would have collected almost 50% more from 
the program's participants than it did - over 100 million dollars 
more.216 Indeed, even under the most optimistic tax assumptions, 
MET should have collected 11 % more during 1988 than it did, over 
20 million dollars more. 
Fifty percent is a big number. But it ought to square with one's 
intuition about the program. MET sold a cheap package. An entering 
freshman in the fall of 1988 was paying, on average, 27% more for a 
college education than MET was charging the parents of a newborn. 
MET was then assuming that it, as a taxable entity, would take the 
money it acquired, invest it in market instruments that are generally 
available at rates that do not appear astonishingly high, and would 
then pay out whatever tuition and fees are prevailing when the benefi-
ciary starts college. 
MET was thus saying that a parent with two children, one entering 
college in 1988 and one newly born in 1988, needed to set aside/ewer 
dollars to pay for the newborn than it did to pay for the older child. It 
was saying that, in present-value terms, the newborn's educ!ition 
215. The correct way to combine the effects of independent percentage changes PCT., PCT2, 
etc., is to multiply (I + PCT1) X (I + PCT2) X ... and so on. See supra note 27. Unfortu-
nately, however, in this case the percentage changes PCT., PCT2, etc., are not entirely independ-
ent. In order to calculate the combined effects shown in the text, one must develop a simulation 
model. 
216. The precise number is 45.9%. The extra charges would not, of course, have been dis-
tributed uniformly. If MET had used my assumptions, its charges for 10th-graders would have 
been only 8.2% higher ($9,903) but its charges for newborns would have been 80.7% higher 
($12,206). This pattern - higher charges for younger children - is consistent with an assump-
tion that after-tax earnings do not keep up with tuition inflation, the clear pattern of the past 20 
years. 
1108 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1035 
would be less expensive than the eighteen-year-old's. MET could jus-
tify such an implicit statement only by making some rather surprising 
tax assumptions and by assuming that tuition inflation will not be as 
bad in the future as it has been in the past.217 But if MET was really 
justified in making such working assumptions, one must surely wonder 
whether there was a genuine need for the program at all. 
C. Actuarial Soundness Revisited - Year-to-Year 
Approaches Reconsidered 
If future conditions are better than they have been, then MET 
could be solvent on a cohort-by-cohort basis. Daring assumptions 
sometimes pan out. But as I emphasized in section II.A, even if those 
assumptions fail, MET may remain solvent on a year-by-year basis. If 
MET attracts additional revenues each year in an amount equal to 
that year's expenditures, it can conceivably go on forever.218 The early 
years of the program, moreover, are giving MET a sizable kitty that 
can make up for some shortfalls in future years. More importantly, 
that kitty can provide an interval during which the actuaries may re-
fine their assumptions so that future cohorts really pay their own way. 
To be sure, MET cannot publicly declare itself to be solvent only 
from a year-by-year perspective. Where the state neither puts its full 
faith and credit behind a program nor has the power to force new 
people to participate, a pay-as-you-go program is nothing but a chain 
letter. Indeed, if street- corner conversation about the Social Security 
program is any evidence, people are skeptical of the solvency of a pay-
as-you-go program even when the government uses the taxing power 
to force people in. 
Nonetheless,. in some ways a year-by-year perspective is the only 
perspective that the public can verify. A cohort-by-cohort perspective 
necessarily requires one to make actuarial assumptions, and by making 
appropriately optimistic assumptions, a measure of "solvency" can be 
maintained almost indefinitely. And if the state of Michigan were to 
put its full faith and credit (that is to say, the full resources of its 
217. There is an alternative way in which MET could have justified such an implicit state-
ment - it could have assumed that it could earn a higher rate of return before taxes than a well-
managed investment portfolio available in the private sector. As we have seen, however, that was 
not MET's assumption. See supra section 11.B.1.e. And if one restricts oneself to the same 
general rate of return that one sees in the private sector, one must find a way to escape the 
historical reality reflected in Figure 4, supra. 
218. Of course, if MET continues to sell contracts for Jess than the current prevailing cost of 
tuition, it would have to sell more and more contracts every year to maintain that sort of 
equilibrium. · 
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taxpayers) behind such a program, investors would undoubtedly be in 
even more abundant supply. 
How long an interval does MET have in which to adopt a more 
stable pricing policy? I would expect three to five years. The ages of 
the initial participants are distributed as follows: 
Year of Expected 
Matriculation 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
TABLE 3 
% of MET Beneficiaries 
0.2% 
0.4% 
2.5% 
3.2% 
4.3% 
4.7% 
5.6% 
5.7% 
6.3% 
6.5% 
6.9% 
7.7% 
7.3% 
8.6% 
7.9% 
8.0% 
8.1% 
6.0% 
Only about 15% of the beneficiaries of the 1988 wave of MET con-
tracts will be entering college before 1995. During that period, MET's 
coffers will inevitably swell. If during that time MET moves to a posi-
tion where it can maintain long-term year-to-year stability, it is possi-
ble that few will notice whether the 1988 wave of entrants in fact 
withdraws substantially more in benefits than its individual contribu-
tions produce. 
This brings us to an important observation. Not all actuarial as-
sumptions are created equal. Some are more demonstrably incorrect 
than others. For example, MET's tax assumptions are either right or 
wrong. Assuming MET is audited two years after it files a return for 
the taxable year in which it first buys an annuity or attempts to deduct 
a payment on a contract, it will begin to debate those propositions 
with the IRS in the spring of 1992 and will know what position the 
IRS will insist upon by the end of that year. If the position is unfavor-
able to MET, it will no longer be possible for the actuaries to rely on 
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the tax assumptions. The effect on MET's solvency would be quick 
and catastrophic. 
The other actuarial assumptions, in contrast, will not be demon-
strated correct or incorrect at a single moment in time; if they prove 
incorrect, they shall do so slowly. The big nontax assumptions - tui-
tion inflation and investment return - are always open to reasonable 
debate. Therefore, what an outsider might call a pay-as-you-go system 
can be described as an actuarially sound cohort-by-cohort system, as 
long as one is willing to make aggressive actuarial assumptions. MET 
could go on for many years in that posture; the ultimate accuracy of 
the program's tuition inflation and investment return assumptions will 
not be clear until the beneficiaries claim their benefits. 
III. EVALUATING MET: IDENTIFYING ITS EFFECTS AND 
EXPLAINING ITS FAILURES 
Because MET is still a toddler, it would be premature to make 
strong assertions about where its greatest significance will ultimately 
lie. Nevertheless, the two most likely candidates have already entered 
an appearance. One is the domain of distributional equity. The other 
is the domain of higher education policy. In this Part, I shall report 
what we already know about MET's likely effects in each of those do-
mains. My conclusion is that, because of the manner in which MET 
has been implemented, the program can be expected to produce some 
very unfortunate side effects. In particular, it can be expected to exac-
erbate income inequalities and distort the process through which edu-
cational policy is made. 
I shall then pursue the question of why MET was implemented in 
the way it was. After offering some plausible explanations for the fail-
ures in MET's implementation, I shall suggest that the best explana-
tion, quite ironically, is that MET's Board of Directors yielded to the 
temptation toward behavior that I characterized in Part I as "socially 
irresponsible." I shall conclude with some speculative thoughts about 
what features of MET's history and administrative structure made it 
especially susceptible to that sort of temptation. 
A. The Effects of MET on Income Distribution 
I have already argued that no comprehensive assessment of a pub-
lic program of MET's scope should omit consideration of its distribu-
tional impact.219 To evaluate MET as public policy, one must ask 
219. See supra section I.C. 
April 1990] Social Irresponsibility 1111 
whether MET gives aid to the poor or gives comfort to the rich.220 To 
answer that question, one needs a precise sense of what we mean by 
"poor" and "rich." Poor or rich compared to whom?221 
This question of the appropriate "reference group" is complex. It 
turns on at least two factors. First, one needs a sense of how the pro-
gram's beneficiaries will become an especially favored (or disfavored) 
group. If the program will operate so as to provide a simple transfer 
of wealth from a set of "lo:;ers" to a set of program-beneficiary "win-
ners," then one ought to compare the incomes of program participants 
with the incomes of those members of society who will have to pay for 
the transfer. If the program enhances wealth in a more complex way, 
or if it is conceived of as an allocation of scarce public attention as well 
as dollars, then an equally (if not more) appropriate reference group 
would be the society as a whole. 
Second, one needs to know why the program is thought to be an 
appropriate public endeavor, for that justification may suggest that the 
program contemplates a benefit for a particular "target group." One 
might then want to know whether the program is reaching all of its 
target group or only an unrepresentative subgroup. Let me use MET 
to demonstrate how these factors can shape one's choice of reference 
group. 
MET's participants might not become a group of "winners." MET 
might well become insolvent and liquidate according to the terms of 
the statute, leaving its beneficiaries with nothing but their initial in-
vestments plus a nominal return. That would not have a substantial 
effect on the incomes of participants, compared to what they were 
before they participated, but it would leave them very- disappointed . 
. 
If MET's participants end up "losers" in this sense, one might 
plausibly want to know how the pain of disappointed expectations 
would be distributed among families in the state. One would be con-
cerned if that pain was concentrated in a particularly needy sector 
(although, as I suggested earlier, that would be unlikely with a pro-
gram such as MET). Accordingly, it would be interesting to know 
220. For the classic debate over how to think about the distributional effects of California's 
heavily subsidized system of public higher education, compare W. HANSEN & B. WEISBROD, 
BENEFITS, COSTS, AND FINANCE OF PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION (1969) and Hansen & Weis-
brod, The Distribution of Costs and Direct Benefits of Public Higher Education: The Case of 
California, 4 J. HUM. RESOURCES 176 (1969) with Pechman, The Distributional Effects of Public 
Higher Education in California, 5 J. HuM. RESOURCES 361 (1970); see also Hartman, A Com-
ment on the Pechman-Hansen-Weisbrod Controversy, 5 J. HUM. RESOURCES 519 (1970). 
221. This question is raised briefly in Witte, The Growth and Distribution of Tax Expendi-
tures, in THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES 171, 184-85 (S. Danziger & K. 
Portney eds. 1988). 
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how the incomes of the families of the beneficiaries compare with the 
incomes of families generally throughout the state. 
On the other hand, it also quite possible that MET's participants 
will become a group of economic "winners." The clearest example 
would be if MET became insolvent and were bailed out by the state 
legislature. That would effectuate a direct transfer of wealth from tax-
payers to beneficiaries.222 One might plausibly want to know whether 
the transfer will alter the shape of the income distribution curve from 
what it otherwise would have been. Accordingly, it might be interest-
ing to compare the distribution of transfer benefits across income 
classes with (a) the distribution of taxes across income classes or (b) 
the distribution of existing income across income classes. (One could 
also substitute "wealth" for "income" throughout this paragraph.) 
MET's participants could also become economic winners in less 
direct ways. Notwithstanding my predictions in Part II, MET might 
remain solvent due (for example) to unusual investment acumen on 
the part of the state employees who manage it. MET might thus en-
hance the wealth of its participants in a way that does not reduce the 
wealth of other citizens in so obvious a fashion as a taxpayer-financed 
bailout. One might then wish to know whether the "MET Kids" are 
drawn from an income group that has traditionally benefited from 
public largesse or attention and compare their families' incomes with 
the incomes of families in general throughout the state. 
Finally, even if MET neither enhances nor diminishes the wealth 
of its participants, scarce public attention will have been devoted to a 
program for their benefit.223 To the extent the justification for such 
public attention depends upon a view that - for one reason or another 
- society ought to help the families of the college-bound,224 one 
might wish to know whether the "MET Kids" constitute a representa-
tive sample of that group or are rather some privileged subgroup. Ac-
cordingly, it might be interesting to know how the incomes of the 
beneficiary group compare with the incomes of families who currently 
send their children to Michigan public colleges, and also (since those 
who currently attend Michigan public colleges may themselves be a 
222. It bears mention at this point that legislators have already given parents who purchase 
MET contracts a tax benefit. Even though tuition payments to public universities are not ordina· 
rily deductible on a Michigan income tax return, the full purchase price of a MET contract is. 
See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 390.1440 (a) (West 1988). That fact alone justifies attention to 
the distribution of participants, although I would think it justifies more attention to the distribu· 
tion of sponsors than to the distribution of beneficiaries. 
223. This point is devefoped in more detail supra in section I.C. 
224. See supra sections I.B and l.D. 
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skewed sample of the group one ought to be interested in) with the 
incomes of all families with children under age eighteen. 
I have been able to use available data sources to make some of 
these comparisons. The details of the comparisons are set forth in the 
Appendix at the end of this article. The data are imperfect, so I can-
not draw conclusions tailored precisely· to the questions one would 
most like answered. Nonetheless, it is clear that, whatever reference 
group one chooses, MET's beneficiaries are drawn disproportionately 
from the upper reaches of the income distribution. This should not be 
surprising. MET is, after all, expensive in an absolute sense, even if it 
is cheap compared to the cost of college. And wealth is concentrated 
far more heavily than education or income. 
Thus, if MET becomes insolvent and is bailed out by the taxpayers, 
the undeniable net effect will be a transfer of wealth up the income 
distribution. If MET does not become insolvent. because it can suc-
cessfully exploit the special tax advantages of deferred annuities, it will 
have done so for the primary immediate benefit of the most economi-
cally privileged segment of the population. And in all events the 
scarce energies and resources of the state will have been directed for 
their benefit. 
Does that mean MET is a bad idea? Not necessarily. The pro-
gram's mood-altering value, its value as a check on social irresponsi-
bility,22s may justify the expenditure of public time, energy, and 
attention. Such a distribution of participants should, however, lead 
those who are required to implement the program to be extremely cau-
tious in making actuarial assumptions - at least if there is a chance 
that the taxpaying public will ultimately be expected to guarantee that 
all the promised benefits are provided. 
A program that has significant public benefits may well be a good 
idea, even if it also carries inddental private benefits for its partici-
pants that are not well distributed throughout the population. But if 
one knows that the participants are concentrated among the most eco-
nomically secure members of the population, one ought to make sure 
that the private benefits are truly incidental-i.e., to ensure that they 
do not end up swamping any hoped-for public benefits. 
In MET's case, that observation suggests two things. It suggests 
that pricing should have been more cautious than it was. And it sug-
gests that if MET does go bankrupt, the. legislature certainly should 
not rush to bail it out. 
225. See supra Part I. 
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B. The Effects of MET on Higher Education Policy 
The ultimate distributional effects of MET and its pricing decision 
will not be known with certainty for many years. In the short term, 
however, it has already had important effects on higher education pol-
icy in Michigan. For while some actuarial "assumptions" are merely 
assumptions, others take on the air of self-fulfilling prophecies. 
When private citizens make assumptions about the economic 
world, their expectations will occasionally influence that world. Per-
haps the most well-known example of this phenomenon is the observa-
tion that under some circumstances citizens' expectations of price 
inflation can themselves cause price inflation.226 In MET's case, the 
assumption about future tuition inflation appears to have the same sort 
of self-fulfilling quality.221 
In June 1988, the MET Directors approved a proposal that as-
sumed tuition inflation at the rate of 9% from 1987 to 1988 and 7.3% 
per year thereafter.228 That assumption, combined with the other ac-
tuarial assumptions discussed earlier in Part II yielded the price sched-
ule ultimately adopted. 
Later in June 1988, and throughout the month of July, the univer-
sities announced their tuition increases for the fall. One school an-
nounced an increase of 7.9%; eleven announced that th.ey were 
adopting increases ranging from 11.3% up to 21.4%; the remaining 
three announced that they had not made a final decision but were con-
sidering increases of between 10% and 14%.229 The combined net 
effect would have been a 12.4% increase in weighted average tuition. 
Then began an intense lobbying campaign in which Governor 
Blanchard announced that he would veto state appropriations for any 
university that did not roll back its tuition increase to less than 
10%.230 The Governor was explicit about linking his announced fig-
ure to the MET program. One by one, the universities yielded to the 
pressure and lowered their tuitions. At its meeting on August 24, 
226. For a review of several different models of how expectations and prices may affect one 
another, see Chick, Monetarist Views on Inflation, in PERSPECTIVES ON INFLATION 37 (D. 
Heathfield ed. 1979). 
227. The phenomenon of self-fulfilling prophecy is a special case of the more general problem 
of endogeneity, where two economic variables feed back onto one another and make forecasting 
more difficult. Unlike many problems of endogeneity, however, this one cannot be addressed 
through sophisticated mathematical forecasting techniques, since the forecast itself is the variable 
causing the feedback. 
228. MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, June 21, 1988, at 8. 
229. Jones, Lawmaker Blasts Tuition Increases, Detroit Free Press, July 28, 1988, at IA, 
col.l. 
230. See Cain, MSU Trims Its Tuition Increase, Detroit News, July 31, 1988, at lB, col. S. 
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1988, the MET Board approved revised actuarial assumptions that as-
sumed up to a 10.1 % rate of tuition inflation between 1987 and 1988. 
The revised assumption had no effect on the prices the Board decided 
to charge. . 
Thus, the MET Board of Directors, in consultation with its actua-
ries and with the assistance of a gubernatorial threat, lowered tuition 
for state residents at the Michigan public colleges for the 1988-1989 
academic year. The universities adapted in various ways. The Univer-
sity of Michigan simply collected more money from its out- of-state 
students. Other schools either found ways to be more efficient than 
they otherwise would have been or else cut back on their programs. 
It is a commonplace that in maintaining a system of public colleges 
and universitie~ a state's electorate is required to make complex judg-
ments about what it deems important. For decades, debates have 
raged over the course governments should pursue regarding higher ed-
ucation. 231 Should a state's universities all pursue the same mission, 
or should the state have different schools that specialize? Should the 
state attempt to serve needs beyond undergraduate training, through 
the maintenance of one or more national research institutions? Should 
it attempt to keep tuitions as low as possible for all students, but 
charge all students the same price, or should it allow some schools to 
adopt de facto sliding-scale tuition policies (by raising tuitions and ex-
panding financial aid)? Should it mandate uniform statewide tuitions, 
or should schools' tuitions vary according to the types of education 
they provide? 
MET's actuarial assumptions about tuition inflation do not resolve 
these questions for the state of Michigan. 232 They do, however, trans-
form the context in which such questions are discussed. They create a 
231. For a representative sampling of the literature, see Hearings on Higher Education Costs 
before the Subcomm. on Postsecondary Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 
lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1988); JOINT EcONOMIC COMM., 91sr CoNG., lsr SESS., THE EcoNOM-
ICS AND FINANCING OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Comm. Print 1969); H. 
BOWEN, THE COSTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1980); R. CARBONE, ALTERNATIVE TUITION 
SYSTEMS (1974); CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION: 
WHO PAYS? WHO BENEFITS? WHO SHOULD PAY? (1973); CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY 
STUDIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, THE FEDERAL ROLE IN POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION 
(1975); EXPLORING THE CASE FOR Low TUITION IN PUBLIC HIGHER EDUCATION (K. Young 
ed., 1974); FINANCING HIGHER EDUCATION supra note 31; c. FINN, supra note·50; R. FREE-
MAN, supra note 33; S. HARRIS, supra note 31; Gladieux, The Student Loan Quandary, CHANGE, 
May/June 1989, at 35; Karelis, Price as a Lever for Refonn, CHANGE, Mar./ Apr. 1989, at 21; 
O'Keefe, College Costs: Have They Gone Too High Too Fast?, CHANGE, May/June 1986, at 6; 
Yanikoski, Over a Barrel: The High Cost of Rising Tuitions, EDUC. REc., Spring/Summer 1986, 
at 12. 
232. The most systematic recent government-sponsored efforts to address those questions in 
Michigan· came in 1984, when Governor Blanchard appointed a special commission to consider 
them. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN MICHIGAN, 
PUTTING OUR MINDS TOGETHER: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR MICHIGAN HIGHER EDUCATION 
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new benchmark, a new point of reference, a new implicit norm. Com-
peting proposals no longer stand pristine; they are perceived as con-
forming to or departing from that norm. Deviance now requires 
justification. The assumptions have sufficient political weight to alter 
the trajectory of any bodies that pass within their orbit. Simply put, 
MET's tuition inflation assumptions will make it much harder to raise 
state residents' tuitions quickly. 
If colleges are kept from raising tuitions as rapidly as they would 
have in the absence of MET, they will have to adapt in other ways. 
They can try to find other sources of revenue. Or they can try to find 
ways to spend less. No matter what route they pursue, however, they 
will be changed in the process. 
The changes would be obvious if the colleges were to reduce spend-
ing associated with the classroom. Some expensive, sought-after 
professors might be allowed to. leave for greener pastures, to be re-
placed by cheaper teachers. Some expensive, but unfashionable, de-
partments might be allowed to close down entirely. The number of 
teaching "slots" in some departments might be allowed to decline 
through attrition; those remaining might be asked to pick up the slack 
by teaching larger classes or by cutting back on research in order to 
teach more classes. Teacher "productivity" might be enhanced 
through more widespread use of technologies like the videotaped 
lecture. 
Other forms of spending cuts might have effects less visible to stu-
dents but just as profound for the overall mission of the university. 
Library and museum budgets might shrink. Repairs and renovations 
might be deferred. Financial aid budgets might be cut back, so that 
"real" tuitions (as opposed to the sticker-price tuitions that are the 
concern of MET) could increase at a higher rate. 
Yet institutions are loathe to reduce expenditures, and so it is more 
likely that, in the short run, they would seek out alternative sources of 
revenue. To the extent the market would bear it, the colleges might 
raise tuitions for out- of-state students faster than they otherwise 
would have. To the extent politically feasible, they might seek to ac-
cept fewer low-tuition-paying state residents and accept more of the 
lucrative out-of-state students, relaxing academic requirements if 
necessary. 
They might look beyond the students for revenue as well. They 
might lobby harder in the state capital for increased taxpayer subsidies 
(1984); GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN MICHIGAN, 
AGENDA FOR DISCUSSION: MIDYEAR PROGRESS REPORT (1984). 
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to higher education. They might ask more of their alumni. They 
might come to view their faculty more as "profit centers" and demand 
that more faculty research be sponsored by outside entities, further 
relinquishing to outsiders the power to define what forms of knowl-
edge ought to be pursued and developed. 
I do not contend that all of these possible changes in the colleges 
would be less desirable than the changes that would be brought about 
by faster tuition increases for state residents. But to the extent that 
MET has reduced the colleges' ability to raise tuitions, some of these 
changes are inevitable. To borrow a phrase from my colleague Peter 
Steiner, "There is a university for every tuition structure, but not the 
same university."233 
· In order to draw strong conclusions about whether the effects of 
MET on higher education policy will be salutary or not, one would 
need more information than we presently have. One would need to 
know precisely how the colleges will adapt to the constraint on their 
abilities to increase state residents' tuitions. And one would need to 
form a judgment about whether the costs of that form of adaptation 
are justified by the public and private benefits of keeping tuition low. 
Such judgments are beyond the scope of this article. 
But if I cannot offer a strong concl:usion about substance, I can 
nevertheless offer a modest observation about process. One can be un-
decided about whether the state of Michigan ought to preclude its 
public colleges from raising tuitions faster than 7.3% per year and still 
care about how such a result is achieved. It matters what system of 
public higher education a state chooses to adopt, and it also matters 
how the choice is made. At a minimum, the choice ought to be under-
stood as such, and defended publicly as an appropriate judgment of 
higher education policy.234 
233. Private conversation between Peter Steiner and the author, Sept. 1989. 
234. In Michigan, the public has imposed even stronger, somewhat idiosyncratic conditions 
on how such decisions are to be made. Whereas in many states the public college$ are entirely 
creatures of statute, Michigan created its system through the state constitution. MICH. CONST. 
Art. 8, § 5 creates publicly elected governing boards for the University of Michigan (three cam-
puses), Michigan State University, and Wayne State University, the state's three "Elected-Board 
Colleges." That section charges each board with "general supervision of its institution and the 
control and direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds." MICH. CONST. Art. 8, § 4 
requires the legislature to appropriate funds to "maintain" those colleges and seven others. 
In cases involving the Elected-Board Colleges, Michigan's courts have interpreted article 8, 
§ 5 to give their Boards full autonomy as independent organs of the state government, free from 
legislative or executive control. The Trustees have 
entire control and management over University affairs, including the management of prop-
erty and expenditure of funds to the exclusion of all other departments of the state. 
Although the Legislature may put certain conditions on money that it appropriates for the 
University, and such conditions are binding ifthe trustees accept the money, the conditions 
may not interfere with the trustees' management of the University and may be applied only 
to state appropriated funds. 
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To be sure, the MET Board's estimate of future tuition inflation 
did not - by itself - have the effects outlined above. The critical 
intervening cause was the Governor's decision to threaten a funds veto 
if the colleges deviated from MET's assumption. 235 What matters for 
the future is that the Governor's behavior was not surprising. 
As we have learned from our experience with Social Security, long-
term governmental promises are powerful engines in political life. 
Their beneficiaries become deeply interested in whether they will be 
kept. Since politicians can be moved by the intensity with which their 
constituents hold preferences, no career politician could lightly risk 
disappointing the families of MET beneficiaries. Indeed, even if the 
Governor did not threaten to veto state appropriations, the public col-
leges would be justifiably nervous· about doing anything that might 
cause them to be blamed for MET's insolvency. 
Consequently, actuarial assumptions made in connection with a 
program like MET about behavior that is subject to future political 
control should be recognized as actS of policymaking. They should be 
understood that way by the officials who make the assumptions. They 
should also be understood that way when legislators consider how to 
allocate the authority to make such assumptions. 
It can thus be said without substantial exaggeration that in 1988 a 
William C. Reichenbach Co. v. State, 94 Mich. App. 323, 335, 288 N.W. 2d 622, 628 (1979) 
(citations omitted). The most extensive discussions of the Elected-Board Colleges' constitutional 
independence may be found in Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 
1 (1975), and in Sterling v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 110 Mich. 369, 68 N.W. 253 (1896); 
see also Sprik v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 43 Mich. App. 178, 204 N.W.2d 62 (1972), affd. 
on other grounds, 390 Mich. 84, 210 N.W.2d 332 (1973); State Bd. of Agric. v. Auditor Gen., 226 
Mich. 417, 197 N.W. 160 (1924); State Bd. of Agric. v. Auditor Gen., 180 Mich. 349, 147 N.W. 
529 (1914);.Board of Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Auditor Gen., 167 Mich. 444, 132 N.W. 
1037 (1911); Bauer v. State Bd. of Agric., 164 Mich. 415, 129 N.W. 713 (1911); Weinberg v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 97 Mich. 246, 56 N.W. 605 (1893). 
Tuition policy is central to the governance of a university and is accordingly consigned to the 
exclusive authority of the colleges' governing boards. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 
Mich. at 64-65. 
The position of Michigan's other 10 public colleges is less clear. In 1963, Michigan amended 
its constitution to enhance the autonomy of the so-called Appointed-Board Colleges. Under new 
article 8, § 6; they "shall each be governed by a board of control which shall be a body corporate. 
The board shall have general supervision of the institution and the control and direction of all 
expenditures from the institution's funds." MICH. CoNsr. art. 8, § 6. But the 1963 amendments 
did not grant those other institutions the full autonomy enjoyed by the Elected-Board Colleges. 
For the boards of control remained matters of gubernatorial appointment. Thus, while article 8, 
§ 6 appears to grant the other institutions a measure of independence from the executive branch, 
as a practical matter their boards of control remain subject to direct gubernatorial influence. 
235. As the authorities in the previous footnote indicate, Michigan's constitution gives rea-
son to doubt that the Governor had the authority to veto appropriations to the public colleges on 
the basis of a disagreement with those institutions' governing boards over tuition policy. That is 
especially true in the case of the Elected-Board Colleges whose Boards are not appointed by the 
Governor. See supra note 234. Yet in 19~8 all 15 public colleges acceded to the Governor's 
demand. 
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major act of higher education policy was undertaken in the state of 
Michigan. A decision was made that in future years resident tuition at 
public colleges would go up more slowly (when compared with the 
rate of return on investments in the economy) than it had in the past. 
The decision was not strictly binding, but it was deeply influential. 
And it was made by the MET Board of Directors in the form of an 
actuarial assumption. 
C. Why and How MET Made Its Assumptions 
MET is an interesting program. It has been imitated by other 
states. Moreover, because of the manner in which MET has been im-
plemented, Michigan may ultimately shift wealth up the income distri-
bution. MET may even change the character of Michigan's public 
colleges. 
To know what MET is doing is not really enough, however. If 
MET made a mistake in the way it set prices during its first year, one 
must ask why. Was it simple human error, a failure to obtain informa-
tion and analyze it in the most sophisticated way possible? Or was it 
something more structural? 
The MET Board of Directors justified setting a very low price for 
its 1988 contracts by making two separate aggressive actuarial as-
sumptions - an aggressive tax assumption and an aggressive tuition 
inflation assumption. For reasons I elaborated in Part II, I think both 
assumptions were too bold. In this section, I shall review the available 
evidence about how each assumption was made. The two assumptions 
share much in the way of history, but each has unique features that 
should be appreciated for themselves. For it is quite possible that 
other public programs could have features that would make them vul-
nerable to replicating one type of mistake without replicating both. 
1. The Common Heritage - Minimal Oversight of the Board 
It is important to keep in mind precisely how the MET Board of 
Directors makes policy. Michigan's legislature authorized MET, an 
administrative body whose Directors are appointed by the Governor, 
to sell promises and to set the price. Such an authorization is different 
in· kind from the standard form of political delegation; in principle it 
ought to be accompanied by a proportionally more extensive structure 
of political oversight. 
When the U.S. Congress gives regulatory authority to the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Federal Trade Commission, or the Food and 
Drug Administration, it usually does so provisionally. If Congress 
does not like a particular IRS interpretation of the Internal Revenue 
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Code, it can amend the statute. If Congress does not like a particular 
policy decision by the FDA, it can undo that damage as well. 
To be sure, administrative agencies can do some things that cannot 
be undone by the legislature. For example, if the IRS incorrectly de-
cides to give someone a refund, Congress can do little about it as long 
as the refund is less than $200,000. 236 And when the Federal Reserve 
Board sets the discount rate or readjusts reserve requirements, its deci-
sion is effectively final. But those sorts of agency decisions, while ac-
knowledged to be important, have traditionally been seen as less 
significant than the authority to borrow money and to commit future 
generations to repay. For that reason, the federal Treasury Depart-
ment's ability to sell bonds is restricted by the overall "debt ceiling," 
which is established and amended by statute. 
The limitations on agency power to commit future generations 
have traditionally been even stronger at the state level than at the fed-
eral level. For example, not even Michigan's legislature is empowered 
to commit the full faith and credit of the state to a particular obliga-
tion. The Michigan Constitution (like that of some other states) re-
quires that any "general obligation" borrowing that is to extend for 
more than one fiscal year be approved by two thirds of each branch of 
the legislature and then be ratified by .voter referendum.237 
MET cannot, as a technical matter, bind the state of Michigan. Its 
obligations under prepaid tuition contracts are not backed by the full 
faith and credit of the state. Accordingly, its actions are not subject to 
the mechanisms for procedural oversight that apply to general obliga-
tion borrowing. 
Yet without creating legal constraints on future generations, MET 
was empowered, indeed expected, to create a set of enduring expecta-
tions. And state officials encouraged those expectations. For example, 
in a state-wide television call-in show held during the period when 
parents were permitted to register for MET contracts, Governor 
Blanchard encouraged parents who were considering buying contracts 
to think of them as binding taxpayers in the future: 
CALLER: I have a question regarding the word "guarantee" that is 
used. As I understand it, the contract is with the Trust Fund and not 
the State .... Which would mean there really is no guarantee as I see it, 
inasmuch as if the money runs out in that fund, then the plan has a 
236. See I.R.C. § 6405(a) (1988). 
237. MICH. CONST. art. 9, §§ 12, 15. That restriction does not apply to long-term leases, 
however, nor does it apply to so-called "revenue bonds" or "special obligation bonds," which are 
to be repaid out of specific state funds. See Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1982 PA 
47, 418 Mich. 49, 340 N.W.2d 817 (1983); Advisory Opinion on Constitutionality of 1976 PA 
240, 400 Mich. 311, _254 N. W.2d 544 (1977). 
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chance of bankruptcy situation. Now I want a little clarification on that 
GOVERNOR: Well, it's a state agency, MET. And it is an absolute 
guarantee, and the state has to stay behind it, and it's contractually en-
forceable, both under our constitution and the U.S. Constitution. Pe-
riod. It's an absolute guarantee. That is the greatest feature of the 
program.238 
Whether or not such statements create legal rights and obligations, 
they certainly create political expectations. As I noted earlier, those 
expectations may constrain the future behavior of public actors in the 
same fashion, if not to the same extent, as legal rights and 
obligations. 239 
MET is thus capable, through its present actions, of shaping the 
obligations and opportunities of future governments. By assuming 
that tuition will be low in the future, MET creates pressures for it to 
be low. By selling contracts at a low price, MET greatly increases the 
likelihood that future taxpayers will subsidize the mostly well-off ben-
eficiaries of those contracts. 
Yet, despite these practical powers, MET's Board of Directors and 
advisors were not subjected to any substantial legislative oversight. 
The legislature did not dictate the manner in which the various actua-
rial assumptions would be made, much less what those assumptions 
ought to be. To understand how and why the MET Board of Direc-
tors made the assumptions it did, one must examine the particular 
situation that the Board. found itself in at the time it made those 
assumptions. 
2. The Common Heritage - Politicization of the Price 
The key feature of the Board's situation was that, in setting the 
price for MET contracts, it was choosing sides in a partisan political 
debate. The Chairman of the Board was a politically ambitious civil 
servant. And even before all of the information essential to a dispas-
sionate actuarial assessment had become available, he had become an 
active participant in a debate over how high MET's price would be. 
The Chairman of MET's Board was Robert Bowman, the state's 
Treasury Secretary. He had been named to the Treasury post at the 
age of twenty-eight by Governor Blanchard after a brief career as an 
238. WTVS Transcript, supra note 74, at 9 (corrected to the extent possible by reference to an 
audio tape recording of National Public Radio's Morning Edition broadcast on Aug. 10, 1988, in 
which portions of the television program were re-broadcast (tape segment ME 880810 IIB, MI 
Education Trust)). 
239. See supra section 111.B. 
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investment banker.240 He had attracted substantial public attention 
both for his successful management of the state's pension funds,241 and 
for his work in designing MET.242 He came close to running for the 
U.S. House of Representatives and has been mentioned as a candidate 
for Lieutenant Govemor.243 
Even before the original MET legislation was introduced, Secre-
tary Bowman publicly suggested that contracts would be sold at a very 
low price. In March 1986, he offered a tentative estimate that a MET 
contract covering four years of college would cost between $2500 and 
$4000.244 When the bill was introduced, the public estimate shifted 
upward to between $3100 and $4600.245 When the bill was enacted at 
the end of 1986, the estimate shifted back down to $2530 for a new-
born child. 246 
Between the end of 1986 and March 1988, the public estimate of 
MET prices rose again, but not drastically.247 On Monday night, 
240. See Reiff, Aggressive Prudence, FORBES, June 13, 1988, at 134-35. 
241. Id. 
242. Governor Blanchard has described Secretary Bowman as the "chief architect" of MET. 
WTVS Transcript, supra note 74, at 7. 
243. UPI Regional News (Aug. 7, 1987) (Bowman says odds are "better than 50-50 that I 
will run" for Congress); Kenworthy, House Talent-Hunters Seek Strong Challengers As Few Seats 
Are Open, Wash. Post, Nov. 15, 1987, at A4; UPI Regional News (Jan. 3, 1988) ("Bowman says 
he won't run for Congress in 1988"); UPI Regional News (June 30, 1989) (Bowman announced 
"that he would in no way accept or allow himself to be drafted for lieutenant governor"); Berg· 
strom, Treasurer May Have Political Future, Ann Arbor News, Mar. 31, 1990, at A7 ("Bowman 
wouldn't discuss rumors about bids for Congress or lieutenant governor"). 
244. Harsha, Bowman: Guaranteed Tuition Interest To Grow Like IRA's, Lansing St. J., 
Mar. 31, 19861 at IB, col. I. How could the estimate have been so low? It appears that through-
out the legislative deliberations, the working assumption was that tuition inflation would be 
about 6% per year. See Memorandum from Jan W. Lyddon, House Democratic Research Staff, 
to Rep. James A. Kosteva (May 6, 1986), at 2. If one assumes that MET is tax-exempt and that 
MET will earn 13% per year on its investments, one gets a price of $2433. If one assumes that 
MET is tax- exempt but will earn only 10% per year on its investments, one gets a price of $4117. 
If one were willing to adopt a short enough time horizon, those assumptions were consistent with 
historical experience. Thus, in response to questions asked by Republican members of the House 
Colleges and Universities Committee of the Michigan House of Representatives in May 1986, 
Secretary Bowman stated: "For the last five years, the [state] pension funds' average return has 
been 16.5% per year. Over the same period of time, tuition increases have averaged less than 
5%." Memorandum from Rep. Judith Miller to House Colleagues 2 (May 14, 1986). 
245. News Release From the Governor 2 (Apr. 15, 1986). 
246. Williams, MSU, U-M Get Behind Tuition Plan, Lansing St. J., Dec. 14, 1986, at IB. 
247. At MET's first Board meeting, in early 1987, Secretary Bowman gave a brief overview 
of the determinants of MET's price, using figures that began with a "base payment amount" of 
$4200. See MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, Mar. 5, 1987, at 2. MET then engaged the 
market research firm of CRW Associates to study the extent of public interest in MET. MET 
Board Minutes, supra note 72, July I, 1987, at 6. CRW presented its results to the Board in 
September. Minutes of Michigan Education Trust Board of Directors Meeting on Sept. 18, 1987, 
at 2-7. The survey covered 950 adult respondents. It reported that the median response to a 
request to "name the maximum price they would be willing to pay" was between $4600 and 
$4700, and Secretary Bowman then "pointed out the similarity between this amount and our 
original cost estimate of between $3000 to $4500." Id. at 5. Later during that meeting, Secretary 
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March 14, on the eve of the adverse ruling from the IRS, aides to 
Governor Blanchard estimated a price of about $4500.248 Two days 
later, after the ruling was in hand, the estimate became "$5000 to 
$6000."249 
At just that moment, researchers for the Senate Republican Cau-
cus issued a report charging that the prices being quoted by the Treas-
ury were "dangerously unrealistic."250 According to newspaper 
accounts from Friday, April 1, when Secretary Bowman was asked 
about the report he "stuck by an earlier estimate that it will take an 
initial investment of between $5000 and $7000 to guarantee four years' 
college tuition."251 On April 13, the Senate Finance Committee held 
hearings at which the Republican researchers and MET officials ar-
gued about whose price estimate was better.252 
It was against that background of partisan fighting that the MET 
Board convened on April 18, 1988. At that meeting, the MET Direc-
tors considered three tentative options presented by their actuaries. 
The options all assumed that tuition would increase by 9% from 1987 
to 1988 and by 6.5% per year thereafter. The rather sketchy available 
public documentation leaves unclear precisely what price schedule was 
chosen.253 Immediately after the meeting, however, Secretary Bow-
man released a schedule showing a price of $6400 for a newborn.254 
All of this history of partisan public discussion of the price is, to be 
sure, circumstantial evidence. Nonetheless, it appears safe to infer 
that the MET Board of Directors, or at least its Chairman, felt some 
pressure to keep the final price low. But while that pressure may ex-
plain why the tuition inflation and tax assumptions that MET made 
were attractive, it does not fully explain why the Board adopted them. 
To understand the adoption (and not merely the attractiveness) of the 
Bowman reported, "The actuaries have concluded that the price is in the range of what the 
Board has been expecting, from about $3500 to $4500 for a newborn." Id. at 7. 
248. Firestone, Tuition Plan May Get LR.S. Backing, Detroit News, Mar. 15, 1988, at lA, 
col. 2. 
249. Jones, Safety Called a Key Factor in State's New Tuition Plan, Detroit Free Press, Mar. 
17, 1988, at 17A, col.1. 
250. College Cost Defended, Detroit News, Apr. l, 1988, at 3B. 
251. Id.; see also Tuition Cost Given, Detroit Free Press, Apr. 1, 1988, at 13C (noting the 
Senate Republican estimate of $7000 to $10,000). 
252. See Barclay et al, MET: A Progress Report From the Senate Finance Committee, Apr. 
15, 1988; Tuition Plan to Start in May, Detroit Free Press, Apr. 15, 1988, at 4A, col. 2. 
253. See MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, April 18, 1988, at 9, handout Plan B. It is 
clear that the chosen option assumed the trust would be taxed as a simple trust at an overall 
effective rate of 18% per year on pre-tax earnings of 10% annually. 
254. See $6400 Can Buy College Education -far Frosh of '06, Detroit Free Press, Apr. 19, 
1988, at 3A, col.3. 
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tuition inflation and tax assumptions; I believe it is useful to consider 
the two categories of assumptions separately. 
3. How MET Made Tuition Inflation Assumptions 
In the end, MET assumed tuition inflation averaging 7.3% per 
year and investment returns averaging 10% per year. The analysis 
presented in Part II suggests that a more appropriate assumption 
would have been tuition inflation of 8. 7% per year during a period in 
which investment returns averaged 10% per year. Why did MET use 
the lower tuition inflation figure? 
The record suggests that the tuition inflation assumption emerged 
out of a long series of discussions between the MET Board and its 
actuarial advisor, Coopers & Lybrand. As early as October 1987, the 
Board received a presentation from Coopers addressing the relation-
ship between tuition inflation and investment returns. 
Interestingly, Coopers began by projecting an even lower rate of 
tuition inflation than it ultimately settled on. At the October 1987 
meeting, Coopers reported that it projected "that tuition rates will in-
crease on average 6.5% per year over the next 18 years [and that its] 
best estimate on rate of return on investments by the Trust Fund is 
· 10% per year on average."255 It explained that "6.5 percent is an av-
erage which is based on 5% annual inflation increases and 1.5% in 
real increases."256 
Dr. David Adamany, a MET Board member and the president of 
Wayne State University, expressed concern about that assumption and 
asked that the payments be recalculated using a higher rate of tuition 
increase.257 For several months more, Coopers continued to present 
price estimates based on 6.5% tuition inflation.258 At the June 1988, 
meeting, however, Coopers presented new prices, assuming only a 
2.5% geometric difference between tuition increases (7.3% assumed) 
and investment earnings (10% assumed).259 
How.could Coopers assume even a 2.5% geometric difference be-
255. MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, Sept. 18, 1987, at 2. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. According to the minutes of the April 1988 meeting, when the Board first voted on a 
pricing methodology, "[Secretary] Bowman referred the Board to charts •.• which compare the 
Consumer Price Index, state pension fund earnings, [and] tuition increases ..• over the last ten 
years. Over the ten year period the spread between tuition increases and pension fund earnings 
was 3.9%." MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, Apr. 18, 1988, at 4. He then referred the 
Board to pricing proposals prepared by Coopers & Lybrand that assumed a "3.5% spread" be-
tween tuition increases (6.5% assumed) and investment earnings (10% assumed). Id. (Secretary 
Bowman was using arithmetic differences rather than geometric differences.). 
259. MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, June 17, 1988, at 8. 
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tween investment earnings and tuition inflation? It appears that 
throughout its representation of MET, Coopers has based its calcula-
tions on data beginning with the 1977-1978 academic year.260 During 
that time, the investments were indeed running 3.5% ahead of infl.a-
tion. 261 The problem is that during the prior decade they had been 
running 4.3% behind infl.ation.262 
I can think of only two speculative explanations for Coopers & 
Lybrand's use of only the most recent ten years' worth of data in order 
to forecast eighteen years into the future. One explanation would be 
that Coopers siniply did not bother to obtain the extra data. That 
explanation, however, is not particularly illuminating, except to the 
extent that it raises the question why the MET Board did not ask 
Coopers to obtain more data. 
A richer explanation would begin with the hypothesis that Coopers 
made a deliberate judgment that the future was most likely to resemble 
the period from 1977-1978 to 1986-1987 and that earlier time periods 
were not relevant. To be sure, if Coopers made such a deliberate judg-
ment, it never made it an explicit part of the public record and never 
acknowledged the strikingly different pattern observable over a longer 
time horizon. Nonetheless, some public evidence could be read to sup-
port such an explanation. 
The most important feature of the time period considered by 
Coopers was a two-year "tuition freeze" negotiated between the Gov-
ernor and the public colleges during the 1984-1985 and 1985-1986 ac-
ademic years. 263 What grounds might there be for Coopers and the 
MET Board to believe such a freeze would be repeated? The most 
likely candidate is MET itself. · 
As I noted earlier, MET's tuition assumption was not entirely "ex-
ogenous." Rather, MET's assumption has itself turned out to be one 
of the more important determinants of tuition.264 If that were fully 
anticipated, then Coopers' use of the short time period might be ex-
plained not as a statement of what MET expected future years to be 
like, but rather as a statement of what MET intended future years to 
be like. 
The problem with this explanation is that, to the extent it works, it 
260. See, e.g., COOPERS & LYBRAND, TUITION AT MICHIGAN UNIVERSITIES: TRENDS AND 
DETERMINANTS 2 (1989). 
261. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. . 
262. Id. 
263. See, e.g., R. Cole, Taking Stock 6-7 (1988) (reviewing·impact of the Governor's Com-
mission on the Future of Higher Education). The second-most important feature was the boom 
in the stock market during that period. 
264. See supra section 111.B. 
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is inconsistent with the publicly expressed desires of the Board. Cer-
tainly, MET's potential effectiveness as a tuition-setting device had 
been foreseen by Coopers and the Board.265 But that was never pub-
licly described as something to be taken into account in making the 
assumptions. Quite the contrary. At a meeting of the MET Board 
early in 1988, Dr. Adamany expressed deep concern about a proposal 
to have Coopers study tuition patterns and project future tuition, ar-
guing that "a one-time tuition projection for a twenty-year period 
could be viewed as a tuition setting policy."266 
And yet, even so, the explanation is not entirely implausible. For 
while the minutes of MET Board Meetings do not reflect a shared 
desire to use MET's assumptions to manipulate public college tuitions, 
that desire can be detected in statements made by the Board's Chair-
man outside the context of formal meetings. During the summer of 
1988, in response to a newspaper reporter's question about whether he 
was concerned that the universities had announced a higher tuition 
increase than MET had assumed, Secretary Bowman said: 
They all will roll back or we'll be recommending to the governor that 
their budgets be vetoed to remind them that they can take this autonomy 
toofar. ... 
. . . I think what we will probably see in 10 years ... is that tuition 
levels will be about the same across all schools, which means (the Univer-
sity of) Michigan's going to go up more slowly th[a]n the cheaper 
schools. We will get to a system like California or New York where the 
same dollar buys the same amount of credits .... 267 
In another conversation earlier that same summer, Secretary Bowman 
had been even more direct: "This can be used as a club against higher 
tuition. . . . [W]e do plan to use this as a way to keep tuition down, 
based on economic and political convictions. Why should tuition go up 
higher than inflation?"268 Thus, for Secretary Bowman, the effects of 
MET's assumptions on higher education were no mere accident. 
Rather, they reflected a calculated vision of what the state's tuitions 
policy ought to be. 
265. Coopers' final report to the Board included a provision stating that a "favorable" major 
item that had not been counted on in setting prices was the possibility of "[s]uasion imposed 
upon tuition rates so that they are limited to no more than inflation." 1988 ACTUARIAL As-
SUMPTIONS -ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 4; 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTJONS - PREMIUMS, 
supra note 67, at 3. 
266. MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, Mar. 9, 1988, at 4. 
267. Aulino, Colleges Threatened by State Money Chief if Tuition Hikes Stick. Birmingham 
Observer and Eccentric, Aug. 18, 1988, at IA, SA (emphasis added). 
268. The conversation took place in Secretary Bowman's office among Secretary Bowman, 
Sabrina Keeley, me, my colleague Kent Syverud, and our research assistant John Furman, on 
July 19, 1988. Meeting, July 19, 1988, supra note 114 (emphasis added). 
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There is, of course, nothing wrong with a state establishing a tu-
itions policy. Indeed, it would not necessarily be crazy for a state to 
announce that, each year, each of its universities would increase their 
tuitions by an amount that is 2.5% less than the pre-tax total return 
on a half-stock, half-bond portfolio. To the extent MET's tuition as-
sumption was a calculated effort at making higher education policy, its 
failure was a failure of process. ' 
MET's brand of higher education policy (if that is what it was) was 
not the product of a public, deliberate debate in the legislature over 
competing values and priorities. It was not even the product of a care-
ful analysis by the state Department of Education. If it was indeed 
higher education policy, it reflected no more than Secretary Bowman's 
"economic and political convictions,'' transformed into a powerful ac-
tuarial assumption. 
The mandate of the MET Board was not to establish a new tuitions 
policy for the state. Its mandate was to run a prepaid tuition program 
in a prudent, actuarially sound manner. And whether or not all the 
members of MET's Board conceived of the tuition assumption as a 
long-range tuitions policy for higher education, it has become one as a 
matter of fact. Yet because the policy was buried in an actuarial as-
sumption, it was difficult to detect until after it had become an effec-
tive force in state affairs. 
4. How MET Made Tax Assumptions 
As I explained in Part II, MET made tax assumptions that are 
unlikely to hold up without substantial help from either the IRS or the 
Congress. Moreover, those assumptions (not the tuition inflation as-
sumption) are the primary cause of MET's surprisingly low price. 
The official public record concerning MET's tax assumptions is 
much slimmer than the record concerning its tuition inflation assump-
tion. In its report to the Board of Directors on June 17, 1988, Coopers 
& Lybrand simply reported the assumption that no tax would be im-
posed on the Annuity Fund. 269 That assumption was not even flagged 
later in the section of the report entitled Major Qualitative Items That 
Will Affect Actual Results. 270 Nor was it mentioned in a letter dated 
June 15, 1988, entitled Guidance as to the Taxability of the Participants 
in the Michigan Education Trust, from the Detroit law firm that was 
advising the Board - Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone.271 
269. 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIPNS - PREMIUMS, supra note 67, at 1. See supra section 
11.B.2.b.ii for a discussion of the issue and its significance. 
270. 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTIONS - PREMIUMS, supra note 67, at 2-3. 
271. The letter does, however, discuss the procedural mechanisms for obtaining review of the 
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At its meeting on June 21, 1988, Secretary Bowman began by dis-
cussing "the possibility of MET investing a portion of its funds in an-
nuities, which provide tax advantages. . . . The annuity investments 
would not be subject to any annual income tax .... "272 Representa-
tives from Miller, Canfield then walked the Board through their "gui-
dance letter," speaking of the beneficiary's potential tax liability if 
annuities are used, but never of MET's. Later on, in response to ques-
tions about the beneficiary's potential liability, a Miller, Canfield attor-
ney stated: 
[I]f MET invests in annuities, the most sensible way to divide the funds 
for investment would be to limit the annuity investments to the amount 
necessary to provide the lowest tuition cost in the future. Therefore, all 
of the annuity proceeds would be used toward tuition and the IRS would 
not be able to consider MET as the owner of the annuity and thus subject 
to paying taxes. 273 
Representatives from Coopers then walked the Board through 
their report, stating that "[t]he costs also assume the worst case scena-
rio for the tax rate, that the guarantee fund is taxed at the 34% corpo-
rate rate."274 The Board of Directors then adopted a resolution 
approving the prices based on those assumptions.21s 
In revised actuarial assumptions, presented to the Board on Au-
gust 24, 1988, Coopers & Lybrand added the following statement to its 
tax assumptions: "It is our understanding that MET's outside attor-
neys feel 'very good' about [the assumption of no tax on the Annuity 
Fund] ... , which [is a] very important factor[ ]."276 At the Board's 
meeting of September 20, 1988, a Coopers representative reported 
orally that "he did receive a letter from Miller, Canfield, Paddock and 
Stone which stated there is a strong likelihood that ... MET will not 
be taxed on the buildup of any annuities."277 
There is no indication that Miller, Canfield's letter to Coopers was 
IRS's decision that § 115 does not apply to MET. It also discusses the manner in which MET 
might apply for exemption from taxation as a charitable or educational organization pursuant to 
§ 50l(c)(3). It concludes by recommending that MET file an application for a § 50l(c)(3) ex-
emption and that MET then commence litigation on the § 115 issue. The letter never offers the 
law firm's views on the likelihood of success of either recommended effort. 
272. MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, June 21, 1988, at 2-3. 
273. Id. at 7 (emphasis added) (comments of Ms. Naoum). 
274. Id. at 8 (comments of Mr. Kaye). 
275. Michigan Education Trust Resolution 1988-10. The resolution also delegated authority 
to Secretary Bowman and the Board's President to adjust the prices by up to 5% if necessary to 
maintain actuarial soundness. 
276. 1988 ACTUARIAL AssUMPTlONS - ANALYSIS, supra note 67, at 2. 
277. MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, Sept. 20, 1988, at 4 (emphasis added) (comments of 
Mr. Richard Kaye). Mr. Kaye reported that "the law firm also expressed a strong likelihood 
MET will receive 50l(c)(3) status." (I) Id. 
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ever shared with the entire Board of Directors. It does not appear that 
the Board ever asked to receive a copy. Nor does it appear that any of 
the Directors asked the Coopers representative how big a risk might 
be associated with Miller, Canfield's "very good" feelings of a "strong 
likelihood" of success. 
The official record here is quite spare. It is surely tempting to dis-
miss the risky tax assumption as an artifact of our monstrously com-
plex federal income tax laws. One might well conclude that, perhaps 
overwhelmed by the complexity of the tax laws, the MET Board as a 
whole never even realized that there was any substantial risk associ-
ated with its tax assumptions. Nothing in the formal proceedings indi-
cated that they were ever aware of any significant risk. None of the 
Directors (other than Secretary Bowman) had any significant experi-
ence with tax matters. And in informal conversations, Secretary Bow-
man indicated that, while he agreed that there was some tax risk, he 
did not consider it substantial. 278 
But such a conclusion would ignore the more significant question 
of why this particular tax risk was not detected. Whether or not the 
Board believed the risks associated with the tax assumptions were sub-
stantial, 279 it presumably understood itself to be basing that belief on 
the judgment of its tax lawyers. The natural question, then, is why the 
Board did not ask that the law firm give it a formal opinion letter, so 
that it could be certain about the precise nature of the risks before it, 
and so that the firm could later be held fully responsible for its 
advice?280 
In a conversation in July 1988, Secretary Bowman answered that 
278. During one conversation, Secretary Bowman said: 
At some point, it's certain that the trust will be true-exempt. Congress will almost certainly 
enact legislation this term making such trusts true-exempt .... Without being true-free, the 
numbers still work out, but in a different fashion. . . . Tax issues are critical, but we 
shouldn't scrap the program just because of them. 
Meeting, July 19, 1988, supra note 114. · 
279. The public record gives no way of knowing the extent to which the law firm elaborated 
to the Board in private on the amount of risk associated with the true assumptions. The most the 
public record reports is the actuaries' statement that Miller, Canfield, Paddock, and Stone felt 
"very good" about their assumptions. See supra text accompanying note 276. 
280. The closest the Board ever came to asking the firm for an opinion letter came during the 
following exchange at a Board Meeting: 
Ms. Dumouchelle [a Board member] referred to Mr. Collins' [a Miller, Canfield attor-
ney's] opening remarks indicating the letter from his firm is a true discussion letter. She 
questioned whether this was a legal term or whether it was providing the Board with an 
opinion or advice. 
Mr. Collins said when someone requests a legal opinion, they would generally receive a 
letter saying "as a matter of law it is our opinion that this is the answer." For some issues, 
such as taxability to the purchaser, Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone can supply to the 
Board information that is certain. Other issues, such as the 50l(c)(3) status, are not certain. 
Rather, the information is provided as advice relating to options which are available to the 
Board. The information was put into the discussion letter format to address both of the 
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question quite explicitly: "I don't want one of my successor[s] to sue 
Miller, Canfield. We should be sued if we screw up. I'm not prepared 
to let lawyers get on the hook for malpractice; I'd rather have the state 
on the hook."281 Thus, for Secretary Bowman the risk that a tax as-
sumption was incorrect was a risk that should be borne by future tax-
payers, not by the lawyers advising on the propriety of that 
assumption. 
Note that Secretary Bowman insisted that the state - not the 
members of the Board - should be "on the hook." By statute, Board 
members are immune from tort liability unless they engage in conduct 
that is "so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for 
whether an injury results."282 Interestingly, the topic of their immu-
nity was of substantial concern to the Board members during the pe-
riod before they set prices. In October 1987, ·Terrence Grady, from 
the office of the Attorney General of Michigan, explained to the Board 
that he would not expect lawsuits against Board members. "[R]ather 
people will most likely sue the Trust first."283 This did not allay the 
Board members' concerns, however, and in May 1988, Mr. Grady re-
turned with a stronger message: 
[A] member could be sued personally or in his/her official capacity .... 
If the member were sued personally, the Attorney General's first ap-
proach would be to move the court to change the suit to one naming the 
member in his/her official capacity unless there could be an immediate 
showing of intentional personal misconduct by the member. The Attor-
ney General would normally expect to be successful in making that 
transformation. It is very important to the Department of Attorney 
General that none of the members have personal liability under any cir-
cumstances. The statute does not contemplate it, nor is it the public 
policy of the state. The state does not encourage suits or let suits remain 
in existenctr that can be pursued to reach any prospect of personal 
liability. 284 
Despite the strength of that message, the Board went on to adopt a 
resolution providing that MET would indemnify them for any liability 
deriving from things other than gross negligence or intentional 
misconduct. 285 
concerns, tax treatm~nt to the purchaser and, at the same time, lay out all the options that 
are available to the Board. 
Ms. Dumouchelle said, in other words, Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, is advising 
the MET Board. 
Mr. Collins said yes. 
MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, June 21, 1988, at 6. 
281. Meeting, July 19, 1988, supra note 114 (emphasis in original). 
282. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1407(2) (West 1988). 
283. MET. Board Minutes, supra note 72, Oct. 20, 1987, at 6. 
284. MET Board Minutes, supra note 72, May 13, 1988, at 3. 
285. Michigan Education Trust Resolution 1988-5. 
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Notice the structure of the situation. In deciding how aggressive 
to be about the tax assumption, MET's Board of Directors had to de-
cide whether to take a risk. They ultimately chose to take quite a big 
risk. Their assumptions created a high probability that MET would 
become insolvent, unable to fulfill its contractual obligations. 
There were immediate benefits for some of those who chose to take 
the risk - certainly for Secretary Bowman. He had taken a strong 
public stand in support of the position that MET's price would be low. 
A risky tax assumption made the low price possible. Moreover, the 
low price meant that more families would participate in the program, 
increasing its political value to the Governor. And the bigger the pro-
gram, the greater the personal satisfaction Board members could feel 
for having gotten it off the ground. 
Yet these benefits were not matched by offsetting costs. None of 
the actors most directly involved in the decision to take the risk were 
personally accountable for the consequences of any mistake they 
Iajght make. The law _firm that advised the Board was never called 
upon for an opinion letter. The actuaries warranted only that their 
forecasts were reasonable, given the Board's tax and investment as-
sumptions. The Board members were personally immune. Even polit-
ical accountability was restricted, because the IRS is not expected to 
complete an audit of a MET tax return in which the tax assumptions 
are raised until after the terms of the 1988 Directors expire - indeed, 
not until after the next gubernatorial election. 286 
I am not suggesting that MET's Dir_ectors should be punished fi-
nancially if they are ultimately shown to have taken a bad risk. There 
are good reasons not to use the risk of economic liability as the mecha-
nism for counteracting temptations for social irresponsibility in the 
public sector. The more sensible practice is to rely on noneconomic 
political and cultural incentives to instill in public servants a sense of 
personal responsibility for their actions. 
In MET's case, the existing noneconomic incentives simply proved 
inadequate to the task. The Board resolutely pursued a high-risk 
strategy. That outcome was not fore-ordained by MET's structure, 
which treats the problem of price setting as a technical question appro-
286. The Internal Revenue Manual establishes a 27-month cycle for disposing of examina-
tions of corporation income tax returns, beginning on the later of the return's due date or the 
date the return is filed. [1 Audit] Internal Rev. Man. (CCH) § 4212.1(1) (Nov. 2, 1981); see also 
An Interview with IRS Commissioner Gibbs, 33 TAX NOTES, 439, 441 (1986). MET did not 
collect money from contract purchasers until late 1988. Since it adopted a fiscal year accounting 
period, it did not need to file a return until late 1989 raising the questions of how to handle either 
MET's receipt of payments from parents or its payment of benefits to children or colleges. 
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priate for delegation to an administrative panel. But that structure 
surely facilitated risk taking. 
CONCLUSION 
Public programs must travel a long path from design to full imple-
mentation. A legislator who designs a program can have a radically 
different understanding of that program from that of the manager who 
runs it from day to day. And an outsider who attempts to evaluate the 
behavior of the legislator and the manager is likely to have yet a third 
perspective. 
The most important lessons to be learned from the Michigan Edu-
cation Trust have to do with the problem of social irresponsibility. 
First, that problem offers insight into the reasons why one might de-
sign a program such as MET. If one's concern is simply with the cost 
of higher education, MET is difficult to defend, since its benefits are, 
by design, concentrated on upper-income families. However, if one's 
primary concern is with reinforcing parents' sense of obligation for 
their children's educations, the design makes somewhat more sense. 
Second, the problem of social irresponsibility offers insight into the 
pitfalls such programs face in implementation. Michigan's legislature 
did not set a price for MET contracts. The only guidance it gave was 
that the Trust should be run in a manner "reasonably designed to be 
actuarially sound." It treated the question of price setting as little 
more than a mechanical act, one that could be delegated to an in-
dependent board of nine people "with knowledge, skill, and experience 
in the academic, business, or financial field. "287 
But in any public program that commits future taxpayers to satisfy 
current promises, it is far from a mechanical act to set the price for 
which those promises are sold. Actuarial assumptions about the fu-
ture are judgments. Sometimes, as with MET's tuition inflation as-
sumption, they are sufficiently important to become pronouncements 
of policy. It is essential that such judgments be made with care. 
The more heavily politicized the program, the more difficult it be-
comes to conceive of such actuarial assumptions as questions of pro-
fessional expertise. If the person who makes the actuarial judgment is 
a political actor, the temptation to be optimistic (and thereby obtain a 
low price) is powerful; political actors like programs to be big and 
purchasers to be happy. In MET's case, the fact that the Chairman of 
the Board was a visible and ambitious political actor may well have 
heightened the pressure to keep the price low. 
287. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 390.1433, .1430 (West 1988). 
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Even an individual or group that is not politically active may feel 
pressure from political actors to be optimistic. Sometimes, other 
structures may be used to neutralize such pressure. In MET's case, 
for example, the Board could have more effectively assigned responsi-
bility for making a judgment about the tax assumption to its outside 
legal counsel. If it had demanded a formal opinion of counsel from its 
law firm, the firm's desire to please its client would have been balanced 
against the firm's desire to protect its own professional reputation. If 
the firm had been asked for an opinion letter, it would have had to give 
an opinion knowing that the risk of error could not be shifted to some-
one else. 
The Michigan legislature failed to anticipate the problems of im-
plementation that MET would face. If the designers of other public 
programs are to be more successful, they must learn to be wary when 
creating programs whose costs will not be borne for many years. They 
must understand the way such programs can facilitate a divergence 
between private and public interests. They must fashion administra-
tive structures that can resist the inevitable temptation of socially irre-
sponsible implementation. 288 
288. In the wake of the savings and loan debacle, the United States Treasury Department 
recently proposed one possible structure - the use of independent credit-rating concerns to im-
pose another form of oversight on the Federal National Mortgage Association and six other 
government-sponsored enterprises. Treasury Asks Congress to Require Firm Backed by U.S. to 
Have a Triple A Rating, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1990, at A2. 
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APPENDIX 
This Appendix discusses the variety of data sources that may be 
brought to bear on the question of how much MET participation was 
skewed toward high-income groups. It organizes the data sources ac-
cording to the variety of "reference groups" that might be thought 
appropriate for policy purposes. 
1. MET Families and Michigan Families 
In March 1989, MET issued a news release which gives the per-
centage of MET families (presumably the families of the beneficiaries 
rather than the purchasers) whose Adjusted Gross Incomes (presuma-
bly for the 1987 tax year) fell into each of five brackets.289 The news 
release offered similar figures for "all Michigan families" :290 
Adjusted Gross Income 
over $80,000 
60- 80,000 
40- 60,000 
20- 40,000 
under 20,000 
TABLE4 
% of"MET 
families in" 
this AGI range 
19% 
20% 
26% 
18% 
17% 
% of "Michigan 
families" in 
this AGI range 
9% 
11% 
29% 
33% 
19% 
289. Michigan Department of Treasury, MET Income Statistics Released, Mar. 1, 1989 
[hereinafter MET Income Statistics]. 
Unfortunately, I was unable to obtain from MET either the individualized income figures 
from which these figures were calculated or a careful explanation of what exactly the figures 
reflected. I do not know whether the "MET families" are grouped by the AGI of the contract 
purc~aser or by the AGI of the family of the contract beneficiary. I do not know whether a 
single family that purchased MET contracts for two children is counted as one "MET family" or 
two. 
It does appear that the percentages shown are percentages of MET contracts sold under any 
of the three plans offered - the full-benefits option, a less expensive "limited-benefits option" for 
families that expect their children to attend less expensive schools, and an even less expensive 
"community-college option." Ninety-six percent of the contracts were for full benefits, slightly 
over 3% were for community college tuition, and less than I% were for limited benefits. 1989 
ACTUARY'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 9. If lower-income families are more likely to have 
bought the community-college and limited-benefits plans, the distribution of full-benefit plans 
would have fewer lower-income families than the table shown in the text. 
Similarly, the percentages shown are percentages of MET contracts, regardless of whether 
the contracts were for one year of college, two years, three years, or four years. Approximately 
79% of the full-benefits contracts covered three or four years, approximately 21 % covered one or 
two. Id. at 10. If one assumes that lower-income families are more likely to have bought fewer 
years than higher-income families, the distribution of "full-benefit plan years" would have fewer 
lower-income families than the table shown in the text. 
290. MET Income Statistics, supra note 289. As was the case for "MET families," I do not 
know precisely how a "Michigan family" was defined. (It is obvious from the figures that fami-
lies too poor to file state tax returns were not treated as "Michigan families.") Nor do I know 
whether the AGI figures reflect 1986 dollars, 1987 dollars, or 1988 dollars (I assume 1987 
dollars). 
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The numbers in this table suggest in a rough sense that MET drew 
( 
disproportionately from the higher end of the income distribution -
39% from the top 20%, 65% from the top 50%.291 
Moreover, these figures understate the extent to which MET's ben-
efits are skewed. Census Bureau data292 suggest that in general 
"Michigan families" are not as well as off as MET's news release indi-
cates, perhaps because MET's news release did not consider families 
too poor to file income taxes. A comparison with Census Bureau data 
would yield the following table: 
TABLE 5 
"MET Families" "Michigan Families" 
Adjusted Gross Income (MET figures) (Census Bureau data)293 
over $60,000 39% 14% 
40 - 60,000 26% 22% 
20 - 40,000 18% 35% 
under 20,000 17% 29% 
The following graph shows the comparison between MET families and 
the two versions of the "Michigan families" data: 
291. But cj MET Income Statistics, supra note 289 (an official MET news release quotes 
Secretary Bowman as saying, "The numbers show that middle income Michigan residents were 
the largest group to take advantage of MET, which was exactly what we expected .... I am 
encouraged by the large number of lower income families who feel that their children's college 
education is a priority and thus signed up for MET."). 
292. Each year, the Census Bureau publishes estimates of the distribution of "total money 
income" among families. "Total money income" measures a range of items slightly different 
"from ''.personal income," which is in tum slightly different from that measured by Adjusted 
Gross Income. For example, AGI includes employee social insurance taxes that the employee 
never actually receives, capital gains, and certain pension income but personal income does not. 
Likewise, personal income includes all government cash transfer payments whereas AGI in-
cludes only some of them. See Park & Reeb, Personal Income and Adjusted Gross Income, 1984-
1986, SOI BULL., Winter 1988-1989, at 71. Total money income is the sum of all money wages 
and salaries, net income from self-employment, and income other than earnings (including social 
insurance and welfare payments), before deductions for taxes, social insurance, union dues, and 
the like. See 1987 MONEY INCOME, supra note 32, at 172-74. 
The Census Bureau's estimates are broken down by region. Michigan's region also includes 
Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and Wisconsin. These regional estimates count numbers offamilies (with 
or without children) rather than numbers of children in families. Overall, there is not a substan-
tial difference between the distribution of incomes of families and the distribution of children-in-
families. Compare 1987 MONEY INCOME, supra note 32, Table 21, col. 3, at 83 (families) with id. 
at col. 4 (children). 
293. Calculated from 1987 MONEY INCOME, supra note 32, Table 16, at 57. 
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2. MET Kids and Michigan Kids 
For many purposes, the comparison between "families" is not pre-
cisely what one is interested in. "Families" includes people without 
children as well as people with children. Thus, if one thinks of MET 
as a program to help the children of the state, and if one's concern is 
whether the program is reaching a representative sample of those chil-
dren, one would like an answer to the question, "What percentage of 
all children who live in Michigan reside in families that have incomes 
in each of.the brackets set forth in the MET news release and shown 
above?" 
I drew on Internal Revenue Service data to obtain a rough answer 
to that question:294 · 
294. The Internal Revenue Service has a microdata sample file of tax returns, coded with the 
taxpayer's state of residence, for all returns having an AGI under $200,000. The file indicates 
the number of exemptions claimed on the returns for children living at home. The same file has a 
sample of returns over $200,000, with the state of residence suppressed. I was able to use the 
1985 version of this microdata file thanks to the Center on Tax Policy Research at the University 
of Michigan. I am grateful to Laura Kalambokidis for programming assistance in retrieving the 
data. 
In order to have comparable figures, it was necessary to take the income figures for 1985 and 
inflate them to 1987 values. Rather than simply multiplying by the change in the overall median 
family income during that period, I attempted to reflect the fact that between 1985 and 1987 high 
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Adjusted Gross Income 
over $60,000 
40- 60,000 
20- 40,000 
under 20,000 
Social Irresponsibility 
TABLE 6 
"MET Families" 
39% 
26% 
18% 
17% 
1137 
"Michigan Kids" 
(IRS data) 
13% 
27% 
37% 
22% 
Once again, the data are not adequate to provide a perfect answer . 
. Like the figures in the MET news release, this table overstates the 
well-being of "Michigan Kids" generally by ignoring children in fami-
lies too poor to file tak returns. Even so, the picture remains one of a 
incomes grew faster than low incomes. Using figures calculated from Census Bureau data, I 
applied differential inflation rates to each income quintile. See 1987 MONEY INCOME, supra ·note 
32, Table 12, at 42. 
I assigned Michigan a share of the over-$200,000 returns reflecting Michigan's share of U.S. 
households in 1985. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF CoMMERCE, STATE POPULA-
TION AND HOUSEHOLD EsrIMATES, WITH AGE, SEX, AND CoMPONENTS OF CHANGE: 1981-
87, at 83 (Current Population Reports, Series P-25, No. 1024, 1988).[hereinafter POPULATION 
AND HOUSEHOLD EsrlMATES]. That provided me with a total of about 2.7 million children 
claimed as exemptions. These figures count dependent children regardless of age, and they ex-
clude children in families too poor to file tax returns; thus, they tend to overstate the well-being 
of the 2.5 million children under 18. 
For a general discussion of weaknesses in the Statistics of Income data, see Bristol, Tax 
Modeling and the Policy Environment of the 1990's, SOI BULL., Fall 1988, at 115. 
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program whose benefits are skewed heavily toward economically more 
privileged children: 
FIGURE 10 
Income Distribution of MET Contracts 
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Unfortunately, the figures provided in the MET news release are 
grouped in a way that allows only a limited set of comparisons to be 
made. For example, suppose one were to ask the question, "If one 
took all the children in the state and ranked them according to their 
family's incomes, what share of the MET contracts would be held by 
the richest 20% of children?" If one used the table above, one could 
answer "Between 39% of the contracts and 65% of the contracts," but 
not much more. 
It is possible, however, to approach that question by another path. 
MET has released the distribution of all MET participants by zip 
code.295 Accordingly, it is possible to take all the children in the state 
and rank them according to the median family incomes of their zip 
codes rather than according to the actual incomes of their families.296 
Ranking the children in this fashion, one can obtain a fairly precise 
295. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, ACTUARIAL TOTAL CONTRACTS DY 
COUNTY, ZIP CODE, (1989). The table does distinguish among the alternative options, but not 
among the number of years purchased. In the ensuing analysis, I use the data regarding "full-
benefits" contracts. 
296. Summary Tape 3B from the Census Bureau provides the 1979 median family income for 
April 1990] Social Irresponsibility 1139 
picture of the distribution of MET contracts.297 If one groups the chil-
dren in "quintiles" (fifths of the population) according to their zip 
code's incomes, one gets the following picture: 
Quintile 
Richest 
2nd 
3rd 
4th 
Poorest 
.TABLE? 
Share of MET Contracts 
50% 
22% 
13% 
11% 
4% 
Like all of the tables presented in this Appendix, this one understates 
the extent of inequality in the distribution. In a table built on informa-
tion about the zip code, all inequality below the level of the zip code is 
ignored.298 Nonetheless, to the extent other information based on zip 
codes is available, it permits a careful relative comparison of the distri-
bution of MET participants to that of other groups. In the remaining 
two sections of this Appendix, I shall compare these zip-code-based 
quintile shares of MET Contracts with zip-code-based quintile shares 
of (a) total income in the state and (b) public college freshmen. 
3. MET Contracts and Michigan Income 
Some might attempt to defend the sort of skewing seen in the pre-
vious section by saying that it merely reflects the skewing of income 
that already exists in society. They might argue that, as long as the 
state's programs are no more skewed toward the most fortunate than 
the allocation of goods produced by the private economy, the pro-
grams should not be criticized. 
I must confess that, in principle, I find this argument to be only a 
partial defense. As I explain in the body of the article, governments 
do not have unlimited resources available for public programs. Imple-
menting one crowds out others. Accordingly, if a public program dis-
tributes private benefits with a pattern of inequality that is no better 
each zip code, the total family income for each zip code, and counts of families and of children 
under age 18 for each zip code. 
297. I am grateful to Marcea Metzler for doing a substantial portion of this work for me. 
Many zip code boundaries changed between 1980 and 1988. Working with a variety of U.S. 
Postal Service sources, she was able to connect 1980 zip codes to the new 1988 zip codes. Where 
an old zip code had divided, or where two had become three, she apportioned the under-18 
population and assigned putative median family incomes in a logical reflection of the number of 
MET contracts sold from each new zip code. 
298. Zip codes are relatively large; there are slightly more than 1000 zip codes in Michigan, 
but roughly 2.5 million children. POPULATION AND HOUSEHOLD EsTIMATES, supra note 294, 
Table 6, at 51. 
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than the pattern generated by the private sector, one ought to insist 
that such a program produce substantial public benefits. 
Even if one is willing to conclude that public programs have noth-
ing to apologize for as long as they replicate the inequalities generated 
by the private sector, however, MET does not meet even that low 
threshold of equitY. Using the zip-code aggregation system described 
in the previous section, I examined the degree of concentration of 
Michigan's total family income. I assigned the total family income of 
each zip code to the children residing in that zip code. Ranking the 
children as before and grouping them again by "quintiles," I devel-
oped the following picture: 
TABLE 8 
Share of 
Quintile Share of MET Contracts Family Income 
Richest 50% 28% 
2nd 22% 23% 
3rd 13% 19% 
4th 11% 17% 
Poorest 4% 13% 
The MET contracts are obviously concentrated far more in the 
hands of children living in high-income zip codes than family income. 
One can reduce this picture of concentration to a single number by 
calculating an index analogous to a "Gini Coefficient" or "Suits In-
dex." Such an index would assign a score of zero to a perfectly equal 
distribution and a score of one to a perfectly unequal (i.e., completely 
concentrated) .distribution.299 Using such a method, the MET con-
299. See generally CHANGING DISTRIBUTION, supra note 38, at 75-78. 
To calculate such an index, one begins by preparing a concentration curve, analogous to the 
Lorenz curve of income concentration. The curve graphs the cumulative percentage of MET 
contracts (or whatever other variable one is interested in) on the vertical axis against the cumula-
tive percentage of the population on the horizontal axis. If the MET contracts were distributed 
with perfect uniformity through the population, the curve would be a diagonal line going upward 
to the right at a 45-degree angle. If the contracts were distributed with perfect non-uniformity 
- all owned by the single richest person in the population - the curve would lie flat along the 
horizontal axis until it reached the top 1 %, and then it would go almost vertically up to join the 
diagonal. The closer the curve is to the diagonal, the more equally distributed are the contracts. 
The farther away it is from the diagonal, the more unequal the distribution. 
To calculate a numerical index of concentration based on these curves, one divides (i) the area 
between the diagonal line of perfect uniformity and the actual curve by (ii) the area between the 
diagonal line of perfect uniformity and the extreme curve of perfect non-uniformity (i.e., the 
entire triangle below the diagonal line). A highly uniform distribution would have a concentra-
tion index close to zero; the more concentrated the distribution the closer the concentration 
index approaches to 1. 
See H. MENDERSHAUSEN, CHANGES IN INCOME DISTRIBUTION DURING THE GREAT DE-
PRESSION 162-67 (1946); see also Current Population Reports, Consumer Income Series P-60, 
No. 123. 
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tracts are highly concentrated, with an index of 0.441, whereas family 
income shows a concentration of only 0.161.300 
4. MET Contracts and Michigan Public College Freshmen 
The last interesting reference group for comparison to MET par-
ticipants is the group of freshmen who entered Michigan public col-
leges in 1988. As I noted at the outset of this article, some have 
sought to justify MET by contending that public colleges are becom-
ing less affordable and that college students deserve help in paying for 
their educations. 301 If that were one's premise, one might be willing to 
accept some inequality in the distribution of MET contracts, provided 
it matched an inequality in the distribution of college students. 302 
Using the now-familiar method of zip-code bunching, one obtains 
the following results: 
TABLE9 
Share of 
Quintile Share of MET Contracts 1988 Freshmen 
Richest 50% 33% 
2nd 22% 21% 
3rd 13% 17% 
4th 11% 16% 
Poorest 4% 13% 
The relative concentration indices are 0.441 for MET Contracts and 
0.191 for freshmen. 
5. Summary 
No matter which set of figures one uses, it remains obvious that 
MET beneficiaries are not representative of the typical Michigan child. 
MET participants are far more heavily concentrated in the wealthier 
reaches of the population than in any of the plausible reference groups. 
300. The calculation of such an index also gives an opportunity to note the extent to which 
grouping by zip code can mask inequality. According to calculations from a Current Population 
Survey computer tape by Jon Haveman and Sheldon Danziger, the Gini Coefficient for family 
incomes in Michigan for the 1984-1986 period was 0.379, far more unequal than the 0.161 figure 
in the text would suggest. If the zip-code groupings are masking a comparable degree of inequal-
ity in the distribution of MET contracts, the economically best-off fifth of Michigan children is 
holding substantially more than half of the contracts. 
301. See supra section I.B. 
302. Doing so would, of course, ignore the extent to which financial constraints might al-
ready be deterring students from attending college. It would thus hold MET to an exceptionally 
lenient standard. 
